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Chapter 1
Introduction
"I think that the Internet is going to be one of the major forces for reducing
the role of government. The one thing that’s missing, but that will soon be
developed, is a reliable e-cash - a method whereby on the Internet you can
transfer funds from A to B without A knowing B or B knowing A."
Milton Friedman, 1999
1.1 Motivation
Nine years after Friedman’s statement above, Nakamoto (2008) introduced a peer-to-peer
electronic cash system called Bitcoin. Bitcoin implements the vision of Milton Friedman
(Berthoud, 1999; Sixt, 2017) and offers fully decentralized, pseudonymous online pay-
ments that allow users to transfer funds digitally without relying on financial institutions
(Nakamoto, 2008). In recent years, the popularity of Bitcoin as an investment opportunity
has grown substantially (Glaser et al., 2014; Cheah and Fry, 2015; Dyhrberg, 2016b) and
Nakamoto (2008)’s idea has inspired numerous new cryptocurrencies (Bariviera et al.,
2017). The underlying blockchain or Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) combines a
distributed and immutable append-only database, a decentralized consensus mechanism,
and crypographic elements to create a reliable, transparent, and complete record of past
transactions (Notheisen et al., 2017). Despite its novelty, Nakamoto’s approach to create
unforgeable digital messages (Lamport et al., 1982) resembles the features of previous
attempts: It enables transactions without identification (Chaum, 1985) and centralized
governance (Shermin, 2017), while digital time-stamping (Haber and Stornetta, 1991)
and cryptographic puzzles (Borisov, 2006) prevent double spending.
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
Smart contracts (Szabo, 1997) extend the functional scope of blockchain and DLT systems
beyond cryptocurrencies and support the development of fully decentralized applications
and organizations (Peters et al., 2015; Cong and He, 2018).
Today, the blockchain and DLT concept has crossed the peak of the hype cycle (Gart-
ner, 2016, 2018) and presents a new way to conduct, record, and manage transactions
without the need to trust in central authorities or intermediaries (Greiner and Hui, 2015;
Fröwis and Böhme, 2017). With respect to markets, decentralized applications and orga-
nizations promise to redistribute governance to their stakeholders (Yermack, 2017; Beck
et al., 2018). From a practical perspective, these features allow market engineers to create
distributed system architectures and implement decentralized platforms that replace cen-
tralized control with consensually imposed, self-enforcing rules (Beck et al., 2016; Glaser
et al., 2019). Practically, blockchain and DLT enables an automated transaction of digi-
tal and physical assets, while keeping a valid and transparent record of past interactions
(Notheisen et al., 2017). Moreover, fully decentralized market mechanisms unify match-
ing, clearing, and settlement of transactions in a joint step, while changes of ownership
can be tracked and audited via the blockchain’s log (Notheisen et al., 2017). In combi-
nation, these building blocks can form the backbone of decentralized markets and reduce
the power of intermediaries that operate, govern, and supervise market platforms (Catal-
ini and Gans, 2016; Risius and Spohrer, 2017; Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017; Tapscott and
Tapscott, 2017).
Driven by this disruptive potential, the prospect of cost savings, and the pursuit of ef-
ficiency gains, start-ups, established organizations, and market authorities intensify their
blockchain activities (e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank and Deutsche Börse, 2016). They join
forces, increase their investments in external knowledge acquisition (Pawczuk et al., 2018),
and promote internal research and development efforts (Lannquist, 2018) to conquer the
’trust machine’ (Economist, 2015). The global industry survey of Pawczuk et al. (2018)
for instance, covers more than 1, 000 senior executives and indicates that 95% of the sur-
veyed companies will invest in blockchain technology in 2019, while 65% will invest more
than 1 million USD. In addition, global venture capital funding exceeded 1, 500 million
USD in the mid of 2016 (Friedlmaier et al., 2018, p. 3523). These initiatives result in
a rapidly growing and increasingly convoluted market for blockchain and DLT solutions
and the exploration of numerous use cases in the context of markets (Friedlmaier et al.,
2018). Potential applications include the tokenization (i.e., digitization) of assets (Oliveira
et al., 2018), notary services (Wörner et al., 2016), identity and digital rights management
systems (Fujimura et al., 2015), and registry systems (Fairfield, 2015), amongst others.
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The most actively explored fields include the finance (Guo and Liang, 2016), automotive
(Bauer et al., 2019), energy (Mengelkamp et al., 2017), and logistics industry (Imeri et al.,
2019) amongst others (Pawczuk et al., 2018). Especially in financial markets, there is a
growing number of decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that promise their customers to trade
in a fair, transparent, and fully decentralized environment (table A.4; Daian et al., 2019).
However, blockchain and DLT is still an emergent technology and its novelty and com-
plexity constitute a challenge for both researchers and practitioners (Glaser and Bezzen-
berger, 2015). As a result, few success stories, such as Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies,
corresponding exchange and investment services, and Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) pioneer
financial markets (Peters et al., 2015; Pawczuk et al., 2018). On the other hand, engi-
neering decentralized markets is a challenging task that goes beyond offering blockchain-
related but still centralized services. As an infrastructure technology, the blockchain lies at
the core of market platform and shapes its characteristics, ensures its proper functioning,
and influences behavioral patterns on and beyond the market. In consequence, it is crucial
to understand both, the technical versatility and limitations of blockchain- and DLT-based
market platforms as well as the economic consequences of adoption, to leverage the tech-
nology’s potential and identify and mitigate adverse side effects. This includes developing
a structured approach to engineer decentralized markets, studying the technological de-
sign of market platforms, and exploring the resulting economic effects from an individual
and market perspective.
In research and practice, the terms blockchain and DLT are often used interchangeably.
Formally, DLT "extends the notion of a blockchain to a system type that comprises systems
under [the] centralized control [...] of a single organization or a small group of organiza-
tions" (Glaser et al., 2019, p. 122). Thus, the mechanisms applied to validate transactions
and to retain data consistency might differ from fully decentralized systems. "Besides, the
term blockchain is often used [...] to refer to the underlying data structure, [to] a specific
type of database system, or [to] the network as a whole including users and smart con-
tracts. In contrast, DLT is neutral regarding technical peculiarities and always refers to the
distributed system that tracks changes to data and ensures its consistency through a con-
sensus mechanism among a group of users with potentially conflicting interests" (Glaser
et al., 2019, p. 123). In this thesis and in line with the idea of Nakamoto (2008) and semi-
nal paper of Buterin (2013), the term blockchain refers to a publicly accessible peer-to-peer
network and comprises a distributed database, a decentralized consensus mechanism to
facilitate data consistency, and smart contracts to implement decentralized applications.
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1.2 Research Outline
In the spirit of market engineering (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007), this thesis aims to
shed light on the blockchain’s capability to implement and operate decentralized market
platforms. It includes the design of a market platform’s technological foundation and its
functional scope as well as the assessment of the resulting economic characteristics that
shape behavioral patterns and market outcomes. Consequently, it is important to under-
stand the relationship between central blockchain features - such as the immutability of
transactions, the public availability of historic information, or its discrete nature - and
technological and economic platform characteristics in order to exploit the technology’s
full potential. To take the interdisciplinary nature of this endeavor into account, this the-
sis integrates conceptual, technological, and economic considerations and rests on a hi-
erarchical three-level approach. Table 1.1 illustrates these three levels, summarizes their
focus, and highlights the corresponding research questions.
Level Focus Research Questions
1 Conceptual framework 1, 2
2 Technological design 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
3 Economics analyses 8, 9, 10
TABLE 1.1: Levels and focus of this thesis.
First, on the conceptual level, blockchain literature is dispersed across disciplines, while
studies that integrate technological and economic aspects in the context of markets re-
main scarce (Notheisen et al., 2017). As a result, the lack of a holistic view impedes the
utilization of blockchain technology as a facilitator of decentralized markets. To address
this issue, the first research question of this thesis builds on Weinhardt and Gimpel’s in-
terdisciplinary market engineering framework to structure the technological elements of
blockchain-based platforms within the context of markets.
Research Question 1. Which pivotal elements and layers define blockchain-based market
platforms?
Besides the platforms’ elements, trust plays a central role in the blockchain realm, as
the ’trust machine’ (Economist, 2015) claims to replace trust with technological system
properties (Beck et al., 2017).
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In contrast, Information Systems (IS) research illustrates trust as a multi-faceted and in-
terlaced construct that includes users’ trust in peers, the platform, and the product (Hawl-
itschek et al., 2018; Hawlitschek, 2019). The second research question focuses on this
tensions and discusses how the behavioral conceptualization of trust in the sharing econ-
omy aligns with the blockchain’s technological approach.
Research Question 2. To which extent can the blockchain implement the multi-faceted na-
ture of trust prevalent on the peer-to-peer platforms of today’s sharing economy?
The resulting blockchain engineering framework is based on a structured review of
blockchain literature in IS and adjacent fields, illustrates the limits of trust-free systems,
and offers a structured approach to guide the creation, communication, and evaluation of
decentralized markets.
Second, the technology level utilizes the conceptualization of the characteristics, com-
ponents, and limitations of blockchain-based platforms and applies the blockchain engi-
neering framework to the use case of decentralized markets. More specifically, it illustrates
and evaluates the design, architecture, and features of decentralized markets by means of
two proof-of-concept prototypes.
The first prototype implements a transparent transaction system that enables the au-
tomated and fully decentralized transaction of real-world assets, such as cars or stocks.
It utilizes blockchain technology to provide a valid, transparent, and immutable (i.e., ir-
reversible) record of historic transactions to its users. In combination with peer-based
consensus process, these features facilitate trust in the correctness of the transactional
record and impede unauthorized transactions and the dissemination of corrupted infor-
mation. However, the irreversibility and delayed finality of blockchain-based transactions
increases transaction risk (Böhme et al., 2015). Especially in case of errors or deceptive
counterparties (Böhme et al., 2015) this remains an unsolved issue and leads to the third
research question.
Research Question 3. How can market engineers decrease the risk resulting from the irre-
versibility of blockchain transactions, while still providing a valid transaction log?
In addition, the life cycle of complex physical assets, such as cars, often involves mul-
tiple stakeholders and comprises a variety of process steps. Integrating these steps in a
blockchain-based system may be infeasible, boost complexity and cost, and inhibit perfor-
mance. To shed light on its feasibility, the fourth research question evaluates the block-
chain’s ability to implement and operate a transaction system for cars.
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Research Question 4. To which extent can a blockchain-based transaction system store and
represent the life-cycle of a car?
Aside from disintermediation, the blockchain provides a comprehensive registry, while
its transparent nature disseminates private information among its users. The fifth research
question transfers these characteristics to the economic context of markets with asymmet-
rically distributed information and asks how it helps uninformed buyers to approximate a
car’s actual value.
Research Question 5. Which characteristics of blockchain-based transaction systems affect
information asymmetries, and thus the uncertainty about quality in the market for lemons?
In total, this first proof-of-concept prototype demonstrates the potential and highlights
the limitations of decentralized transaction systems. It introduces a mechanism to reduce
transaction risk, aims to replace bureaucratic, trust-based registry systems, and utilizes the
blockchain to dismantle information asymmetries.
The second prototype narrows the focus to a crucial prerequisite for each transaction -
a mechanism to connect demand and supply. However, transferring the continuous design
of today’s financial market platforms to the blockchain’s discrete world is a challenging
task (Clark et al., 2014). At the same time, academic approaches remain scarce and lack
either a holistic perspective or technical details. Similarly, DEXs refrain from disclosing
their specifications to protect business interests. The following research question aims
to address these issues by illustrating the software architecture of a blockchain-based,
decentralized market mechanism.
Research Question 6. How can smart contracts implement a decentralized market mecha-
nism that incorporates a double auction, keeps distributed order books, and allows traders to
submit limit and market orders?
Independent of the market mechanism, the motivation to trade stocks on a blockchain
is simple: The technology promises to streamline the value chain of securities trading by
providing a self-sufficient, intermediary-free, and transparent system with a high transac-
tion speed and low transaction costs (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016; Daian et al., 2019).
Again, implementing all stages may be infeasible, inefficient, or costly. In consequence,
the seventh research question aims to explore the blockchain’s capability to implement and
operate the value chain of securities trading.
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Research Question 7. To which extent can a blockchain-based market platform operate the
value chain of securities trading and which technology features limit performance?
Overall, the second prototype demonstrates the feasibility and illustrates the design of
decentralized market mechanisms by implementing a fully decentralized matching engine
as well as distributed order book structures. From a business perspective, it challenges the
role of traditional market institutions by enabling users to raise equity and trade stocks
intermediary-free.
In combination, both prototypes form the backbone of decentralized markets: The
transparent transaction system utilizes fiduciary transaction safeguards to reduce trans-
action risk. At the same time, the blockchain’s transparent, reliable, and complete log
supplies interacting parties with information. In between, the intermediary-free market
mechanism connects demand and supply, while clearing and settlement become an in-
tegral part of the trading process. On the other side, the prototypes highlight the tech-
nological limitations of decentralized markets and point towards the blockchain’s public
transparency paradigm and discrete nature as starting points for economic analyses.
The third and last level of this thesis elaborates these starting points up and investi-
gates the economic impact of the identified technology characteristics on market outcomes.
More specifically, it examines how increasing transparency affects behavioral patterns and
evaluates the impact of the discrete, block-based nature of database updates on market
quality.
The first analysis focuses on a cornerstone of the blockchain’s consensus process: The
public disclosure of historic transactions. This non-discriminatory form of transparency
ensures data integrity and facilitates the validity of database updates in the absence of a
central authority. However, in market environments, interacting parties’ strategies often
depend on different levels of information about their counterparties or the transactional
object. As a result, it is crucial to understand whether and how their behavior changes
with the blockchain’s shift towards public transparency. Especially in market environments
with asymmetric information and quality differences increasing transparency may have
ambiguous effects, as it reduces uncertainty on one hand but also enables opportunistic
users to exploit disclosed information on the other. The following two research questions
utilize game theory to explore how behavioral changes affect individuals and how these
effects spill over to the market and economy.
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Research Question 8. Which participants of a market with asymmetric information are
affected by the blockchain’s shift towards public transparency? When and how does their
behavior change?
Research Question 9. How do the behavioral changes of opportunistic market participants
affect their counterparties, market outcomes in total, and the welfare of the economy?
In line with prior research, the findings of the first analysis indicate that the blockchain’s
shared record reduces moral hazard, mitigates adverse selection effects, and provides in-
centives for individual users to behave opportunistically. More specifically, the disclosed
information allows them to learn about quality differences and deceive their counterpar-
ties to increase their utility. Despite a welfare gain, the market may collapse and future
generations are denied access to the market. Practically, these results offer initial guidance
for blockchain adoption in markets with information asymmetries and highlight risks that
arise from competition, the exposure to irrational behavior, and the implementation of
value-adding services within the infrastructure.
Guided by the second prototype, the second analyses furthermore examines the impact
of the blockchain’s discrete nature – namely the size and frequency of database updates
– on a DEX’s market quality. This includes the assessment and quantification of market
quality effects, the identification of quality drivers and trade-offs, as well as the discussion
of practical implications and is summarized in the following research question:
Research Question 10. How do the size and frequency of database updates (i.e., blocks)
impact the activity, liquidity, and price formation on blockchain-based markets?
Based on five years of trading data, the second analysis indicates that increasing the
blocks’ capacity and frequency is mostly beneficial for market activity and liquidity. On
the other side, faster and bigger blocks facilitate volatility, and thus are no silver bullet to
scale decentralized markets.
Finally, the findings of the third and last level illustrate the consequences of concep-
tual and technological decisions and thereby complement the first and second level of
this thesis to form a holistic perspective. In total, the three levels constitute a first step
towards the assessment of decentralized markets by illustrating the conceptual compo-
nents of blockchain-based systems, demonstrating the technological feasibility of market
platforms, and highlighting economic risks and side effects of blockchain adoption.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: To pave the way, Chapter 2 estab-
lishes a fundamental understanding of blockchain technology (Section 2.1) and introduces
market engineering as a toolbox to create, evaluate, and shape market platforms (Sec-
tion 2.2). Adopting the notion of the blockchain as a platform, Chapter 3 leverages a
structured review of interdisciplinary blockchain literature to combine technological and
economic aspects with the market engineering approach and derive the blockchain engi-
neering framework.
After conceptualizing the characteristics, elements, and limitations of blockchain-based
platforms, Chapter 4 applies the blockchain engineering approach to the use case of decen-
tralized markets. More specifically, it introduces and utilizes established Design Science
Research (DSR) and blockchain design frameworks (Section 4.1) to illustrate, implement,
and verify the design, architecture, and features of an intermediary-free transaction system
(Section 4.2) and market mechanism (Section 4.3).
Based on the findings of Section 4.2, Chapter 5 applies game theory to analyze the ef-
fect of the blockchain’s public transparency paradigm on behavioral patterns and market
outcomes. Similarly, Chapter 6 explores the relationship between the discrete nature of
blockchain-based market mechanisms illustrated in Section 4.3 and market quality quan-
titatively.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by summarizing its findings, outlining its con-
tributions, and illustrating the potential for future research.
Appendices A, B, C, and D provide supplementary literature, Gitlab references to the
prototypes and illustrations of other software infrastructures, proofs and calculus to sup-
port Chapter 5, and additional statistics for Chapter 6. Figure 1.1 illustrates the thesis
structure including research questions 1 to 10 accordingly.
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Chapter 2
Foundations
Engineering decentralized markets is a challenging task. It requires market engineers to go
beyond established approaches and utilize peer-to-peer technologies to create platforms
that connect users without depending on central authorities, intermediaries, or platforms.
One technology that bears the potential to fulfill these requirements and to form the back-
bone of decentralized markets is the blockchain technology. However, despite the growing
adoption (Notheisen et al., 2017), the blockchain term and concept remains opaque for
many users. To pave the way for this thesis, Section 2.1 illustrates the basic components of
blockchain-based systems (2.1.1) and discusses their capability to function as a platform
(2.1.2), while Section 2.2 introduces market engineering as a holistic toolbox to create,
evaluate, and shape market platforms.
2.1 Blockchain Basics
"The blockchain was first introduced as a mechanism to prevent double-spending in the
peer-to-peer electronic cash system known as Bitcoin. Based on the underlying idea of
Nakamoto (2008), blockchain protocols provide an immutable record of transactions by
combining a distributed database [with] chronologically ordered and cryptographically
interconnected blocks [...] with a decentralized consensus mechanism and cryptographic
security measures (Glaser, 2017). The interplay of these elements impedes the dissemina-
tion of corrupted information and moderates frictions among potentially conflicting agents
without the need for a central governing institution or authority" (Notheisen et al., 2017,
p. 426).
11
Chapter 2 Foundations
In combination with smart contracts (Szabo, 1997), the technology has emerged from its
origin in cryptocurrencies and heads to a variety of commercial applications (Nofer et al.,
2017).
More specifically, blockchain technology offers a distributed software architecture that
has no single point of failure or requirement for centralized governance (Xu et al., 2016).
As a result, it enables autonomous, transparent, secure, and tamper-free transactional
databases (Glaser, 2017), reduces the complexity of writing contracts (Davidson et al.,
2016), facilitates cost-efficient micro transactions (Beck et al., 2016), and allows [...] novel
organizational forms and business models (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015). From a prac-
tical perspective, this leads to "[...] decentralized market and application platforms, notary
services (Wörner et al., 2016), digital proof of identity and legitimization (Wörner et al.,
2016), digital rights management systems (Fujimura et al., 2015), validated, immutable,
and consistent registries (Fairfield, 2015; Glaser, 2017; Xu et al., 2017), and transaction
systems that track the ownership of (digital) assets (Fairfield, 2015; Beck et al., 2016)"
(Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 426).
Nevertheless, the blockchain is still an emergent technology that faces several limita-
tions: First and foremost, researchers and practitioners still explore the interplay between
technical and economic characteristics of blockchain-based systems, whereas the inter-
disciplinary nature of potential applications requires a rigorous understanding of both
(Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015; Salviotti et al., 2018). "Second, due to the nature as
a transaction-based system, smart contract applications cannot trigger themselves but
rather require some form of external intervention to execute (Glaser, 2017). Third, [...]
blockchain-based systems still face a variety of technical limitations, such as capacity, la-
tency, and query issues (Glaser, 2017; Beck et al., 2016; Wörner et al., 2016). Fourth, there
are some drawbacks associated with the technical structure of blockchain protocols, such
as the threat of 51% attacks (Nakamoto, 2008; Böhme et al., 2015), increased costs related
to the deployed consensus mechanism (Brenig et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2016; O’Dwyer and
Malone, 2014), privacy concerns (Kosba et al., 2016; Böhme et al., 2015), and transaction
risk (Böhme et al., 2015)" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 426).
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2.1.1 The Blockchain Concept
"A blockchain is a distributed, immutable, append-only database without a central author-
ity that orders and validates transactions to keep data consistent across multiple nodes.
In public blockchain systems, every [...] user can operate a node and access core func-
tionalities by simply downloading and running a client software. In [these] systems, the
core functionality is transacting system-inherent tokens" (Glaser et al., 2019, p. 122).
For the Bitcoin platform for instance, this is sending a Bitcoin or a fraction thereof from
one user to another. To achieve these features, the seminal works of Nakamoto (2008)
and Buterin (2013) integrate previous approaches that allow users to transfer assets with-
out identification (Chaum, 1985) and centralized governance (Shermin, 2017), enable
the time-stamping of digital documents (Haber and Stornetta, 1991), prevent Sybil at-
tacks (Borisov, 2006), and "formalize and secure relationships" via smart contracts (Szabo,
1997).
Distributed Database Access
The backbone of a blockchain-based system is borne by a distributed database. In dis-
tributed databases storage and processing units remain separate, while data is stored re-
dundantly at or linked across different (physical) locations. As a result, managing and
maintaining the system’s integrity and state across the network follows two paradigms:
Replication and duplication (Özsu and Valduriez, 2011). Replication is used to determine
data inconsistencies on an ongoing basis and updates the distributed data accordingly.
Duplication creates a physical backup of the database. In addition, a (usually centralized)
database management system keeps track of the indexing, organizes data, and manages
the participating users (Özsu and Valduriez, 2011). In a peer-to-peer setup, data is spread
and replicated across multiple users that have equal rights to access and write data. Conse-
quently, all users of the network have the same privileges, pledge their resources to the net-
work, and thereby render central coordination obsolete. In a blockchain-based system, the
distributed database is managed by a decentralized database management systems known
as decentralized consensus mechanism, comprises a list of transactions called ledger, and
is replicated across all nodes of the peer-to-peer network. As a result, the historic record
enables each user to verify and validate database updates, to audit past transactions, and
to determine the blockchain’s current state (Nakamoto, 2008).
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The Decentralization of Consensus
The core innovation that comes with blockchain technology is the decentralization of the
consensus authority. As a result, agents with different levels of information and poten-
tially conflicting interests can engage in interactions without depending on a central au-
thority. To replace intermediaries, a decentralized consensus mechanism provides a means
to achieve an agreement over the validity and order of transactions within the blockchain
system’s peer-to-peer network. More specifically, consensus mechanisms resolve informa-
tional conflicts (Lamport et al., 1982; Chohan, 2017) by creating a Sybil-resistant voting
system that ensures a parity between voters and votes (Borisov, 2006; Dinger and Harten-
stein, 2006; Xu et al., 2016). To do so, a consensus mechanism creates an artificial barrier
that makes participating in the consensus process - i.e., the proposition of a database up-
date and voting on the correctness of updates - costly (). To compensate the peer-to-peer
network for this effort, most mechanism grant a reward to the first user that proposes a
correct database update. To determine the correctness of the proposed update, the remain-
ing participants of the consensus process check its validity and vote accordingly. Only if a
majority of users agrees with the update, it is added to the database and the proposer is
rewarded (Mingxiao et al., 2017).
The specific features of a consensus mechanism depend on the system’s degree of open-
ness, the characteristics, rationales, and objectives of users, the application environment,
and other blockchain design parameters1. Proof of Work (POW) - the consensus mecha-
nism of the popular Bitcoin and Ethereum platforms - for instance is designed to achieve
a consensual agreement in an open, publicly accessible, and pseudonymous network. By
requiring the network participants to solve a randomized cryptographic puzzle, it can tol-
erate up to 50% of malicious actors (Gervais et al., 2016).
Kroll et al. (2013) and Biais et al. (2018) study Bitcoin’s consensus game and analyze
the underlying equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic users. More specifically, Kroll
et al. (2013) show that complying with the rules of the consensus mechanism is a Nash
equilibrium. This implies that compliance is the best strategy given the strategy choices
of the other users. However, they also show that there is an infinite number of other
equilibria.
1A detailed overview of blockchain design dimensions, choices, and characteristics is available in Sub-
section 4.1.2 of this thesis.
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As a result, a malicious user may be able to destabilize the system by pushing it to one
of those equilibria. Biais et al. (2018) extend this analysis and model POW-based block-
chain protocols as a stochastic game. Consistent with the idea of Nakamoto (2008), they
find that extending the longest chain is a Markov perfect equilibrium. However, in line
with Kroll et al. (2013) they also stress that interacting via a blockchain-based system is
a coordination game, where the presence of multiple equilibria may lead to opportunistic
behavior. Eyal and Sirer (2018) for instance illustrate how rational actors could collude
with an attacker to take over the majority of computing power of the system and thereby
show that Bitcoin’s POW is not incentive compatible. In addition, Nayak et al. (2016) high-
light that a combination of attacks can amplify threats to Bitcoin’s POW consensus process,
while Chiu and Koeppl (2017) estimate the welfare loss created by Bitcoin’s mining and
update scheme.
In consequence, there is a growing number of other consensus mechanisms that aim to
resolve the inefficient and costly nature of POW by changing the way costs are generated
or by restricting system access (Panarello et al., 2018). Saleh (2018) for instance shows in
an extensive form game that Proof of Stake - the most popular alternative to POW - induces
consensus in equilibrium by creating an implicit cost for delaying an agreement on new
transactions. Proof of Stake creates a barrier and randomizes the right to append new data
based on a combination of a user’s stake and age (i.e., system membership). In addition,
there is a variety of other approaches that go beyond computation-based or time-based
proofs and propose permission-based, memory-based, communication-based, and other
concepts (Cachin and Vukolic, 2017; Mingxiao et al., 2017). Table A.2 in appendix A.2
summarizes the characteristics of selected approaches, compares their security, latency,
and transaction volume, and illustrates current applications.
The Role of Cryptography
Cryptographic hash functions are the glue of blockchain-based systems. They enable users
to send and receive transactions, interconnect data blocks to facilitate decentralized time-
stamping, allow the efficient assessment of database updates, and empower consensus
mechanisms. From a technical perspective, they are deterministic one-way functions that
are quick to compute and map input data sets of arbitrary length to an unique output with
a fixed length. This output is also known as hash or hash value. As a result, it is impossible
to guess the input from the output, two different inputs never lead to the same result, and
the same input always leads to the same output (Katz et al., 1997).
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From a user perspective, asymmetric cryptography enables the identification of individ-
uals by public keys and the specification and authorization of transactions by the combi-
nation of public and private keys. More specifically, a user can utilize the recipient’s public
key to specify and one of his or her own private keys to sign and send a transaction. After
signing a transaction, a private key becomes stale, while the mathematical relationship
between a public and the corresponding private key enables the transaction’s recipient
to validate its correctness (Rivest et al., 1978). In consequence, each user has a unique
public and a potentially infinite number of perishable private keys that can be created and
managed by a wallet software.
To conduct a blockchain transaction, a user denominates a transactional object, speci-
fies a recipient via a public key, references past transactions to proof ownership, signs the
transaction with a private key, and broadcasts it to the peer-to-peer network (Antonopou-
los, 2017). Across the network, other users collect, verify, and aggregate broadcasted
transactions and propose the resulting data blocks as database updates to their peers (Eyal,
2015). Whenever a new block is proposed, each user checks its validity before casting a
vote. In addition, the sequential order of database updates - and thus the timely order of
past transactions - is ensured by the cryptographic interconnection of data blocks. Merkle
Trees or hash trees summarize the content of each block to a single hash value. This al-
lows the auditing users to traverse the blockchain’s historic transaction graph efficiently
(Antonopoulos, 2017). If a majority of the users agrees with the proposed update, the pro-
poser appends his or her block to the blockchain, broadcasts the update to the network,
and earns a reward (Nakamoto, 2008). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate this update process
and the blockchain’s resulting data structure, respectively. Moreover, they highlight the
role of of public and private keys.
Besides, crypographic hash functions are an essential building block of the most com-
mon consensus mechanism POW. More specifically, Nakamoto (2008)’s approach follows
the Hashcash algorithm introduced by Back (2002). Hashcash was initially designed to re-
duce e-mail spam and requires the sender to include the solution of a costly cryptographic
and easy to validate puzzle. As a result, it becomes unprofitable to deliver spam mails on
a large scale as there is a small cost attached to each message. In a similar fashion, POW-
based consensus protocols require a user to solve a cryptographic puzzle to gain the right
to propose a database update and vote on others’ updates. This artificially created cost
threshold renders the creation of virtual nodes to skew voting unprofitable and thereby
reduces the risk of Sybil attacks (Yeow et al., 2018).
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Smart Contracts
Smart contracts extend the functional scope of blockchain-based systems and allow the
execution of software logic within their distributed environment. Formally, they are pro-
grams that are written by individual users and broadcasted to the peer-to-peer network.
As a result, they become part of the distributed database and are subsequently available
to all users of the system and already deployed contracts. "Smart contracts are triggered
through a transaction that is sent either by a user or by another smart contract [...]. This
interaction of contracts enables complex systems of interacting services that are imple-
mented in the form of smart contracts. [...] The control over a contract and hence also
[...] the implemented service is defined by the creator of the contract. Control can be left
to its creator, another user in the system, or no specific entity at all. The latter setup, auton-
omy of control, renders the contract an autonomous entity or agent in the system who acts
according to its programmed logic, no matter who interacts with it" (Glaser et al., 2019,
p. 123). From a technical perspective, smart contracts are stored in the blockchain’s dis-
tributed database and their output becomes part of the consensual agreement of database
updates. In consequence, each participating node has to compute a triggered contract’s re-
turn within the consensus process. From an economic perspective, the utilization of smart
contracts also changes the informational environment within markets and organizational
applications. Cong and He (2018) investigate the impact of smart contracts on indus-
trial organization and competition by the means of a dynamic model and find that smart
contracts reduce information asymmetries and improve welfare and consumer surplus by
enhancing market entry and competition. On the other hand, they also highlight that the
disclosure of information within the consensus process facilitates collusive behavior.
In practice, different platforms, such as Ethereum (Ethereum, 2016), Hyperledger Fab-
ric (Androulaki et al., 2018; Cachin, 2016), or Corda (Brown et al., 2016) provide software
libraries that support smart contracts and enable the implementation of various services,
market applications, or generalized functions (Bartoletti and Pompianu, 2017). However,
due to its turing complete nature, easy to access scripting language, and open source char-
acter, this thesis utilizes the Ethereum platform to implement the building blocks of de-
centralized markets in a prototypical fashion in Chapter 4.
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FIGURE 2.1: Transaction process
This figure illustrates the process of a blockchain transaction and highlights the involvement of cryptographic elements at each stage. After the
transaction is specified and signed by the sender, it is broadcasted to the peer-to-peer network. The network’s users collect all new transactions
aggregate them into blocks, check their validity, and propose them as a database updates. Eventually, on block is chosen by the consensus
mechanism, added to the distributed database, and the blockchain’s new state is disseminated through the peer-to-peer network.
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This figure is based on Nakamoto (2008) and illustrates the cryptographic connection of blocks and resulting chain that forms the blockchain’s
distributed database (I). In addition, it highlights how merkle trees summarize transactions within a block (II) and how public and private
keys span the historic transaction graph (III). t denotes the current and t − n with n ∈ {1, . . . , N} the preceding blocks.
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2.1.2 Blockchain as a Platform
This subsection is based on the book chapter "Blockchain as Platform". The chapter is co-
authored by Florian Glaser and Florian Hawlitschek and was published in Business Transfor-
mation with Blockchain - Volume I in November 2018. Direct citations are highlighted by
double quotes.
Publication details:
Glaser, F., Hawlitschek, F. & Notheisen, B.2,
Blockchain as a Platform,
Business Transformation through Blockchain, Volume I, First Edition, Palgrave Macmillan,
November 2018, ISBN 978-3-319-98911-2,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98911-2_4.
Introduction
"Digitalization is a ubiquitous term and refers to the digitization of processes and informa-
tion alongside improvements, innovations, and reinventions that are enabled by increas-
ingly powerful information technology. Today, nearly every industry sector is affected by
digitalization and is facing threats and opportunities through new possibilities. With the
rise of the digitalization, the platform approach has become the dominant strategy for
large companies to operate an extensible, digital medium of exchange for products, infor-
mation, and services. A large share of companies with the highest market capitalization
based their business on platforms (e.g., Apple, Alphabet, Amazon). The earlier evolution-
ary stages of today’s digital platforms were two-sided markets, where two groups of users
exchanged goods and every internet user could take the role of either a buyer or a seller
(e.g., eBay). Over the last decades, it became a common decision to open up a platform to
third-party service developers who could reuse the platform’s core functionality to build
complementary components. This opening up of platforms is referred to as ’permission-
less innovation’ (de Reuver et al., 2017). A digital platform is defined as ’a system that can
be programmed and therefore customized by outside developers users and in that way,
adapted to countless needs and niches that the platforms original developers could not
have possibly contemplated’ (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2018).
2Authors are listed in alphabetical order.
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Given the definition above, we can derive features that distinguish a platform from
a two-sided market: The openness to innovation through third-party developers. That
is, platforms provide Application Programming Interface (API)s which grant developers
access to core functionalities provided by the platform for integration of extended func-
tionality, external services, or platforms. A recently emerging type of digital platforms is
blockchain systems. Although they can be considered platforms according to the discussed
definition, they [...] differ with respect to the provision of their core functionality."
The characteristics and properties outlined in section 2.1.1 "render blockchains a poten-
tial infrastructure for various (novel) business models in today’s digital platform economy,
ranging from [peer-to-peer] sharing and [peer-to-peer] lending, over autonomous asset
registries, to completely crowd-based financing and investing. Although blockchain tech-
nology has been around for nearly a decade (Nakamoto, 2008), few sociotechnical chal-
lenges have been sufficiently researched and few best practices to address key challenges
have been developed. The goal of this [section] is to arrange blockchain technology within
the concept of institutions and explain and discuss two resulting key challenges, namely,
governance and trust, of such decentralized and potentially autonomous service systems,
by drawing upon research on incumbent digital platform models."
Blockchain Systems as Open Digital Platforms
"From an abstract perspective, blockchain systems can be analyzed on two distinct lay-
ers: the fabric layer and the decentralized application layer (dapp or application layer)
according to Glaser (2017) [and Notheisen et al. (2017)]. The fabric layer comprises the
[peer-to-peer] communication, consensus, and database management components. The
application layer includes all services and features implemented in the form of smart con-
tracts and is relying upon the functionalities provided by the fabric layer. Application layer
services can be (re)used by other users in the same blockchain system. A smart contract-
based service, for example, can require services of other smart contracts or might require
token transactions on the underlying level for performing its service.3 Both layers of a
blockchain system are providing core functionalities that are open to be used or extended
by users of the system. Hence, blockchains are open platforms, and therefore research on
and knowledge about digital platforms and blockchain share a common ground.
3The layers of blockchain systems and their respective components are explained and illustrated in Chap-
ter 3 and figures 3.2 and 3.3 in detail.
21
Chapter 2 Foundations
A crucial difference to digital platforms is, however, that blockchains do not provide a
common API to interact with service interfaces, but the possibility to deploy code onto the
platform’s fabric layer which is shared by all users. To set up a smart contract, a user has
to attach code to a transaction and send the transaction into the network. Other nodes
in the system receive the transaction attach it to the blockchain of transactions according
to the consensus mechanism and can thereafter retrieve the code of the contract from the
blockchain database. Thus, once a smart contract is deployed in the blockchain, its code
is available at every node for execution whenever a user calls the contract. Put differently,
the functionality of the entire platform can be extended by any user through deployment
of smart contracts onto the fabric layer. Incumbent digital platforms are usually governed
by larger corporations or organizations that have full control over additional features pro-
vided for the platform. The governing company is in control of the technical APIs of its
platform or in control of the extensions that are available and published for the platform.
For example, Google governs its android platform’s Playstore, and Apple is in control of
iOS’ App Store, while Facebook is in control of its platform’s APIs. In summary, blockchains’
core functionalities are solely developed and operated by a multitude of open-source devel-
opers (that develop the fabric layer) and participants (miners that validate transactions)
in a globally distributed system with extending functionality provided by users (on the
application layer). There does not have to be a single organization or corporation that is
coordinating the development or overseeing the operations of the fabric layer. Although,
in practice, a crowd/privately funded organization is often in charge of coordinating the
selection and implementation of future features of a fabric layer.
While this holds for the fabric layer, smart contracts can be written by any participant
who might be a single user, a nonprofit organization, or a corporation. These proper-
ties render a blockchain system a decentralized, open digital platform that provides a set
of core functionalities for others to build upon, which is, however, changing over time
through contributions of arbitrary other users. This allows blockchain-based platforms to
function as a decentralized institution that enables and implements new forms of gover-
nance mechanisms. However, the distributed nature of such systems also requires a new
form of governance mechanisms as neither the fabric layer nor the application layer has
a central authority that can deliberately impose binding processes. Given the inherently
distributed nature of public blockchain systems, previous approaches might apply to some
degree but are challenged by these new and pervasive sociotechnical interaction mecha-
nisms. The openness of public blockchain systems further implies that smart contract code
can be developed and deployed by any participant.
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Relying upon services provided by publicly available smart contracts requires trust. On the
one hand, the user has to trust in the correctness of the code. This requires the user to trust
the developer of the code and the code that it performs exactly the way the user expects
it to do. The alignment of expectations and reality regarding performed functionality of
code might be possible for simple contracts but becomes nearly impossible for complex
service networks that are composed of a multitude of interacting contracts.
If these trust requirements are fulfilled, the actual execution of the code in its unchanged
version is comparably reliable, that is, trust-free, as the code is deployed into a large dis-
tributed system and once deployed cannot easily be manipulated or changed. This resem-
bles the actual meaning of a stipulated enforcement of a smart contract as by proposed
by Szabo (1997). However, this trust-free property is limited to the consensus regarding
smart contract code execution and data that is generated within the blockchain system
(i.e., trust in system information about token transactions between users). As soon as ex-
ternal data might be required for a smart contract to execute (e.g., sensor data, financial
time series data, or any other data describing the state of the physical world), additional
trust into the externally provided data is needed. These two issues induce two severe
sociotechnical challenges, governance and trust, if blockchains are to become ubiquitous
and utility-bearing parts of our future digital economies and societies. The remainder of
this section discusses these two challenges in [...] sociotechnical and socioeconomic con-
texts."
The Blockchain’s Institutional Characteristics and Governance Implications
"Institutions form the core of any governance mechanism. To create a rudimentary under-
standing of institutions and how they work, this section gives a brief introduction to the
field of institutional economics, builds on this foundation to arrange blockchain technology
within the concept of institutions, and discusses the resulting governance implications."
The role of institutions. "To provide a common starting point, we follow North (1991)
and define institutions as ’[...] humanly devised constraints that structure political, eco-
nomic, and social interaction’ (North, 1991, p. 1). As such, they consist of both formal
and informal rules that take the behavior of individuals into account.
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These behavioral factors comprise the impact of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976),
the consequences of separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the
relevance of property rights associated with interactions (Demsetz, 1967), the social costs
generated by external effects (Coase, 2013), and the impact of transaction and coordina-
tion costs on organizational structures (Williamson, 1979).
(2.1) X → Y, in C .
The purpose of institutions is to structure interactions and organize human behavior by
constraining action spaces, attributing a set of possible reactions to possible actions, and
collectively assigning a function to objects. We can formalize this perception by the saying
X counts as Y in C where X stands for the domain of physical and nonphysical objects that
are allowed by the institution (i.e., the action spaces), while Y is the function assigned
to them. C represents the institutional environment that defines the manifestation of X
and Y and the relationship between them. It restricts the available set of actions in X by
specifying which objects belong to X and assigns a possible set of functions Y to these
objects. These enabling rules are embedded in the transformation function and allow
individuals to act within a specific spectrum. Both restricting and enabling rules are equally
important as they depend on each other. This way, institutions impose consistency on
human activities, which allow interacting parties to ’[...] create stable expectations about
the behavior of others’ (Hodgson, 2006). The resulting order of social [...] interactions
reduces [information and enforcement activities,] as institutions prescribe the behavior of
individuals [...] (Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1979).
As highlighted before, institutions can be formal or informal, and thus do not require
an explicit representation in order to exist and be relevant (Hodgson, 2006). In addition,
they form either directly or indirectly as a result of the combined effort of a society and its
individuals (Tuomela, 1995). Formal institutions are written rules that prescribe specific
behavior and provide a basis to enforce it. In case of violations, they also specify sanctions
that allow a (centralized or decentralized) authority to enforce the previously agreed ar-
rangement. Informal institutions, on the other hand, are usually not available in an explicit
form and manifest on the basis of reciprocity as individuals implicitly agree on them by
behaving accordingly. In addition, enforcement is not specified in advance, and instead
violators are punished by spontaneous feedback of the society (e.g., by exclusion). In-
dependent of their formal or informal nature, institutions can form either spontaneously,
which is when their existence leads to an improvement for a society as a whole (Foss,
1996), or as a result of a conscious design (Smith, 2003).
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FIGURE 2.3: The dimensions of institutions.
In the case of a conscious design, the individual agents that form a society negotiate rules to
govern interactions in their social and economic life in order to reach some superordinate
goal. Figure 2.3 summarizes the dimensions of institutions and illustrates their assorted
characteristics. It is important to note that institutions - irrespective of their level of for-
malization and their origin - are not fixed and are subject to change as societies evolve
over time (Ostrom, 1986):
(2.2) X (t)→ Y (t), in C ,
To ensure that they adapt accordingly, rules have to be renegotiated or adapt implicitly, as
the sociotechnical and economic environment evolves continuously and interacting indi-
viduals change their behavior."
The blochchain as an institution. "Based on the understanding of the role, characteris-
tics, and key components of institutions developed in [the previous paragraph], we apply
this understanding to blockhchain-based platforms.
First, we will take look at the key components, namely restricting and enabling rules,
that span the governing scope and define the fashion of order an institution establishes.
Transferring this concept to blockchain systems, the fabric layer restricts the action spaces
of its users by setting the boundaries of the technical infrastructure, thus constraining the
scope of possible application scenarios.
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[...] The fabric layer specifies the characteristics of a blockchain system and thus deter-
mines its application domain and scope of governance. Building on the fabric layer, the
application layer empowers individuals to shape the way they interact with each other. It
enables users to assign a function the generalized IT artifact defined by the fabric layer
and engage in concrete interactions, by allowing users to tokenize values, provide and use
services, and conduct transactions. The fabric layer of the Bitcoin blockchain, for instance,
is specified to conduct transactions between pseudonymous counterparties without a cen-
tral intermediary, while allowing only a highly limited incorporation of program/software
logic via Opcodes. In consequence, the action space is constrained to actions related to
transferring some number-values between users. However, this limited functionality en-
ables its users to use Bitcoin as a peer-to-peer payment system. In other words, it allows
the users of Bitcoin to act within a given spectrum and provides a common understanding
of the Bitcoin system as an electronic cash system. In contrast, the Ethereum blockchain
goes beyond the concept of a pure cryptocurrency and incorporates a shared global in-
frastructure that allows the implementation of smart contracts by itentional design. As a
result, it enables a variety of assigned functions that range from the simple functionality
of a cryptocurrency known as Ether, over transaction systems (Notheisen et al., 2017) to
decentralized autonomous organizations (Jentzsch, 2016) and market places (Notheisen
et al., 2017). This functional scope has multiple advantages, such as the automation of
governance, but also impedes the development of a common understanding of its assigned
function(s).
Second, we arrange the blockchain protocol, which includes fabric and the application
layer, as well as adjacent processes such as protocol development and maintenance within
the institutional dimensions introduced (see figure 2.3), in order to highlight and un-
derstand the multi-faceted nature of blockchain-based platforms. The fabric layer, which
forms the technological foundation of each blockchain system, is usually the result of a
conscious design of a small group of core developers that coordinates to achieve a com-
mon goal, such as providing a fully decentralized electronic cash system in the case of
Bitcoin. The resulting system aims to contribute to a collectively determined goal of soci-
ety by reducing the coordination efforts of individual agents required to achieve this goal.
With respect to blockchain technology, such a goal could be the transfer of assets between
interacting parties without relying on a central authority. However, whether a specific
blockchain fabric becomes widespread standard or fails to establish in the institutional
landscape cannot be enforced by the protocol itself but is rather determined implicitly by
its actual use.
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If a user does not agree with the proposed protocol, he or she can provide an update to the
system to which other users can switch if they prefer the proposed update. As a result, the
compliance with a specific blockchain fabric is enforced via a the network effects based on
the implicit vote of users by joining a proposed protocol or protocol update or stick with the
incumbent system version. In addition, blockchain fabrics that have the reputation of not
functioning well or giving unfair advantages to a specific group of users are also punished
by social feedback (that is a bad reputation), which in turn leads to an absence of users.
In most cases, the fabric layer is maintained and updated by an open source community
or an organization that is based on an open source community (examples include the Bit-
coin Foundation or the Ethereum Foundation). These maintenance mechanisms form as a
result of an evolutionary cultural process within the specific communities and often build
on the altruistic aspiration to improve the underlying protocols. To comply with specific
rules, customs, and manners within these communities are usually enforced by social feed-
back. The application layer, which embeds payment services, smart contracts, and other
functionalities, results from the conscious design of the fabric layer, which enforces the
compliance of interacting agents with their previous commitments based technical speci-
fication of the blockchain system (Beck et al., 2018). More specifically, individual agents
can only engage in a transaction with assets for which they can provide a verifiable proof of
ownership (for example by referencing to received transactions stored in older blocks) and
the settlement of a transaction takes place as a direct consequence of the consensus mech-
anism. The same logic applies for contractual agreements implemented in smart contracts
and non-monetary transactions within more complex smart contract-based platforms. Fig-
ure 2.4 summarizes and illustrates the arrangement of the blockchain’s institutional char-
acteristics within the dimension of institutions [...]. In total, this illustrates how blockchain
systems resemble the key components of institutions and highlights the enforcement chan-
nels that blockchain technology utilizes in order to govern the interactions of individual
users of an open platform."
Implications for platform governance. "As a result of its institutional and technolog-
ical features, blockchain technology has the potential to reshape the way platforms, in
general, are governed. The following section highlights a potential path of such a trans-
formation along the core value propositions of blockchain technology - the improvement
in transparency resulting from the current and complete record, the decentralization of
consensus authority, and the automation of enforcement. Eventually, we illustrate how
platform governance might change in the future.
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FIGURE 2.4: The institutional dimensions of blockchain-based platforms.
First, the more current and more complete information about ownership structures (Yer-
mack, 2017) facilitates the dissemination of information among platform users in real-time
and allows them to make more informed decisions. The resulting technical establishment
of the accountability of individual users (Beck et al., 2018), leads to a reduction of the
uncertainties that interacting parties face under asymmetric information (Notheisen et al.,
2017). Further, it mitigates free-rider problems (Yermack, 2017) that arise in economi-
cally and socially opaque environments. In addition, the historical record of interactions
reveals entanglements among individuals thereby disclosing potential conflicts of interest
(Yermack, 2017) that might impede platform efficiency. However, the increase in trans-
parency also raises some issues with respect to the incentives of users to contribute to
the consensual agreement, as the disclosure of formerly private information reduces the
rents individuals were able to generate from this informational monopoly. Furthermore,
the visibility of unique identifiers and related transactional histories raises privacy con-
cerns (Beck et al., 2018; Böhme et al., 2015) that need be considered when designing
blockchain-based platforms.
Second, the decentralization of consensus facilitates the decentralization of decision
rights (Beck et al., 2018) and enables the resolution of disagreements and conflicts with-
out the involvement of a centralized arbitrator (Beck et al., 2018). As a result of this
diffusion of authority, individuals themselves, supported by the scrutiny and wisdom of
the crowd, become the sources of authenticity (Morabito, 2017). In combination with the
irreversibility of transactions, this shift ensures the correctness [of the] database.
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In addition, the reliability and quality of the stored information does not depend on the
judgment and ability of costly auditors and data integrity becomes independent of the in-
tegrity of individuals (Yermack, 2017). However, the absence of a central authority and
the resulting transmission of decision rights and consensus authority to the heterogeneous
crowd of individual platform users requires an effective alignment of individual incentives
and collective interests (Beck et al., 2018). When the incentives to participate in the costly
consensus process are not properly aligned with the users’ individual interests and motiva-
tions, their contributions may be insufficient or even malicious, which eventually threatens
the integrity of the entire platform (Beck et al., 2018).
Third, [...] blockchain technology automates the enforcement of agreements between
interacting parties. These agreements can range from simple monetary transactions at a
single point in time, such as in the Bitcoin system, to a contractual nexus of multiple inter-
actions between multiple parties at multiple points in time. Smart contracts provide a tool
to govern such complex interaction patterns by autonomously enforcing the rules defined
by the ecosystem of the platform and the agreements specified in multilateral negotiations
and encoded in the smart contract itself (Beck et al., 2018). The resulting automation of
enforcement enables leaner and simpler contracts (for example fewer covenants in debt
contracts (Yermack, 2017)), reduces opportunistic behavior of individuals, such as balance
sheet fining, and alleviates the scope of manipulative actions (Yermack, 2017). In addi-
tion, it facilitates the replacement of (government) entities that manage property rights of
physical and digital assets by blockchain-based equivalents (Morabito, 2017).
However, it is important to keep in mind that blockchain technology and smart con-
tracts will not be able the replace the negotiation of agreements. Instead, lawyers will no
longer draft extensive paper documents but rather encode the results of their negotiation
in self-executing legal documents based on smart contracts (Morabito, 2017). So while
the blockchain may be able to reduce coordination costs, this negotiation process might
entail a substantial amount of new coordination costs (Beck et al., 2018). An important
prerequisite for these new coordintation costs is some sort of common language that allows
lawyers and developers a joint understanding of the concluded agreement (Al Khalil et al.,
2017). In addition, the finality of the data stored on the blockchain, leaves no chance to
correct undesired outcomes or to react to unexpected events. The resulting immediate-
ness of transactions and triggered agreements increases transaction risks (Böhme et al.,
2015) and can cause hazardous feedback loops (Paech, 2017) as smart contracts cannot
be breached (Morabito, 2017).
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Besides the potentially beneficial impact of blockchains on the governance of platforms,
maintaining and updating the underlying blockchain infrastructure, especially on the level
of the fabric layer, raises new governance problems itself (Yermack, 2017). One way to
maintain a blockchain system is to utilize the open source community as a governance
institution (see figure 2.4). In such a governance system, a change in the source code of
the fabric layer can be initiated by every user and system-wide adoption requires a ma-
jority of nodes to implement the update on their device. This passive process of adoption
puts powerful individuals in a dominating position and makes blockchain-based platforms
vulnerable to sabotage by malicious users that distribute updates that favor themselves by
exploiting collective action problems (Yermack, 2017). The distribution of such asymmet-
rically favorable updates might be detrimental to other, less powerful users, and are pro-
nounced in systems with more heterogeneous user bases (Paech, 2017) and on platforms,
where individuals show more distinct collusive tendencies. The empirical findings of Wang
et al. (2017) reflect this imbalance and indicate that while individuals value decentraliza-
tion within the application layer, they do not value decentralization with respect to the
governance of a fabric layer (Wang et al., 2017). In consequence, it remains necessary to
delegate the responsibility for maintaining the network and to ensure compliance with the
socio-economic and legal environment a platform operates in to some governing entity
(Paech, 2017). Although the increase in transparency, the decentralization of authority,
and the automation of enforcement shifts trust towards a more technical, algorithmic no-
tion (Lustig and Nardi, 2015), the trust of users in the governing entity still plays a crucial
role in order to ensure the efficacy and efficiency of blockchain-based platforms."
Trust in Blockchain Systems
"Many of the governance features highlighted in the previous section build the trust-free
nature of blockchain technology. The term trust-free refers to the ability of blockchain
technology to ’create an immutable, consensually agreed, and publicly available record
of past transactions that is governed by the whole system’ (Hawlitschek et al., 2018) and
therefore should be considered a mainly technological feature in the first place. In addi-
tion, [...] trust still plays an important role with respect to the governance of the system.
This section builds on these presumptions, elaborates the trust-free property and discusses,
which trust relationships prevail or even gain importance in blockchain-based platforms.
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Blockchain systems are increasingly taken into consideration to form the basis of dif-
ferent types of digital platforms. Given the characteristics of blockchain technology, it
is possible to assume that as long as the platform remains a closed-up, purely technical
ecosystem, it can be in fact considered trust-free (Glaser, 2017). However, such purely
technical platforms do rarely exist in the real world. Instead they form the basis for a
variety of whole microeconomies that need to be managed by platform providers (Parker
and Van Alstyne, 2018). This shifts the purely technical view on blockchain-based plat-
forms to a sociotechnical perspective (de Reuver et al., 2017). As a result, the notion of a
trust-free blockchain system as underlying infrastructure for platforms should be critically
assessed and discussed. Leaving the realm of blockchain systems as purely technical con-
cepts, it is viable to revise the notions of trust and trust-freeness in greater detail. Across
disciplines, trust is usually considered as ’a psychological state comprising the intention to
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of an-
other’ (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). Therefore, trust-freeness is a property that is hard,
if not impossible to achieve for a platform (notwithstanding the use of blockchain systems
as a technological basis). From the perspective of IS research, different trust relationships
matter for users. For example, users need to trust the IS, the provider of the IS, the internet
(as an enabler for using an IS), as well as the community of internet users (Söllner et al.,
2016). We propose that the same holds true for platform users. In fact, the trust relation-
ships in a platform microeconomy can even be more complex – especially for the case of
two-sided markets. The notion of blockchain-based platforms for peer-to-peer sharing is
not only in the center of the (popular) scientific discussion (Hawlitschek et al., 2018), it
has already begun to enter the global market. The Universal Sharing Network (USN) of
the German company slock.it, for example, can be considered as a digital platform with
an extensible codebase (de Reuver et al., 2017). In contrast to most posterchild examples
of the sharing economy, such as Airbnb or BlaBlaCar, the USN is based on an open source
infrastructure on which blockchain application modules can be deployed, enabling third
parties to onboard any object to the USN4.
In the following we will outline which trust relationships matter for blockchain-based
platforms. We guide and exemplify these considerations based on an example of a peer-
to-peer sharing economy platform and [...] illustrate why even blockchain systems require
trust. The engineering of two-sided markets is a particularly difficult task, since markets
need to attract participants that take both the roles of consumers and providers in order
to facilitate market growth and stability (Teubner et al., 2017).
4See https://slock.it/usn.html.
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FIGURE 2.5: Trust targets for blockchain users (based on Söllner et al., 2016).
Therefore, a set of different user perspectives has to be taken into account to understand
the different trust relationships in two-sided blockchain-based markets in detail (see 2.5).
In contrast to ISs with a rather homogeneous user base, at least two different user types
need to be distinguished, that is, consumers and providers. Since two-sided platforms
may well benefit from a possible dual role of users acting as both, consumer and provider
(Stummer et al., 2018), it is also worthwhile to extend this categorization by a third type:
The prosumers (Ritzer et al., 2012). Obviously, the segmentation of the user role in at least
two sub-types is accompanied by a need for trust between these roles. Especially in the
context of peer-to-peer sharing, interpersonal trust plays a significant role (Hawlitschek
et al., 2018; ter Huurne et al., 2017). In particular, sharing economy platform users need
to belief in each other’s ability, benevolence, and integrity to develop transaction inten-
tions (Hawlitschek et al., 2016). Furthermore, following the work of Söllner et al. (2016),
a set of further trust targets is relevant to understand the use of information systems. For
blockchain-based information systems, we adapt and summarize these targets as the in-
formation system itself, the platform provider(s), the platform’s blockchain infrastructure,
and the community of users.
Trust in the information system includes both layers of the blockchain system, that is
the application layer and the fabric layer. Therefore trust in the IS is a rather broad con-
cept comprising multiple aspects, such as the tokenization of the ecosystem value, the im-
mutable decentralized database, the decentralized permissioning, as well as autonomous
and user controlled services. Importantly, the perception of the trustworthiness of the dif-
ferent layers and corresponding components, will largely depend on the user type. While
inexperienced and less tech-savvy users may perceive the IS mainly through the presen-
tation layer, expert-users may have the ability to dig deeper into layers and evaluate the
blockchain system’s components.
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Blockchain systems and their components are operated by both open source developers
(developing the fabric layer) and participants in a globally distributed system (developing
on the application layer). Consequently the community of open source developers can
be considered as the blockchain platform providers. Trust in the platform provider(s), is
therefore necessary to prevent an absence of users (for example due to the perception
of unfair or fraudulent implementation). In the same way, the participants in a globally
distributed system can be considered as the community of users. Following Söllner et al.
(2016), we argue that blockchain systems can only provide effective support to their users,
if the community of users offers valuable services or information. Thus trust in the commu-
nity of users describes an individual’s belief that the community of users provides services
and information reliably, benevolently and with integrity. Finally, users of a blockchain sys-
tem need to trust the underlying technology itself [...]. Trust in the blockchain becomes
necessary due to the high complexity of the technology. Since in most cases users will
not be able to fully understand the mechanics of the underlying blockchain technology,
they will need to trust in its reliability [(Lustig and Nardi, 2015)]. This is [similar to]
institution-based trust in the internet (Söllner et al., 2016)."
Concluding Remarks
"The institutional characteristics of blockchain technology help to structure and organize
the interactions on these platforms by facilitating a common understanding of a platform’s
functionalities and imposing consistency to individual users’ behavior. In this context, the
fabric layer, which usually results from the conscious design of an informal group of de-
velopers and is maintained by spontaneously evolving open source communities, sets the
boundaries for interactions of users and the scope of application domains. The concrete
manifestation of the fabric layer and thus the characteristics of a platform, is determined
implicitly by the informal feedback of user adoption. Building on the fabric layer, the
application layer enables individual users to implement various features based on smart
contracts. The services and applications resulting from this conscious design reshape gov-
ernance mechanisms within platforms and redefine how users interact with each other.
Their transparent, autonomous, and distributed nature has the potential to reduce the neg-
ative effects of information asymmetries, democratize decision processes, secure property
rights, simplify contracting and enforcement, and limit opportunistic behavior. However,
these features also increase transaction risks and raise privacy concerns.
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In combination with the governance of a blockchain-based platform, mastering these chal-
lenges requires a new notion of trust. The core dimensions of this new notion of trust
are the trust in the IS and the deployed algorithms, trust in the providers of the platform
infrastructure (that is the blockchain providers), and trust in the community of users. It is
this user and developer base that maintains and secures the fabric layer, which fuels the
variety of applications and services build atop the application layer. This trust remains
a central facilitator of the adoption of blockchain-based platforms, in particular when it
comes to intersections with the real world and the governance of the system itself."
2.2 Market Engineering
"The economic environment evolves, but is also designed" (Roth, 2002, p. 1431). How-
ever, shaping markets within their economic environment is a complex task that requires
knowledge and methods from multiple fields. More specifically, it requires a shift away
from the dominant analytic ex-post view of economics towards a joint perspective that
combines traditional game theory and mechanism design with experimental, computa-
tional, and engineering approaches. This way, we can create an interdisciplinary and
formative view on the organization of economic interactions (Roth, 2002). In addition,
market design goes beyond a conceptual approach and should investigate the cause-effect
relationship between a market’s features and its outcomes to identify relevant trade-offs
(Roth, 2002).
Market engineering builds on this notion to create a structured and systematic approach
that offers a toolbox to market designers that helps them to analyze, design, and evalu-
ate (electronic) market platforms within their institutional environment (Weinhardt et al.,
2003). As a result, it provides "[...] an integrated, [holistic] view on markets, a multiplic-
ity of methodologies, an interdisciplinary approach, and the understanding that details
matter" (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007; Gimpel et al., 2008). However, in contrast to Roth
(2002)’s notion of market design, market engineering comprises a concrete framework
that describes the elements and steps a market designer or engineer should consider in
his or her endeavor. Figure 2.6 illustrates the resulting market engineering framework in
detail.
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The market engineering object (figure, 2.6 panel A) comprises a transaction object, the
market structure, auxiliary services, agent behavior, as well as market outcomes and em-
beds these components within the market’s socio-economic and legal environment. This
environment is defined by laws, rules, and regulations as well as social norms and out-
side of the market engineer’s control. As a result, it is assumed as given and forms the
institutional environment of the market platform at hand. Within this environment, the
market engineer aims to achieve a specific market outcome (e.g., maximize activity, liquid-
ity, or information aggregation) by designing the market structure, corresponding auxiliary
services, and the underlying transaction object. A market’s structure is defined by its mi-
crostructure, its (IT) infrastructure, and its business structure. The microstructure defines
the core of the market mechanism by connecting demand and supply and determines the
price and allocation of the transaction object. The business structure on the other hand,
describes the way market operators generate revenue, for instance in form of trading fees.
Eventually, the (IT) infrastructure comprises the technical framework that supports the
market and implements the micro- and business structure, embeds auxiliary services, and
provides an interface that allows agents to connect to the market platform. Auxiliary ser-
vices are services that are not a core part of the market mechanism but support agents in
their interactions. According to Gimpel et al. (2008), these services include decision sup-
port and reputation systems or the clearing and settlement of transactions. However, all of
these components affect market outcomes only indirectly as the actual agents’ behavior lies
beyond the market engineer’s control. Instead, it depends on the design of the transaction
object, market structure, and auxiliary services as well as the agents’ characteristics and
(economic) rationales. In consequence, the market engineer has to anticipate behavioral
patterns in order to achieve the desired outcomes.
Within this framework, the market engineering process (figure 2.6, panel B) describes
the steps necessary to create a market. It builds on established methods from software en-
gineering (e.g., waterfall model), combines sequential and iterative elements, and guides
the market engineer in his or her creative task (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007). More specif-
ically, it illustrates each stage of the engineering process, the corresponding inputs, as well
as a selection of potential methods. In the first step, the objectives form the input for a
detailed environmental analysis in order to elicit requirements the market platform should
meet. Based on the resulting requirement list, the market engineer derives an initial mar-
ket design with the help of methods from mechanism and parametric design, computer
science, and IS. In the evaluation stage, theoretical models, empirical studies, and proto-
typing are used to evaluate and refine the conceptual design iteratively.
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FIGURE 2.6: Market engineering framework (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007; Gimpel et al.,
2008).
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If all requirements are met, the implementation stage follows. The implementation stage
builds on a preliminary requirement satisfaction list and comprises the creation of the
market platform. Finally, the market engineering process terminates with the introduction
of the implemented market platform.
Due to its general perspective and comprehensive nature, the market engineering ap-
proach is not bound to a specific application domain or a specific type of market. Instead,
it has been successfully applied to a multitude of domains and has proven its efficacy and
efficiency in energy (e.g., Dauer et al., 2016; Mengelkamp et al., 2018), prediction (e.g.,
Kranz, 2015; Kloker et al., 2018), financial (e.g., Burghardt and Weinhardt, 2008; Zhang
et al., 2011; Riordan et al., 2013), and other market-based applications (e.g., Luckner
et al., 2005; Teschner et al., 2014; Kranz et al., 2015). However, despite the possibility to
reiterate in the evaluation stage, the development of a market remains static and does not
take changes of market participants or the market’s environment explicitly into account.
In consequence, the notions of agile (Block, 2010) and continuous (Kranz, 2015) market
engineering extend the basic concept introduced above with a dynamic perspective and
enables continuous monitoring and improvement.
Agile Market Engineering
Agile market engineering was introduced by Block (2010) and constitutes an advancement
of the market engineering approach. As such, it details and extends the development pro-
cess illustrated in panle B of figure 2.6b by taking the complexity of real-world markets
into account. As a result, it facilitates short, lightweight, and incremental development
cycles and enables its users to implement an iterative and flexible design-and-build strat-
egy. In addition, Block (2010) evaluates his approach in 5 real-world use cases to create
a "[...] collection of best practices, experiences, and tools [...]". Figure 2.8 outlines the
agile market engineering process and its 3 phases: The pre-development phase, the de-
velopment phase, and the operation phase. In the pre-development phase, the business
owner assesses the market environment and develops a market vision (I), derives initial
requirements with the help of a market expert (II), and evaluates the applicability of ex-
isting platforms with the help of a market engineer and the market developer (III). The
resulting set of initial requirements initiates the development phase. Within this second
phase, the business owner prioritizes the collected requirements (IV), concretizes them,
and chooses the most important ones for implementation together with a market expert
(V).
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In the third and final step of the development phase, the business owner, the market expert,
the market developer, and the change manager jointly design, implement, and test the
current version of the market platform (VI). Note that the steps of the development phase
can be repeated multiple times until the tests yield the desired results. With the release
of the market platform, we eventually move on to the continuous operation phase. This
phase comprises the actual deployment of the platform by the market operator and the
market developer (VII). After the deployment, the business owner, market operator, and
market expert observe market activity and outcomes to ensure a proper functioning (VIII).
If this is not the case, they add or revise requirements based on their observations (IX) and
reenter the development phase.
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FIGURE 2.7: Agile market engineering process (Block, 2010).
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Continuous Market Engineering
Similar to agile market engineering, the continuous market engineering approach extends
the market engineering framework from figure 2.6 with a continuous view on operation,
monitoring, and refinement. However, in contrast to agile market engineering this per-
spective includes the monitoring of an operating market and emphasizes the assessment
of deviations and the following redesign. More precisely, the introduction and operation of
a market platform is complemented by a monitoring step. This step comprises the continu-
ous assessment of technical aspects (e.g., the performance of hard- and software), market
outcomes (e.g., by activity, liquidity, and information measures (Zhang et al., 2011)), the
behavior of traders and other market participants, as well as the impact (and changes)
of the socio-economic and legal environment. According to Kranz (2015), there are two
events that trigger a deviation analysis: First, the observed performance measures indicate
a deviation from the market’s normal functioning. If this is the case, the deviation anal-
ysis furthermore aims to identify the reasons for the deviation and initiates the redesign
to make adjustments. The second trigger are changes in the market’s objectives. Conse-
quently, the deviation analysis evaluates the available market parameters and initiates the
redesign step accordingly. In both cases, the redesign is followed by an evaluation that as-
sesses the functionality, acceptance, and outcome of the adjusted market structure before
the implementation. After the successful implementation, the new release of the market
platform is reintroduced and monitoring starts again.
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FIGURE 2.8: Continuous market engineering process (Kranz, 2015).
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Chapter 3
Blockchain Engineering
This chapter is based the articles "Breaking Down the Blockchain Hype - Towards a Block-
chain Market Engineering Approach" and "The limits of trust-free systems: A literature review
on blockchain technology and trust in the sharing economy". "Breaking Down the Blockchain
Hype" is co-authored by Florian Hawlitschek and Christof Weinhardt and was published in
the proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) 2017. "The
Limits of trust-free systems" is co-authored by Florian Hawlitschek and Timm Teubner and
was published in the May 2018 issue of Electronic Commerce Research and Applications. In
addition, an earlier version was presented as a short paper on the 17th International Con-
ference on Group Decision and Negotiation 2017. Direct citations are highlighted by double
quotes, while Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.6 are based on the first, Section 3.5 on the second,
and Sections 3.1 and 3.7 on both papers.
Publication details:
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Breaking Down the Blockchain Hype - Towards a Blockchain Market Engineering Approach,
Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017,
pp. 1062–1080,
https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rp/69.
Hawlitschek, F., Notheisen, B. & Teubner, T.,
The limits of trust-free systems: A literature review on blockchain technology and trust in the
sharing economy,
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, May-June 2018, Volume 29, pp. 50-63,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2018.03.005.
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3.1 Introduction
"Driven by the expectations about the disruptive and transformational impact on busi-
ness, the blockchain hype is just about to reach the peak of the Gartner Hype Cycle for
Emerging Technologies (Gartner, 2016). While start-ups as well as established compa-
nies like Deutsche Börse and the Deutsche Bundesbank put a considerable amount of ef-
fort in the development of pioneering blockchain-based market solutions (Deutsche Bun-
desbank and Deutsche Börse, 2016), many researchers and practitioners still struggle to
grasp the true potential of the blockchain (Beck et al., 2016). Since ’[...] the technical
protocols and implementations [of distributed ledgers, decentralized consensus systems,
and decentralized applications based on smart contracts] are quite complex’ (Glaser and
Bezzenberger, 2015), the engineering and implementation of sophisticated market set-
tings is a nontrivial problem that requires knowledge from various disciplines (Gimpel
et al., 2008). The IS community, focusing on both, the IT artifact (i.e., blockchain tech-
nology) and the surrounding (economic) structures and contexts (Benbasat and Zmud,
2003) is therefore particularly well suited to conflate and extend the work from different
technological and economic disciplines to interdisciplinary research approaches (Giaglis
and Kypriotaki, 2014).
So far however, IS research on blockchain-based solutions is still in an early stage and
mainly focuses on use case analyses and design science aspects of proof-of-concept proto-
types (Beck et al., 2016). At the same time, research approaches and findings are dispersed
across a variety of other disciplines such as computer science or economics and finance and
therefore would benefit from an interdisciplinary view on a macro level (Giaglis and Kypri-
otaki, 2014)" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1063) In consequence, we formulate the following
first research question:
Research Question 1. Which pivotal elements and layers define blockchain-based market
platforms?
Besides the elements, layers, and structure of blockchain-based platforms, trust plays a
crucial role in engineering decentralized markets. "In recent years, [the blockchain] was
sometimes denoted a trust-free technology (Beck et al., 2016) [...]. Trust-free systems
rest on the idea to utilize blockchain technology to automatically create an immutable,
consensually agreed, and publicly available record of past transactions [...] (Greiner and
Hui, 2015). [This] enables verified and transparent [interactions] without the need for a
central authority or institution (Nakamoto, 2008; Alt and Puschmann, 2016).
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[As a result,] the business model of platforms such as Airbnb and Uber [and] their role
as intermediaries between peers and private resources, [is threatened by] the blockchain
(Avital et al., 2016) [...]. In fact, several cooperatives such as Lazooz or Share & Charge
have set out to establish decentralized sharing platforms with remarkable success in first
crowdfunding campaigns (Sundararajan, 2016)" (Hawlitschek et al., 2018, p. 50 - 51).
However, against the backdrop of trust as interlaced construct that comprises the relation-
ships between peers, platforms, and products (Hawlitschek, 2019), the question arises
whether ’trust-free’ blockchain technology will be able to implement this multi-faceted,
behavioral nature (Section 2.1.2; Hawlitschek et al., 2018).
Research Question 2. To which extent can the blockchain implement the multi-faceted na-
ture of trust prevalent on the peer-to-peer platforms of today’s sharing economy?
To answer these questions, this chapter builds on the notion of the blockchain as a mar-
ket platform (Section 2.1.2) and combines technological aspects with the market engineer-
ing approach (Section 2.2) to derive an interdisciplinary framework. To do so, we analyze
the growing body of interdisciplinary blockchain research by the means of a comprehen-
sive structured literature review and provide a concept-centric overview. The findings of
this review "[...] indicate a strong dispersion with regard to the focus, methodology and
specific issues addressed in present IS research, emphasizing the need for a structured ap-
proach to guide future research. Based on these findings, we [integrate a technological and
a market perspective to derive an] interdisciplinary blockchain engineering framework.
[...] The framework differentiates between four layers, and takes [...] the socio-economic
and legal environment, the characteristics of the deployed blockchain protocol (i.e., the
IT-infrastructure), the application’s micro and business structure, as well as the outcomes
of the (economic) agents’ behaviors" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1063) into account. This
way, we aim to support researchers and practitioners "[...] in analyzing and designing the
elements of blockchain-based markets on an individual and global level. In addition, [it
goes] beyond a purely analytic perspective and provides a toolbox to support the active
construction of blockchain-based ecosystems and infrastructures" (Notheisen et al., 2017,
p. 1062). Eventually, we extend the blockchain engineering framework by a trust perspec-
tive and challenge the claim of the blockchain as a trust-free technology (e.g., Beck et al.,
2016). More specifically, we adopt the notion of blockchain-based trust from Section 2.1.2
and discuss, how this behavioral perspective aligns with the blockchain’s technological ap-
proach (Hawlitschek et al., 2018).
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3.2 Literature Review Methodology
"To explore blockchain-related research in the field of IS, we follow the guidelines of Vom
Brocke et al. (2009), Webster and Watson (2002), and Cooper (1988) to conduct an ex-
haustive and selective concept-centric review of literature [...] on blockchain technology.
We focus on tangible research results but also shed light on applied research methods to
provide a structured overview of the central concepts of blockchain research and the cur-
rent status of the field. The literature search and selection, as well as the classification
process will be described in the following.
In order to ensure the relevance and quality of the reviewed publications, we focus on
the top eight peer-reviewed, scientific IS journals from the AIS Senior Scholars’ Basket5 and
selected IS conferences6. To identify relevant literature, we follow a four step approach
based on Webster and Watson (2002), as depicted in figure 3.1.
Journal search Conference search
Step 4: 
Forward Search
Step 3: 
Backward Search
Search query: 
„blockchain“ OR „block chain“ OR „bitcoin“ OR 
„cryptocurrenc*“ OR „distributed ledger“ OR 
„decentralized consensus“
IS Journals
EJIS
ISJ
ISR
JAIS
JIT
JMIS
JSIS
MISQ
IS Conferences
ACIS
AMCIS
ECIS
ICIS
HICSS
ISD
PACIS
Adjacent fields
Economics
Computer 
Science
Law
Journal & 
conference 
website
Databases
AISeL
IEEE Xplore
ACM DL
ScienceDirect
Wiley
informs
Step 2: Abstract-             
based selection of 
relevant IS 
contributions
List A: 
Review 
literature
List B: 
Complementary 
literature
FIGURE 3.1: Literature search and selection process
"This figure displays the four-step approach employed in the literature search and selection pro-
cess. In the first step, we conducted an extensive database search to identify key articles in the
top eight peer-reviewed, scientific IS journals, recommended IS conferences, and adjacent fields.
In Step 2, we selected articles for the detailed review. Based on those, we performed backward
and forward searches in step 3 and 4, respectively. We repeated steps 2, 3, and 4 until our search
did not yield any new results" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1065).
5See https://aisnet.org/?SeniorScholarBasket.
6See http://www.acphis.org.au/index.php/is-conference-ranking.
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First, we selected a comprehensive set of scientific databases, such as AISeL, IEEE
Xplore, ACM DL, EBSCO Business Source Premier, ScienceDirect, the Wiley Online Li-
brary, and in-forms. Within these databases, we searched titles, keywords, abstracts, and
full texts by applying the following search string: blockchain OR block chain OR bitcoin OR
cryptocurrenc∗ OR distributed ledger OR decentralized consensus. Since blockchain technol-
ogy was introduced in 2008 (Nakamoto, 2008), we limited the search to dates later than
January 1, 2008. The first database queries were conducted in June 2016. However, to
take the most recent articles into account, we updated the search between the 16th and the
20th of November 2016. Whenever there were no database entries for one of the selected
IS journals or conferences, we checked the journals’ or conferences’ websites [...].
To account for the interdisciplinary nature of the field of IS we furthermore extended
our search scope to adjacent fields such as economics and finance, computer science, and
law. Within those fields, we exclude publications not labeled as research papers, such as
research commentaries, keynotes, news, editorials, extended abstracts, book reviews, PhD-
theses, or posters. The review of literature in adjacent fields preserves a complementary
character and does not claim to be a complete overview of existing blockchain-related
research.
In the second step, we selected a primary set of relevant IS research papers by reviewing
each paper’s abstract, as suggested by Vom Brocke et al. (2009). Studies that did not
contain any of the keywords previously specified in the search query in their abstract or that
did not have a primary focus on blockchain research were not considered any further.
For the remaining papers we third, performed a backward and fourth, a forward search.
IS articles identified in these steps were added to the selection of relevant literature and
both a back-ward and forward search were performed again. Articles that were not pub-
lished in one of the top eight IS journals or one of the selected conferences were added
to the list of adjacent re-search efforts and excluded from the IS review. We repeated the
steps 2, 3, and 4 until we did not find any new articles. Eventually, we obtained two lists
of publications related to blockchain research. List A contains all IS articles included in
our structured review, whereas list B contains all articles excluded in step 2 of the search
process as well as all complementing articles from adjacent fields."
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3.3 Literature Review Results
3.3.1 Summary Statistics and Research Perspectives
"The literature search process yielded a total of 427 articles, whereof 1 was published in the
Senior Scholars’ Basket of Eight and 49 in one of the selected IS conferences. Furthermore
29 complementary papers were published in other renowned IS journals such as Business
& Information Systems Engineering and Communications of the Association for Information
Systems, or specialized IS conferences. The exclusion of papers only vaguely related to
distributed ledgers and blockchain technology, resulted in a list of 26 IS conference papers
and no IS journal contributions. Table 3.1 depicts the distribution of the relevant articles
across (complementary) journals and conferences.
IS Literature Hits Relevant
Management Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ) 1 0
Australasian Conferences on Information Systems (ACIS) 1 1
Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) 12 5
European Conference in Information Systems (ECIS) 17 12
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) 8 3
Hawaii International Conference on System Science (HICSS) 8 3
International Conference on Information System Development (ISD) 0 0
Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) 3 2
Total 50 26
TABLE 3.1: Core IS literature
"This table shows the number of articles published in the core IS journals and conferences and
differentiates between found (hits) and relevant contributions" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1066).
In Table 3.2, we display the chronological distribution of articles across different fields,
starting with the introduction of the blockchain in 2008. Similar to economics and finance,
the number of IS publications, remained substantially low until 2014, while the fields of
computer science and legal studies started to pick up the topic one year earlier in 2013.
These developments seem to coincide with the increasing popularity of Bitcoin, which
exceeded the weekly moving average of 50,000 transactions per day at the beginning of
2013 Overall, 86.4% of blockchain-related research was published within the year 2014
or later. In total, articles published in the field of computer science account for more
than half of the publications related to blockchain today. The IS community contributes a
comparatively small share of 19.4%.
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Before summarizing the most important insights from the IS literature, we will give a
brief overview on the different views on blockchain from the perspectives of economics
and finance, computer science and informatics, and legal sciences in the subsequent para-
graph. While researchers in the field of economics and finance mainly concentrate on the
characteristics of cryptocurrency markets by analyzing Bitcoin price formation, market ef-
ficiency (Nadarajah and Chu, 2017; Fry and Cheah, 2016; Dyhrberg, 2016a), or portfolio
diversification effects (Dyhrberg, 2016b; Brière et al., 2015; Bouri et al., 2016), block-
chain research in computer science is quite diverse. While some efforts aim to improve
the performance of mining technology (Dev, 2014) or solve scalability issues (Karame,
2016), others assess the technology’s potential aside of cryptocurrencies (Xu et al., 2016;
Hari and Lakshman, 2016). However, one of the most discussed topics is privacy and se-
curity (Zyskind et al., 2015; Kosba et al., 2016; Gervais et al., 2016; Eyal, 2015). In turn,
research in the field of law follows two major streams: The first one analyzes the use of
cryptocurrencies for criminal activities, such as funding terrorism, online black markets,
or white-collar crimes (Irwin and Milad, 2016; Barratt, 2015; Marian, 2013). The second
stream focuses on the calls for regulatory actions and the need for legal innovations in
the face of cryptocurrency markets and blockchain applications (Farmer, 2014; Burleson,
2013; Varriale, 2013; Gump and Leonard, 2016)."
Year IS Journals IS Conf.
Complimentary outlets Total
IS Eco CS Law Total Abs. Rel.
2008 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 0.7%
2009 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.2%
2010 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.2%
2011 0 2 0 3 7 0 10 12 2.8%
2012 0 4 0 1 7 1 9 13 3.0%
2013 0 0 0 2 21 4 27 27 6.3%
2014 1 11 4 15 34 9 62 74 17.3%
2015 0 19 9 36 56 3 104 123 28.8%
2016 0 13 16 46 83 14 159 172 40.3%
2017 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.2%
Total Abs. 1 49 29 104 213 31 377 427
Total Rel. 0.2% 11.5% 7.7% 24.4% 49.9% 7.3% 88.3%
TABLE 3.2: Summary statistics literature search process
"This table provides a chronological distribution over all research perspectives, namely IS, eco-
nomics and finance (Eco), computer science and informatics (CS), and legal sciences (Law)"
(Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1066).
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3.3.2 Literature Classification
"As a basis for the [...] literature review, we performed a keyword analysis on the relevant
IS literature (list A) identified in the literature search and selection process. In a first step,
we calculated the Levenshtein or edit distance (Levenshtein, 1965) between all keywords,
in order to measure the number of morphological changes required to transform a random
keyword into a search keyword. This allowed us not only to account for transpositions and
similar keywords, such as cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency but also to identify subsets
of keywords, such as Bitcoin and Bitcoins. For clustering, we then joined the strings with
’[...] the minimum number of insertions, deletions and substitutions to make both strings
equal’ (Navarro, 2001). In the second step, we then grouped keywords related to similar
concepts, such as Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies for instance. Based on these groupings we
devised the following four concepts: Blockchain technology, Trust-free economic systems,
Bitcoin & cryptocurrencies, and Financial Service Innovation & FinTech. All papers that ad-
dressed more than one of the identified concepts or emphasized blockchain or Bitcoin as a
use case in the context of another concept (e.g., payment systems) were assigned to their
primary field of interest."
3.3.3 Blockchain in the Information Systems Literature
"As stated in the previous section, we identified four central areas of interest within the
most important IS journals and conferences related to blockchain — Blockchain technology,
Trust-free economic systems, Bitcoin & cryptocurrencies, and Financial service innovation &
FinTech. Table A.3 [in appendix A.3] depicts the allocation of the most relevant IS articles
within the corresponding concept matrix." A brief summary of the reviewed literature and
the resulting implications are outlined in the following paragraphs. For a more detailed
review of the underlying literature, we kindly refer to Notheisen et al. (2017).
In total, "[...] blockchain in IS literature is an emerging research area with a huge
potential, which calls for further attention (Gomber et al., 2016). While to date, issues
related to blockchain are scarcely discussed in top tier IS journals, conference proceedings
increasingly started to broach the issues of blockchain-based technologies (table 3.2) but
mainly focus on taxonomy development (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015), industry frame-
works (Brenig et al., 2016), use case analyses (Wörner et al., 2016), and design science
aspects of smart contract-based prototypes (Beck et al., 2016).
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Moreover, most of these studies put an increased focus on entrepreneurial (Connolly and
Begg, 2015) (Ingram et al., 2015; Ingram and Morisse, 2016; Kazan et al., 2015) and user-
specific issues (Glaser et al., 2014; Mai et al., 2015; Hur et al., 2015) related to Bitcoin but
rarely go beyond this use case. Other research streams addressing blockchain technology
itself or the role of blockchain in the context of trust-free economic systems deliver first
valuable insights on how the blockchain might be understood and leveraged as an IT arti-
fact, inter alia enabling a shift from trust in institutions to trust in algorithms (Lustig and
Nardi, 2015). In addition, research methodologies range from empirical models (Glaser
et al., 2014), over semi-structured interviews (Ingram et al., 2015) and surveys (Lustig
and Nardi, 2015), to case studies and DSR-based prototyping (Beck et al., 2016). At the
same time, research approaches and findings are dispersed across a variety of other disci-
plines such as computer science (50%), economics and finance (24%), and law (7%). IS
accounts only for 19% of the journal and conference proceedings listed in table 3.2.
While the application of blockchain technology in a variety of financial or other market
settings is broadly discussed in the public press (Kassin, 2016) and exhibits an increasing
relevance in the business context (Consultancy.uk, 2016), IS research on decentralized
economic systems is still in its infancy. Literature on blockchain-based financial market
innovation primarily deals with the competitive impact of FinTech start-ups on established
financial service providers, neglecting technological aspects of blockchain-based economic
systems."
In consequence, "[...] our findings indicate that IS research rarely goes beyond Bitcoin-
related topics and exhibits a strong dispersion with regard to the focus, methodology and
specific issues addressed. Without a structured alignment of these different views on block-
chain, it is difficult to put existing research results into perspective and to derive clear
managerial or research implications. In order to take the lead in this emerging, interdisci-
plinary research area, efforts should be focused on the central issues of understanding the
potential of blockchain technology as an IT artifact in different (financial) market scenar-
ios. In combination with the rising relevance of FinTech, the complexity and multidimen-
sional nature of this issue, a structured approach to guide future research efforts is imper-
ative. We hence, propose the interdisciplinary research framework of market engineering
(Weinhardt et al., 2003; Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007; Gimpel et al., 2008) that helps to
structure and understand the characteristics of blockchain-based markets and ecosystems
and provides a guideline for the design, implementation, and analyses of blockchain-based
platforms and applications."
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3.4 Towards a Blockchain Engineering Approach
"The [market engineering] framework provides a holistic view and supports the active con-
struction of markets by taking the socio-economic and legal environment, market micro-
structure, IT infrastructure, and business structure, as well as the decisions and behavior
of agents, and the resulting outcomes into account. [Formally, it constitutes] ’the process
of consciously setting up or restructuring a market in order to make it an effective and ef-
ficient means for carrying out exchange transactions’ (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007, p. 6).
Offering an interdisciplinary, holistic toolbox to systematically analyze, structure, design,
and construct the elements of market platforms, to identify areas of application, and to
develop theoretically founded design and evaluation procedures, the market engineering
approach, is well suited to guide research on developing blockchain-based markets.
Based on the market engineering framework (Weinhardt et al., 2003; Weinhardt and
Gimpel, 2007; Gimpel et al., 2008), we aim to provide an unified guideline to evaluate past
and consciously structure future blockchain research. In contrast to Glaser (2017), whose
primary focus is on technological aspects, we suggest a theoretical foundation framework
for the blockchain as an IT artifact in the field of economic applications. In doing so, we
support the identification of applications and areas, in which blockchain-based economic
systems offer effective and efficient solutions. We furthermore build on the descriptive
frameworks of Glaser and Bezzenberger (2015) and Brenig et al. (2016) (i.e., a taxonomy
system, knowledge bases for common concepts, and use case analyses on a global level).
We extend these approaches by going beyond the provision of pure classification schemes
and instead suggest a means to actively support the construction of blockchain-based in-
frastructures on the micro and macro level.
In Figure 3.2, we introduce the blockchain [...] engineering framework, which pro-
vides an integrated, holistic view of interconnected and pivotal elements of blockchain-
based platforms and surrounding factors. To account for the openness of the technology
and its capability to pervade multiple elements of the market engineering framework, we
follow Glaser (2017) and add a multi-layer perspective. As the basic macro layer, the en-
vironment layer captures legal, social and economic constraints determined by the field of
application, legal requirements, the transaction object, and other external contingencies.
It is important to note that the transaction object is not limited to a physical object but
rather is an abstraction and includes any form of information or object that is transacted
over the blockchain network.
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FIGURE 3.2: Blockchain engineering framework
"This figure shows the blockchain engineering framework and its pivotal elements and layers"
(Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1073).
Building on the environment layer, the infrastructure layer implements the blockchain
protocol, and thus specifies the characteristics of the virtual machine eventually running
the application logic. Within the infrastructure layer, we differentiate between the proto-
col layer and the hardware layer. The hardware layer comprises a heterogeneous crowd of
interconnected devices that [...] constitute the runtime environment of the decentralized
system. The protocol layer, also known as fabric layer (Glaser, 2017), implements the ac-
tual code of the blockchain protocol and thus facilitates the communication between the
nodes, enforces agreements, and determines the level of security. In short, the protocol
layer defines the basic elements of the IT artifact, i.e. the distributed database, the consen-
sus algorithm, and the cryptographic protocol, that enable the tokenization of economic
value and the implementation of decentralized applications on a micro level.
51
Chapter 3 Blockchain Engineering
Together, the hardware and the software layer form the backbone of the distributed
system and provide the foundation of the microeconomic design, i.e. the micro- and busi-
ness structure, of potential applications in the application layer. Based on these realized
applications, the characteristics and behavior of the interacting economic agents – human
and artificial - within the created ecosystem can be analyzed. In combination with the
environment layer, which defines the foundation, the agent layer allows the analyses of
market outcomes, application performance, or other system properties from a macroeco-
nomic perspective. In addition, the agent layer allows the study of the individual’s behavior
from a microeconomic perspective. One aspect for instance, is the agent’s incentive to par-
ticipate in the process of truth revelation, which can range from monetary incentives, like
in the Bitcoin system, over asymmetrically distributed information or conflicts of interest,
such as in the ’Market for Lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970), to simply decreasing transaction costs
(Davidson et al., 2016)."
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3.5 The Limits of Trust-free Systems
3.5.1 Engineering Blockchain-based Trust
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FIGURE 3.3: Extended blockchain engineering framework
The framework displayed in this figure extends the framework from Section 3.4 with the role
of trust HawlitschekECRA.2018. More specifically, the trust frontier highlights the differences
between the behavioral conceptualization of trust in the sharing economy and the implementation
of trust-free systems on the technology level.
"A central issue in current literature on [trust in] the sharing economy and blockchain
is the ambiguous use of central terms [...]. A consequence of this trend is the ongoing
speculation and hype around possible applications of the blockchain technology that may
fail to live up to existing expectations (Notheisen et al., 2017). In order to guide future
research on trust-related issues at the interplay of the sharing economy and blockchain
technology, a common typology for the different conceptualizations of trust is required."
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To take these facets into account, we build on the blockchain engineering framework
introduced in the previous section and add a behavioral and a technological perspective
on trust (see figure 3.3). More specifically, the review of Hawlitschek et al. (2018)7 "[...]
indicates that the trust-free property builds on the synergetic collection of technological
features located in the infrastructure layer and application layer. Therefore, the notion of
trust-free systems applies well to the logic of the blockchain engineering framework, as
long as it operates as a closed ecosystem within its technical boundaries (Glaser, 2017).
Particularly, this includes transactions carried out in the agent layer of the framework.
Importantly, the agent layer itself captures the virtual representations of both human or
computer agents within the blockchain-based system. However, in many use-cases for
blockchain technology, it is crucial to take the actual interaction of agents in the real-world
into account. This means that behavior outside the closed blockchain ecosystem needs to
translate into the agent layer (Notheisen et al., 2017; Glaser, 2017). For example, peers
in a sharing economy scenario need to interact with each other, with (smart) products,
and/or the platform. The corresponding issue of reliably transferring information on such
real-world interactions to the virtual representations within the blockchain-based system
emphasizes the boundaries of technical systems that operate trust-free in theory. We con-
sequently extend the framework [introduced in Section 3.4] by an additional behavioral
layer that is separated from the agent layer by a trust frontier. It allows a behavioral per-
spective on the rather technical idea of trust-free (peer-to-peer) platforms and paves the
way for a structured analysis of different targets of trust from a behavioral perspective.
Most trust conceptualizations that are addressed in the sharing economy literature de-
scribe the relationships between human agents (i.e., peers) with each other, the platform,
and potentially a product or other targets. In consequence, the literature on trust is widely
grounded in the behavioral layer. However, some contributions are located in the agent
layer (if, for instance, profiles or ratings are discussed as a means of virtual user or product
representation) and also in the application layer (in case the target for trust is the plat-
form). This is well reflected in the typical notion of online matching, offline interaction,
and online rating on sharing economy platforms (Hawlitschek et al., 2016). The relevance
of the infrastructure layer is only discussed in one case.
7The structured dual literature review of Hawlitschek et al. (2018) offers a detailed analysis of the
behavioral and technological conceptualization of trust in the sharing economy and the blockchain realm.
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Specifically, Keymolen (2013)’s conceptualization of interpersonal system trust goes be-
yond the translation of offline cues to an online environment (e.g., through representation
in the agent layer). The author suggests to take into account the peculiarities of the un-
derlying online technology. In particular, it is recommended to ’evaluate the techniques
employed to build, use, and maintain the platforms’ (Keymolen, 2013).
In contrast, the reviewed blockchain literature conceptualizes trust mostly in the lower
technology-based layers, and thus does not cross the trust frontier. An exception is the
study of Sas and Khairuddin (2015), which dips into the behavioral layer and attempts to
elicit the main trust challenges of Bitcoin users and the related mitigation strategies. In
their assessment, the authors find that a core element of dealing with dishonest counter-
parties is a transactional limitation on those embedded in a credible institutional or social
environment. In the light of [the extended blockchain engineering framework illustrated
in figure 3.3], this highlights the importance to connect virtual action spaces with actual
behavioral patterns to establish trust between [interacting] parties and to cross the trust
frontier."
In total, "[...] the concepts of trust for the sharing economy and for blockchain technol-
ogy differ substantially and [...] there exists an obvious tension. On the one hand, trust
in the sharing economy is widely regarded as a complex concept with multiple stakehold-
ers, targets, and dimensions [(Hawlitschek, 2019; Mittendorf, 2016; Möhlmann, 2016;
Tussyadiah, 2016)]. On the other hand, the promise of the blockchain as a trust-free tech-
nology points at the replacement of trusted third parties such as platform intermediaries.
The difference that lies in these mainly distinct concepts has important implications for
theory and practice. First, in order to successfully contribute to theory on trust in different
contexts, it is of utmost importance for sharing economy and blockchain related research
to agree on a set of common concepts and expressions and to relate those to established
work. Since both fields of research are relatively young, it is all the more necessary to
critically assess and discuss the promises derived from nonacademic literature and media,
from a scientific, well-structured and theory-grounded point of view. Second, established
platform operators and developers of blockchain-based platforms need to be aware of the
fact that blockchain technology in and by itself is not able to provide an environment that
renders trust-building outside the closed blockchain ecosystem obsolete. Third, in order to
leverage the advantages of a trust-free blockchain-based platform, means of overcoming
the trust-frontier between the closed technical system and the actual physical world need
to be further developed by both researchers and practitioners."
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3.5.2 Overcoming the Trust Frontier
"While we agree with the general notion of the blockchain’s potential to replace central
infrastructures as well as intermediary and payment services [(Glaser, 2017)], we suggest
a more critical view on the actual closedness of complex [...] ecosystems. Based on [the]
literature review [of Hawlitschek et al. (2018)], we argue that the sharing economy as a
complex phenomenon with socio-technical characteristics (John, 2013), can usually not
be regarded as a fully self-contained or closed ecosystem that only relies on transactions
and information generated within its own boundaries (Glaser, 2017). We propose the
concept of the trust frontier that separates interactions in the behavioral layer from their
representation in the agent layer. Since human interactions in the real world are very
difficult to integrate in a closed blockchain-based ecosystem without the need for a ’trusted
interface’ (Glaser, 2017, p. 1550), sharing transactions with actual human interaction
cannot be carried out in a completely trust-free manner.
A recent study on commons-oriented sharing ecosystems finds that ’when it comes to
more complex social relationships, involving sharing of resources and assets, blockchain
technology alone does not suffice for people to develop trusted interactions’ (Pazaitis et al.,
2017, p. 6). The authors suggest to address this issue by introducing an additional trust
layer based on human relations, that is, a reputation system nourished by a community-
based evaluation process (Pazaitis et al., 2017). Using participatory evaluation as a first
step towards a trusted interface to blockchain-based ecosystems may, however, entail a set
of potential drawbacks. Not only did the authors report that users stated a sense of dis-
comfort for evaluating certain contributions of others, [...] empowering the crowd [also]
entails the risk of unintended consequences and even misbehavior (Wilson et al., 2017).
The German start-up slock.it circumvents the problem of integrating behavioral aspects
in the blockchain system, by reversing the challenge [...]. Instead of developing a trusted
interface, [they extend] the reach of the closed blockchain system by integrating smart
products in a blockchain-based internet of things. Therefore, mainly behavioral aspects
related to shared products and not necessarily to other peers need to be considered. How-
ever, this strategy does not resolve or overcome the trust frontier but rather shifts it towards
the real world, leaving the question of trusted interfaces for human behavior unaffected.
As a result of the current scarcity of functional trusted interfaces to blockchain-based [...]
ecosystems, the sharing economy is unlikely to run completely trust-free in the near fu-
ture.
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Even if [...] trusted interfaces for overcoming the trust frontier would be available,
replacing trust in a platform provider with the provision of blockchain-based algorithmic
authority raises several issues concerning trust in algorithms (Ahangama and Poo, 2016;
Lustig and Nardi, 2015). A user’s individual degree of trust in algorithms and her will-
ingness to rely on blockchain technology may well depend on the technical knowledge,
experience, and affinity. While smart contracts that organize sharing economy transac-
tions can in theory be reviewed by each individual capable of reading their specifications
and thus may operate trust-free, less tech-savvy users have to trust in the algorithm itself
or rather the programmers or actors providing the code and making the algorithm ’run
smoothly’ (Lustig and Nardi, 2015, p. 751) and legally compliant (Al Khalil et al., 2017).
As suggested by Lustig and Nardi (2015), this kind of trust in algorithms may require reg-
ulation, the development of social norms, and a common language between developers
and lawyers (Al Khalil et al., 2017) that further complicate the successful development of
platforms based on blockchain technology."
3.6 Research Gap Blockchain Engineering
"Overall, we perceive the blockchain as a decentralized infrastructure that not only sup-
ports markets [and other] forms of platform-based applications [but has the potential to
reshape] the role of trust [(Hawlitschek, 2019)]. Within this scope, the blockchain [...]
engineering framework [provides] a guideline, to direct future research in the field of IS
and supports researchers and practitioners to identify key concepts of blockchain-based
economic systems in their endeavors. However, these key concepts should not be limited
to specific elements of our framework but also take dependencies, interactions, and recip-
rocal relationships among the respective elements into account. Moreover, we encourage
the blockchain community to go beyond a pure engineering perspective and include all
stakeholders, such as users, regulatory bodies, and other third parties in their interdisci-
plinary analyses. In addition, IS researchers should go beyond the known use cases and
adopt blockchain as an IT artifact to connect human and artificial agents on a decentralized
level. [Closing this research gap may] include [...] DSR approaches to explore the [design
and] technological capabilities of blockchain-based [...]" systems (Chapter 4) and trusted
interfaces as well as theoretical and empirical studies to assess user behavior (Chapter 5),
the interplay between technological and economic system characteristics, and the impact
on market outcomes (Chapter 6).
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
"The blockchain is a truly fascinating technology with a set of characteristics that have the
potential to transform and disrupt a variety of different industries, such as financial mar-
kets (Fanning and Centers, 2016), transaction and asset management systems (Ruault,
2016), or the sharing economy (Sundararajan, 2016). However, in order to transition
from a buzzword at the top of the Gartner Hype Cycle (Gartner, 2016) to an established
technological basis for real-world [(market) platforms], blockchain technology still has
a long way to go" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1074). As demonstrated in the literature
reviews of Notheisen et al. (2017) and Hawlitschek et al. (2018), "[...] IS research can
play a leading role in facilitating and shaping this transition [...]. However, in order to
make a valuable contribution [...], IS researchers may profit from a common language
and approach to structure their research efforts, put them into perspective with respect to
the elements of blockchain systems, and position their work in relation to other contribu-
tions. In order to help and guide [them] in doing so, [this chapter introduces and extends]
the blockchain [...] engineering framework" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 1074). It com-
prises five layers – the environment layer, the infrastructure layer, the application layer, the
agent layer, and the behavioral layer. "The environment layer forms an ambient fundament
that incorporates social, legal, and economic surroundings and norms and constrains the
action spaces available within the other layers. Building on this foundation, the infras-
tructure layer forms the technological backbone of the blockchain system. It consists of
the protocol layer, which implements the core blockchain elements [...] and connects the
heterogeneous crowd of devices of the hardware layer with a specific application context.
The resulting application layer realizes the features and rules that form a platform, market,
or service [and determines] interaction of human and computer agents [in the real-world
behavioral layer]. [...] The trust-free property builds on the synergetic collection of tech-
nological features located in the infrastructure layer and application layer" (Hawlitschek
et al., 2018, p. 59). However, the behavioral and technological conceptualizations of trust
differ substantially. On one side, trust is perceived as a complex and interlaced construct
with a multitude of stakeholders, targets, and dimensions. On the other side, the trust-free
character of blockchain-based systems focuses on technological details, while neglecting
the actual behavioral patterns of interacting agents. In consequence, overcoming the re-
sulting trust frontier between the application and the behavioral layer is paramount to
realize the promise of fully decentralized markets.
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After conceptualizing the elements, layers, and limitations of blockchain-based platforms
in Chapter 3, the blockchain engineering approach is applied to the use case of decentral-
ized markets in this chapter. More specifically, we illustrate and verify the design, architec-
ture, and features of decentralized markets and implement their core building blocks - a
transparent transaction system and a intermediary-free market mechanism - by the means
of proof-of-concept prototypes.
To guide the creation of these IT artifacts and demonstrate their validity, efficacy, and
utility, we apply established guidelines from DSR. To take blockchain-specific characteris-
tics into account, these approaches are furthermore complemented by tailored blockchain
design frameworks. Section 4.1 summarizes these design principles, outlines implications,
and thereby paves the way to implement the building blocks of decentralized markets in
the two subsequent sections.
Section 4.2 implements "[...] a blockchain-based proof-of-concept prototype that en-
ables the automated transaction of [digital and] real-world assets, such as cars, and pro-
vides a valid, transparent, and immutable record of vehicle history to market participants,
authorities, and other third parties" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 425). The resulting trans-
action system aims to replace "[...] trust-based, centralized, and bureaucratic [registries]
with a tamper-free and autonomous transactional database [...] that comprises a secure
registration and transaction process" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 425). In addition, it com-
prises "[...] a built-in mechanism to reduce transaction risk resulting from the irreversibility
of transactions in blockchain-based systems" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 425).
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As a result, the prototype "[...] proposes a novel approach to mitigate adverse selection
effects in lemon markets by providing a reliable, transparent, and complete record of each
marketable asset’s history" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 425). In total, Section 4.2 illustrates
a possible system design, demonstrates the potential of a decentralized transaction system,
and highlights technological limitations (e.g., scalability) and economic implications (e.g.,
transparency). A detailed analysis of the transparency effects that come with such systems
follows in Chapter 5.
Section 4.3 extends this transaction system with an essential prerequisite to implement
fully decentralized markets: A mechanism to connect demand and supply without a cen-
tral authority. The resulting proof-of-concept prototype challenges the role of traditional
intermediaries and proposes a market framework that enables users to raise equity and
trade stocks in an intermediary-free environment. The resulting IT artifact implements
the software structure of a decentralized market place, demonstrates "[...] the feasibility
of decentralized market mechanisms, and highlights potential use cases as well as limi-
tations" (Notheisen et al., 2017, p. 474). Again, an economic analysis of the impact on
market outcomes and market quality follows in Chapter 6.
Eventually, Section 4.4 merges Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 to illustrate the concept
of decentralized markets. In addition, full versions of the implemented prototypes and
the corresponding testing procedures are available on Gitlab. Appendix B provides an
overview of the associated repository, briefly describes the stored smart contracts and test-
ing procedures, and offers references to the directories and code files.
4.1 Design Principles
4.1.1 Design Science Approach
To guide the creation, evaluation, and presentation of the IT artifacts presented in this
chapter, we build on established theories and guidelines from the field of DSR. More
specifically, we follow the guidelines proposed by Hevner et al. (2004) and search for a
solution to a practical problem or challenge. These problems are explained in detail and
formulated as research questions in each section respectively. The resulting IT artifacts are
proof-of-concept prototypes that aim to illustrate how one could implement the building
blocks of decentralized markets in a trust-free fashion.
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Throughout the development process, we ensure our research’s rigor by adopting the
guidelines introduced by Hevner et al. (2004) and by complementing them with additional
DSR frameworks (Peffers et al., 2007; March and Smith, 1995) as well as blockchain-
specific approaches (Xu et al., 2017, 2016; Wüst and Gervais, 2017). More specifically, we
build on existing knowledge gathered from the field of blockchain-based economic systems
in Chapter 3 and iteratively adapt the prototypes throughout the development process (Pef-
fers et al., 2007). In order to ensure the efficacy and efficiency within the building phase,
we perform detailed requirements analyses within each use case and continuously reeval-
uate the artifacts within each iteration (March and Smith, 1995). To evaluate the resulting
solutions and to demonstrate each prototype’s utility, quality, and efficacy, we furthermore
apply structural and functional testing procedures (Hevner et al., 2004). Figure 4.1 illus-
trates the integrated development process. Embedding the development into the artifact’s
application environment ensures its relevance and the application of the existing knowl-
edge base facilitates the rigor in its creation. In addition, it illustrates the iterative cycle
of building and evaluation phases that form the development process.
Environment IS Research Knowledge Base
Rele-
vance
Rigor
Foundations
 Theories 
 Frameworks
 Market models
 Instantiations
 Use cases
Methodologies
 Blockchain enginneering
 DSR
 Software engineering
Justify/Evaluate
Testing procedures,
case study
Develop/Build
Artifact
Application to the 
appropriate environment
Additions to the 
knowledge base
Assess Refine
Business needs
Application 
knowledge
Stakeholders
 Roles
 Capabilities
 Characteristics
Market platform
 Structure
 Processes
Technology
 Infrastructure
 Architecture
 Development capabilities
 Applications
FIGURE 4.1: DSR approach artifact development
Iterative DSR approach applied to guide the development of the IT artifacts in Chapter 4 (adapted
from Hevner et al., 2004).
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Eventually, we aim to maximize the impact of our research by presenting our results
to both, technology- and management-oriented audiences. To do so, we structure the
following sections according to Gregor and Hevner (2013) and illustrate the underlying
economic principles as well as the artifacts’ architectural features. Figure 4.2 illustrates
the resulting structure of Sections 4.2 and 4.3 and summarizes the content and purpose of
each subsection briefly. By these means, we hope to make our findings accessible to both
researchers and practitioners alike.
Intro-
duction
Literature 
Review
Method
Artifact 
Description
Discussion
Concluding 
Remarks
Section 4.1
Evaluation
 Motivation and 
introduction to key 
concepts
 Resaerch objectives
 Problem definition 
and significance
 Overview and brief 
summary of the 
findings
 Prior research and 
findings from 
practice
 Description of  the 
use case
 Research questions
 Demonstration of 
the artifact’s 
validity, quality, 
and efficacy
 Utilized test 
procedures
Artifact
Design
Artifact 
Features
 Abstract descript-
ion of the artifact’s 
architecture
 Mapping to DSR 
guidelines
 Blockchain design 
decisions
 Description of the 
designed artifact, its 
specific software 
structure and methods
 Illustration of the 
implemented processes
 Demonstration of the 
artifact’s usefulness
 Summary of results 
and connection to 
the research 
questions
 Interpretation of 
implications
 Analysis of 
limitations
 Summary of the 
section
 Highlight the 
contribution
 Future research 
and outlook
FIGURE 4.2: Structure and content of Chapter 4
This figure is based on Gregor and Hevner (2013) and illustrates the structure and content of Sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3. Dashed lines indicate adaptions: To prevent redundancy and pave the way, the
DSR approach is outlined in the preceeding Section 4.1. To provide a detailed artifact description,
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 differentiate between the generalized design and specific features.
4.1.2 Blockchain Design
To guide the blockchain-specific aspects of the design of the prototypes in Sections 4.2
and 4.3, we utilize and combine the frameworks introduced by Wüst and Gervais (2017),
Xu et al. (2016), Xu et al. (2017). Wüst and Gervais (2017) examine under which cir-
cumstances a particular scenario is reasonably solvable with blockchain technology. The
resulting framework supports us in the assessment of the blockchain’s general appropri-
ateness and allows the elimination of infeasible use cases before the implementation of a
prototype. Xu et al. (2016) consider the blockchain as a software connector that enables
decentralized data sharing among interacting parties in the absence of trust.
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Building on this paradigm, they differentiate between different blockchain and application
design decisions to elaborate on the implications and trade-offs associated with specific
choices. In consequence, we use this framework to explicitly guide our design decisions
in the artifact development. Xu et al. (2017) propose an indicative conceptual model that
aims to support the assessment of design implications. Their framework captures central
design parameters of the blockchain systems via a taxonomy and enables users to compare
different blockchain configurations with respect to the implementation of fundamental
blockchain properties, cost efficiency, performance, and flexibility. As a result, we use the
study of Xu et al. (2017) to assess the implications of our design decisions.
To provide a brief overview of potential blockchain configurations and discuss the re-
sulting implications, we break the associated design decisions down into distinct design
choices. These mutually exclusive choices build on academic literature about blockchain
design (Wüst and Gervais, 2017; Xu et al., 2016, 2017) and specifications extracted from
the most popular publicly available blockchain platforms (i.e., Ethereum, Hyperledger Fab-
ric, and R3’s Corda). The five resulting design dimensions include network characteristics,
data storage, scalability, architectural features, and the deployment model. Table 4.1 sum-
marizes the design decisions associated with each dimension and indicates choices.
Design dimensions Design decisions Design choices
Network characteristics
Degree of centralization Centralized Intermediate Decentralized
Access rights Private Hybrid Public
Access control Permissioned Permissionless
Data storage
Privacy Sensitive data No sensitive data
Immutability No changes or deletions Changes or deletions preferred Changes or deletions required
Location On-Chain Mixed Off-Chain
Instances Single chain Multiple chains
Scalability
Tasks/second Low Medium High
Cost/task Low Medium High
Computation On-Chain Mixed Off-Chain
Architectural features
Consensus Not needed Security focus Performance focus
Incentives Not required Optional Needed
External validation Automated Ad-hoc No validation
Deployment model
Hardware deployment On premise Third-party cloud Blockchain-as-a-service
Protocol development & maintenance Insourcing Mix Outsourcing
TABLE 4.1: Blockchain design dimensions, decisions, and choices
This table summarizes possible blockchain design dimensions, decisions, and choices within the
artifact development. It is based on Xu et al. (2016), Xu et al. (2017), and Wüst and Gervais
(2017) and the specifications of popular blockchain platforms. Note that infeasible configurations,
such as a fully centralized public network, a public network without a consensus mechanism or
no incentives, the deletion of on-chain data, or a high scalability in combination with on-chain
storage and computation are not considered in this overview.
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Network characteristics. Network characteristics focus on system access and its de-
gree of centralization. In research and practice, it is common to differentiate between
public, hybrid or consortium, and private networks. The decentralized character of public
blockchains offers high levels of transparency and facilitates an equal distribution of rights
among all users but impedes performance (Guo and Liang, 2016). In a fully centralized
and private network on the other hand, the users rely on a central authority to mediate
transactions, manage memberships, or illegitimate malicious parties (Xu et al., 2017). As
a result, performance increases, while the provision of database updates is limited to a cen-
tral authority (Xu et al., 2017). In addition, commercial applications often require privacy
levels that go beyond the cryptographic means available in public blockchains. A hybrid
blockchain allows intermediate levels of centralization as users that know and potentially
trust each other form a consortium. In such network setups, only a few users may write
data, whereas the others can only read it. However, the ability to append new information
depends on the access rights granted to each user. In a permissioned blockchain, a specific
set of users acts as gatekeepers that restrict read and write access (Xu et al., 2017). In
consequence, permission management is essential to control access rights and authorize
(new) users. In contrast, permissionless systems restrict neither the right to write or read
nor the ability to join the network thereby facilitating true peer-to-peer interactions and
the balance of power among users (Wüst and Gervais, 2017).
Data storage. With respect to data storage, the the community of blockchain users
needs to consider where and how data should be stored and whether data privacy is impor-
tant for them or not. Especially in commercial or corporate scenarios, data privacy may be
crucial as sharing sensitive information entails significant strategic and legal risks. On the
other side, transparency and immutability are essential to ensure the integrity of the data
stored on the blockchain. Hence, there is an inherent trade-off between privacy and trans-
parency in every use case (Wüst and Gervais, 2017). Potential measures to account for
privacy concerns include the encryption of on-chain data or refraining from storing sensi-
tive data on-chain. However, this may lead to a loss of functionalities and jeopardizes data
quality. Beyond that, other approaches do not resolve privacy issues but offer anonymity,
while at the same time providing enough transparency for any node to verify data transac-
tions (Sasson et al., 2014). Similarly using private or permissioned blockchains does not
prevent users from seeing the stored information. In consequence, the best way to keep
data private is to store it off-chain or setting up separate blockchains that run in parallel,
and thus limit disclosure (Wüst and Gervais, 2017).
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A second feature that is essential for data integrity is immutability. It ensures the avail-
ability of a precise and verifiable audit trail for historical transactions thereby alleviating
the need for trust. However, there are situations in which data may change or needs dele-
tion (Catalini and Gans, 2016). Changes to the blockchain are realized by creating new
transactions, which are appended to the database (Xu et al., 2016). Incorrect or expired
entries are not replaced, and thus deleting data is a problem. In consequence, data im-
mutability does not only pose challenges from a business perspective but also includes legal
risks. Potential solutions to this issue propose to store sensitive data off-chain keeping it
erasable (Xu et al., 2016). In addition, limiting on-chain storage to meta-data, critical data,
and hashes mitigates problems due to the blockchain’s growing size (Xu et al., 2017).
Scalability. Scalability is one of the most discussed limitations of blockchain technol-
ogy and depends on a multitude of factors, such as the number of network participants,
the orthogonality of their interests, network characteristics, data storage, and security re-
quirements (Vukolic´, 2016). As result of this multi-faceted nature, assessing scalability
includes many aspects that require individual measures. To assess the number of tasks a
system can process per second, we need to differentiate between submission and validation
throughput. The submission throughput represents the maximum number of transactions
(e.g., in form of process steps) submitted per second. The validation throughput - which
determines the actual processing speed - relates to the maximum number of transactions
validated per second. Latency refers to the time between submission and validation. On
average, Xu et al. (2017) claim, current public blockchains are able to process 3-20 trans-
actions per second. This is in line with the anecdotal evidence extracted from the small
sample of blockchain platforms considered in this section as well. However, due to the
trade-off between security and performance, the simpler consensus mechanisms applied
in private or hybrid networks can improve scalability. In addition, current research ex-
plores means to improve performance across all network types (Vukolic´, 2016). Besides
task performance, the blockchain designers should also consider the costs per transaction
that result from the consensus process (e.g., in form of electricity consumption (O’Dwyer
and Malone, 2014; de Vries, 2018)) and infrastructure investments (e.g., blockchain de-
velopment and maintenance or the provision of storage capacity). An essential inhibitor
of performance and driver of costs is the implementation of applications via smart con-
tracts. These applications rely on on-chain computations within the blockchain network,
and therefore limit performance and increase costs significantly. Consequently, shifting
computational efforts off-chain, while keeping the verification of the results on-chain con-
stitutes an efficient means to improve a systems throughput (Xu et al., 2016).
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Architectural features. The architectural features of a use case set the way consensus
between participating users is achieved. At the core of each blockchain, the consensus
mechanism mediates conflicts and defines the rules that ensure that a newly added trans-
action is valid (Xu et al., 2016). Due to the trade-off between a network’s openness and
a system’s integrity, different forms of consensus mechanisms are required to achieve a
specific level of security and data quality. Today, the most common approach is POW -
an expensive mechanism that enables a high Sybil resistance in public networks. How-
ever, there is a rising number of alternatives that solve the consensus challenge efficiently,
such as proof-of-stake or practical byzantine fault tolerance (Xu et al., 2017). For hybrid
blockchains, one can assign consensus duties to authorized nodes in favor of scalability (Xu
et al., 2016). In private blockchains, a central authority may replace a consensus mecha-
nism in its original sense. However, in any setup an important prerequisite of the consen-
sus process is the users’ motivation to participate. Especially in open and conflict-laden
scenarios, it may be important to introduce explicit incentives (e.g., in form of monetary
rewards or reputation systems) to facilitate honest behavior among participants. How-
ever, if there are implicit incentives, such as the reduction of information asymmetries or
increased process efficiency, explicit incentives may play a minor role (Notheisen et al.,
2017). Irrespective of the way consensus is reached, the integrity of the blockchain is lim-
ited to its digital boundaries (Xu et al., 2017; Glaser, 2017). As a result, a use case may
require external validations. In the case of digitized value networks, existing workflows
can integrate this procedure via validation oracles (Xu et al., 2016). If on the other hand
automation is not possible or impractical, one can fall back to ad-hoc validations by human
arbitrators (Xu et al., 2016).
Deployment model. Eventually, after the specification is considered, a deployment
model needs to be chosen. This decision determines the amount of blockchain-specific
skills and knowledge required, and thus comprises a substantial strategic component.
Blockchain-as-a-service models offer an easy access but may impede building up own
blockchain competencies (Xu et al., 2017). An intermediate solution are cloud-based ser-
vices offered by third-party infrastructure providers. However, if a use case embodies an
essential driver of one of the users’ competitive advantage a deployment on premise may
be the preferable choice. The same considerations also remain relevant for the develop-
ment and maintenance of the blockchain protocol and smart contract-based applications.
Eventually and consistent with previous IS research, the decision to in- or outsource devel-
opment strongly depends on the exposure of the stakeholders core competencies (Quinn
and Hilmer, 1994) and the quality of the service provider (Lee and Kim, 1999).
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4.2 A Transparent Transaction System
This section is based on the article "Trading Real-World Assets on Blockchain An Applica-
tion of Trust-Free Transaction Systems in the Market for Lemons". It is co-authored by Jacob
Benjamin Cholewa and Arun Prasad Shanmugam and was published in Business & Informa-
tion Systems Engineering in December 2017. Direct citations are highlighted by double quotes.
Publication details:
Notheisen, B., Cholewa, J. B. & Shanmugam, A. P.,
Trading Real-World Assets on Blockchain - An Application of Trust-Free Transaction Systems
in the Market for Lemons,
Business & Information Systems Engineering (BISE), December 2017, Volume 59, Issue 6,
pp. 425–440,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-017-0499-8.
4.2.1 Introduction
"In this [section], we utilize the use case of the Danish Motor Register (DMR) to present
a new way to record, manage, and track the status of ownership of physical assets, such
as cars, and develop, implement, and evaluate a blockchain-based transaction system that
aims to replace centralized institutions as trusted third parties. We choose Denmark as
it is a technologically advanced nation and a front-runner in the digitalization of govern-
mental services to illustrate the benefits of blockchain-based systems with respect to public
registry and transaction systems. In collaboration with the Danish tax authority SKAT, we
explore the potential of a blockchain-based car register and illustrate how it might be able
to replace traditional trust-based, centralized, and bureaucratic systems.
Within this scope, the contribution of our research is threefold: First, we introduce a
built-in mechanism to reduce transaction risk associated with the irreversibility of block-
chain transactions (Böhme et al., 2015). Second, we address the challenges of providing
and maintaining a complete and consistent public record of vehicle history by replacing a
traditional register with a blockchain-based alternative that includes a secure registration
and transaction process. In doing so, we illustrate how to replace a potentially expensive,
trust-based, incomplete, and inconsistent bureaucratic registry with an autonomous and
potentially cost-efficient transaction log.
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Third, we propose to mitigate adverse selection effects in lemon markets (Akerlof,
1970) by providing a reliable, transparent, and complete record of each marketable as-
set’s history. In addition, our generic software design introduces a generalized transaction
framework, in which the DMR use case inherits its core functionalities from the high-level
framework. This way, we take practical considerations into account as the generic system
design allows the extensions to other assets and ensures applicability beyond the use case
of cars."
4.2.2 Related Literature
"This [sub]section provides a brief introduction to blockchain-based commercial systems,
outlines the DMR use case, and identifies a research gap at the interdisciplinary intersec-
tion of the fields of information systems and economics. In consequence, [the following
paragraphs introduce the issue of transaction risk in blockchain-based systems], illustrate
the use case of the DMR and its practical challenges, and [highlight] the problem of adverse
selection in used good markets, such as the market for used cars."
Trust-free Transaction Systems & Transaction Risk
"Transaction risk relates to the irreversibility of transactions conducted via blockchain sys-
tems (Böhme et al., 2015). In combination with decentralized timestamping and the inter-
connection of blocks, the irreversibility of transactions ensures the correct order of trans-
actions and is essential to protect users from double-spending attempts and the dissemi-
nation of corrupted data by malicious agents. The resulting data immutability enables the
transacting parties to trust in the correctness of the stored transactional history. In the case
of erroneous transactions or fraud, the irreversible character of current protocols, such as
Bitcoin or Ethereum, remains an unsolved issue and poses a prohibitive obstacle for the
transaction of valuable real-world assets, such as cars and securities. All else equal this
leads users to prefer alternative systems that offer mechanisms to undo faulty transactions
or to retake the transacted asset by force. Overall, we take up the notion of cryptographic
transaction systems introduced by Beck et al. (2016), extend the concept to the on-chain
transmission of real-world assets, and formulate the following first research question:"
Research Question 3. How can market engineers decrease the risk resulting from the irre-
versibility of blockchain transactions, while still providing a valid transaction log?
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Use Case - The Life Cycle of a Car in Denmark
"In the course of its product life cycle, a vehicle and its owner(s) are involved in a variety
of administrative and bureaucratic processes. These processes include a variety of steps,
such as a car’s registration with the motor register, the payment of levies and taxes, repairs,
modifications, inspections, and interactions with loan, leasing, or insurance firms. One of
the most important and complicated steps is the transfer of ownership after a trade.
With Denmark being a small country, SKAT owns and oversees most of these adminis-
trative and bureaucratic processes and provides the related governmental services. More
specifically, the DMR operates an IT system that handles the bureaucratic processes in-
volved in vehicle transfers and provides a trusted record of ownership and vehicle-specific
information throughout the vehicle’s life cycle. As a result, the DMR database serves as
a repository for all inputs and outputs from various stakeholders, such as owners, deal-
erships, importers, and scrap dealers, as well as government agencies, such as transport
authorities, police departments, SKAT themselves, and other third parties, such as insur-
ance companies, banks, or leasing firms.
The following steps and figure 4.3 illustrate a vehicle’s life cycle in detail and highlight
the involvement of SKAT, the DMR, and other stakeholders:
• Import & initial registration: Since there are no domestic car manufacturers in Den-
mark, all vehicles have to be acquired from foreign producers. Imported vehicles are
registered at the DMR upon arrival and the importer has to pay levies and taxes to
SKAT.
• Allocation: After the registration, the vehicles are transferred to dealerships, which
allocate them to their new owners. As the status of ownership changes, the new
owner as well as insurance information need to be reported to SKAT and stored
in the DMR. Only if all requirements are met, SKAT issues a vehicle registration
certificate and and grants a road approval.
• Maintenance: During its life cycle, a vehicle experiences a variety of maintenance
procedures, such as automobile inspections, repairs, or rebuilds. To ensure road
safety and to maintain a correct record of vehicle information, the DMR records
these maintenance activities and any other modifications.
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• Transfer of ownership: When a current owner wants to sell his or her vehicle and a
buyer is found, the interacting parties need to settle their trade by simultaneously
exchanging the vehicle and the negotiated payment amount. To minimize fraud
risk, it is crucial that the DMR provides a complete and valid record on the vehicle’s
history and its characteristics.
• De- and reregistration: Following the transfer of ownership, the vehicle needs to
be reregistered with SKAT and the DMR. Only if a vehicle is de- and reregistered
correctly, taxes and levies are paid, and the transfer of ownership is recorded at
the DMR, SKAT issues a new registration certificate legitimizing the new status of
ownership and granting road approval.
• Scrapping: Eventually, a vehicle is worn-out or damaged and needs to be scrapped.
As a result, the owner receives a scrapping certificate and the DMR deregisters the
vehicle."
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FIGURE 4.3: The life cycle of a car in Denmark
This figure illustrates the process steps and stakeholder involvement of a car during its life cycle
(Notheisen et al., 2017).
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"Along these steps, SKAT is involved at several points and faces individual challenges at
each integration point, with the transfer of ownership being the most crucial one. In ad-
dition, the integration of third party services, such as financial or insurance services, and
updating and maintaining the centralized DMR database produces a significant bureau-
cratic and organizational effort. As a result, the increasing size of the centralized DMR
database leads to an increase in complexity, an increase in hardware, maintenance, and
conversion costs, and a decrease in performance (Connolly and Begg, 2015; Elmasri and
Navathe, 2010)."
Research Question 4. To which extent can a blockchain-based transaction system store and
represent the life-cycle of a car?
Adverse Selection in the Market for Used Cars
"Adverse selection describes a situation, in which interacting parties attach value to the
quality of a transacted object but at the same time possess different levels of information
about it. One of the best-known examples for a market with adverse selection effects
is Akerlof’s Market for Lemons (Akerlof, 1970), where used cars of differing quality are
traded between buyers and sellers.
In order to dismantle this asymmetric distribution of information, potential buyers use
heuristic approaches to assess the quality of their prospective purchase and try to infer
the cars’ characteristics from statistical estimators based on prior experiences, markets
trading similar goods, or price signals provided by sellers (Wolinsky, 1983). Despite their
efforts however, the heuristic’s accuracy decreases in bi- or multilateral market setups and
the buyers’ knowledge about the true value of a car often remains opaque and a residual
uncertainty about quality cannot be resolved (Genesove, 1993). As a result, equilibrium
prices reflect the average quality of all cars in the market (Wilson, 1980) and good and bad
vehicles sell at the same price, while only sellers know their true characteristics. In this
pooling equilibrium, the sellers of low-quality cars (i.e., lemons) earn informational rents
equal to the difference between the market price and the cars’ true values, and thus have an
incentive to enter the market. The owners of high-quality cars on the other hand would
earn negative rents as their vehicles’ true values are greater than the equilibrium price,
and thus withdraw form the market. Eventually, Gresham’s Law comes into effect and
the lemons drive out high-quality cars (Akerlof, 1970). In a continuous world, different
levels of quality create a cascading effect as lower quality cars continuously drive out the
marginally better ones until no demand or supply is left and the market collapses.
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Reality however is less extreme and studies such as Bond (1982), Hendel and Lizzeri
(2002), or Peterson and Schneider (2014) show that markets for used cars never shut
down completely and that the traded volume remains substantial despite the presence
of information asymmetries. One explanation for these findings is the development of
counteracting institutions (Akerlof, 1970; Bond, 1982; Genesove, 1993), which aim to en-
sure a minimum level of quality. These institutions include the provision of guarantees,
licensing and certification, or the introduction of brand names. In addition, in a long-term
relationship with repeated transactions reputation-based mechanisms can function as a
disciplining device (Genesove, 1993). Another explanation is the impact of efficient sort-
ing between drivers who prefer different levels of quality (Hendel et al., 2005). However,
the resulting self-selection effect only holds for non-functional parts of cars, such as a ve-
hicle’s exterior condition, and Peterson and Schneider (2014) find evidence that adverse
selection effects prevail for vital parts, such as the engine or the transmission. As a third
solution, Tirole (2012) proposes governmental interventions that aim to support sellers
with the strongest legacy assets and at the same time cleans the market of its weakest
assets. The fourth and final explanation simply describes a situation, in which the buyers
are able to acquire enough information to approximate the cars quality sufficiently Bond
(1982) in order to overcome the adverse selection problem. Despite their limited efficacy,
all of these counteraction measures are costly, and thus might impede a market’s efficiency
beyond a socially optimal level (Bond, 1982). The evidence of Gavazza et al. (2014) sup-
ports this notion and indicates a negative effect of transaction costs related to information
asymmetries on transaction volumes, allocation, and the welfare of lower-valuation house-
holds. Similarly, Peterson and Schneider (2014) show that adverse selection effects have
a negative impact on trading volume and overall quality in the U.S. secondary market for
cars.
In consequence, we follow Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Jappelli and Pagano (2002),
Djankov et al. (2007), Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014) who identify a positive impact of
the transmission of privately held information on market efficiency and trading volume, go
beyond known concepts, and introduce a blockchain-based transaction system, that aims
to resolve adverse selection by sharing information. As a distributed, publicly available,
consensually agreed, and secured ledger, the blockchain facilitates the disclosure of infor-
mation and impedes the provision of intentionally corrupted information. The resulting
transactional database provides a valid and transparent record of each vehicle’s history
[and thereby improves] the ability of an uninformed buyer to approximate a car’s true
quality and value.
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From an administrative perspective, the transaction system assumes the task of tracking
changes of ownership and vehicle characteristics, improving the accuracy and transparency
of the database at any given point in time. Overall, we propose to utilize the blockchain
as an alternative to current institutions and a novel mechanism to publicly disclose vehicle
information thereby reducing adverse selection effects in the market for used cars (Lewis,
2011)."
Research Question 5. Which characteristics of blockchain-based transaction systems affect
information asymmetries, and thus the uncertainty about quality in the market for lemons?
4.2.3 Artifact Design
Design Decisions
To guide the creation, evaluation, and presentation of our prototypical blockchain-based
transaction system, we utilize the design principles introduced in Section 4.1. Table 4.2
summarizes the mapping of our research against the DSR guidelines summarized in Sub-
section 4.1.1. "The resulting IT artifact is a proof-of-concept prototype that aims to replace
a traditional registry system with a trust-free, decentralized, and automated alternative
with a built-in mechanism to prevent unwanted transactions. Utilizing the blockchain’s
core features, it furthermore provides a resilient, transparent, and valid database for multi-
ple parties, such as buyers and sellers of cars, government agencies, and other third parties
that reduces information asymmetries by sharing previously private information. In order
to ensure the efficacy and efficiency of our artifact, we perform a detailed requirement
analysis based on the use case of the DMR and continuously reevaluate the system within
each iteration of the building phase (March and Smith, 1995). Overall, we contribute to
existing research of blockchain-based commercial systems by extending the knowledge on
the development of a blockchain-based IT artifact, offering a new approach to address in-
efficiencies in public sector registries (Fairfield, 2015). In addition, we go beyond known
concepts and propose a novel solution to adverse selection effects by transacting assets in
a trust-free setup without a central authority or institution. "
In addition, we take the blockchain-specific design decisions introduced in Section 4.1.2
into account. Table 4.3 summarizes the related choices. Based on the resulting blockchain
configuration (Xu et al., 2016, 2017), "[...] our proof-of-concept prototype utilizes the
Ethereum framework introduced by Buterin (2013) and Wood (2014)."
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Guideline Contribution
Design as
an artifact
"The outcome of our research is a proof-of-concept prototype that implements a blockchain-based IT
artifact with built-in transaction safeguards that allow the correction of errors in the transaction pro-
cess."
Problem
relevance
"Our research questions respond to the mitigation of transaction risk inherent in blockchain systems
(research question 3), the reduction of inefficiencies in public registry systems (research question 4),
and the resolution of adverse selection risks in used good or lemon markets (research question 5)."
Design
evaluation
"We evaluate and demonstrate the utility, quality, and efficacy of our prototype via structural and func-
tional testing (Hevner et al., 2004). In addition, we execute our prototype across different scenarios of
the DMR use case to test and illustrate its functionalities."
Research
contribu-
tions
"The contribution of our research is threefold: First, we extend the knowledge on blockchain-based
commercial systems and provide a built-in mechanism to mitigate transaction risk (Böhme et al., 2015)
by allowing users to cancel incorrect transactions. Second, we adopt the concept of trust-free eco-
nomic systems (Beck et al., 2016) to the use case of the DMR and introduce a novel way to replace
trust-based and centralized bureaucratic registries with a trust-free, potentially cost-efficient, and au-
tonomous transaction system. Third, we alleviate adverse selection effects and dismantle information
asymmetries between buyers and sellers by sharing a transparent, reliable, and complete record of
vehicle history and ownership."
Research
rigor
"To ensure our research’s rigor, we employ well established DSR frameworks, such as Hevner et al.
(2004), Gregor and Hevner (2013), and March and Smith (1995), to guide the creation and construc-
tion of our IT artifact. In addition, we include guidelines specifically designed to support architectural
and structural decisions in the development of blockchain-based systems (Xu et al., 2016; Glaser, 2017;
Walsh et al., 2016)."
Design as a
search pro-
cess
"To discover an effective solution to the introduced research questions, we build on existing literature
about blockchain-based transaction systems, such as Beck et al. (2016), Nakamoto (2008), Buterin
(2013), or Wood (2014) and continuously evaluate and adapt our IT artifact throughout the develop-
ment process (March and Smith, 1995; Hevner et al., 2004)."
Communi-
cation of
research
"To maximize the potential impact of our research and to present our results to both, technology-
oriented and management-oriented audiences likewise, we structure our work according to Gregor
and Hevner (2013) and utilize the use case of the DMR to illustrate the organizational context for the
artifact’s development and application. To facilitate the understanding of technology-oriented audi-
ences, we provide a detailed description of the prototype’s software architecture, its implementation
logic, its features, and its application context. To support management-oriented audiences, we further-
more discuss the underlying business problems as well as related economic theories. Eventually, we
prove the effectiveness of our solution by discussing potentials and limitations of the prototype as well
as future applications."
TABLE 4.2: Application of the DSR guidelines to the DMR use case (Notheisen et al., 2017).
To implement and manage a fiat currency token, we furthermore use the popular ERC-
20 token standard8. This way, "[...] we can promote automation through transaction-
triggered smart contracts [and thereby minimize] bureaucratic and organizational efforts
related to the administration and maintenance of databases and registries, such as the
DMR. Ethereum furthermore possesses the following desirable features: First, it provides
security and resiliency through the integration of cryptographic hashing algorithms.
8A detailed description of the ERC-20 token standard is available in the Ethereum Wiki and on Github.
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Second, due to its distributed nature, the network is able to maintain itself and there is no
central point of failure. In addition, the block-based and chained data structure enables
users to traverse through the entire database, retrieve every past transaction and recon-
struct each vehicles history (Beck et al., 2016). In theory, this transparency provides a
solution to the adverse selection effects and data inconsistency issues introduced in [Sub-
section 4.2.2]. In total, these features establish an environment for a trust-free transaction
system that allows to move value between parties with divergent interests and information
and governs the transfer of ownership by generating a complete, transparent, and secure
record without a central institution."
Software Architecture & Market Design
"In order to build a powerful framework that meets the requirements described in [sub-
section 4.2.2], we choose an object-oriented software engineering approach and structure
the underlying smart contracts hierarchically. To do so, we first define a generic mar-
ketplace structure (as shown in figure 4.4) that spans a structural framework, while the
implementation of the prototype inherits its core functionalities. The generic design uti-
lizes a two-layer approach that combines a market platform with individual goods that can
be traded on this platform. Both, the platform and the traded object are represented by
smart contracts, which implement different methods, functions, and variables. The mar-
ketplace contract functions as an escrow agent that organizes trading activities and defines
the transaction process. The tradable contract represents the physical asset, keeps track of
its current owner, and allows ownership to change after a successful trade."
To ensure the marketplace’s extensibility, we [...] employ a hierarchical structure with
three levels as depicted in figure 4.4: The Marketplace contract defines the interface and
sets the minimum requirements for methods and corresponding events to achieve the ba-
sic functionalities specified above. The StandardMarketplce implements these methods
and constitutes the basic implementation of a functional marketplace. The IndexedMar-
ketplace extends the Marketplace with a set of convenience methods that allow the
offers on the marketplace to be indexed as iterated through. This way, we segregate the
interface, the core logic, and the convenience methods, [increase] the framework’s robust-
ness, [keep] it adaptable to different use cases and scenarios, and [ensure] the testability
of different modules. In addition, we allow the onTransferOwnership() method of the
Tradable contract to be overridden thereby allowing logic to happen during the transac-
tion process.
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Blockchain appropriateness (Wüst and Gervais, 2017)
With our prototype, we aim to illustrate the potential of decentralized registries to record and disclose transactional
information in a market setup with asymmetric information and opportunistic counterparties without a trusted
third party. Using blockchain technology allows us to take these requirements into account.
Blockchain design decisions (Xu et al., 2016)
Decision 1: Transac-
tion processing rate
"In 2015 the DMR conducted a total of 1,757,664 registration operations covering the reg-
istration of new vehicles by dealers, SKAT and other parties, the de- and reregistration fol-
lowing changes of ownership, registry updates following repairs, inspections, or modifica-
tions, and the deregistration of worn-out vehicles. At the current specification (gas limit per
block, average gas cost per transaction), the Ethereum network is able to process roughly
7 to 8 vehicle transactions every 30 seconds, which equals 22,439 transactions per day. In
comparison to the DMR’s average daily transaction load of 4,816 operations, the Eteherum
framework offers a suitable transaction rate for the infrequent transaction of cars."
Decision 2: Block se-
lection
"To provide a reliable and consistent source of information in a public setup with conflicting
agents, we choose a proof-of-work-based block selection mechanism. This approach mod-
erates conflicting parties and prevents malicious nodes from spreading incorrect or coun-
terfeited information."
Application design decisions (Xu et al., 2016)
Decision 1: On- and
off-chain data storage
"In order to balance the required computational power and the level of transparency, we
apply a mixed on- and off-chain data storage model. To ensure a sufficient level of trans-
parency and to enable the verification of transactions on one hand, transactional data (i.e.,
registration operations including repairs and automobile inspections) is stored on-chain.
Personal details and other information not specific to the transaction object on the other
hand will be stored off-chain in a SKAT database and can be assigned to transactions via
hash-based keys."
Decision 2: Public vs.
private chain
"We choose a public setup to facilitate accessibility, transparency and trustworthiness and
to take the existing as well as the potential user base into account. Different privacy levels
are realized through user-specific interfaces, hashing, and on- and off-chain data storage."
Decision 3: Single vs.
multiple chains
"To facilitate data consistency, allow easier chain and permission management, and provide
third party integration we select a single chain setup."
Decision 4: Validation
oracles
"We use external validation oracles, such as SKAT, police departments, transport and road
authorities, and other government agencies, as well as workshops and automobile inspec-
tors, as trusted parties that provide and verify vehicle-specific information."
Decision 5: Permis-
sioned vs. permission-
less
"We plan to integrate our transaction system with other government services, and thus
choose a permission-based setup, which requires all [users] to provide some form of govern-
mentally approved authorization, such as a passport or ID number or a registered corporate
ID, to join the network and submit transactions." One way to establish a blockchain identity
is the ERC-725 standard.
TABLE 4.3: Blockchain design of the DMR prototype (Notheisen et al., 2017).
This way, our market platform allows the implementation of various background checks
before a car is traded and grants the possibility to abort the trade by throwing the transac-
tion, if certain conditions, such as an adequate insurance coverage or sufficient funding,
are not met or one of the transacting parties does not comply to the previously agreed
terms."
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FIGURE 4.4: Generalized software architecture of the marketplace (Notheisen et al., 2017).
4.2.4 Artifact Features
"To develop the prototype, we use the holistic deployment framework Truffle. Truffle sup-
ports all steps of the development process including testing and deployment and [stream-
lines the] use smart contracts in Ethereum. [...] To implement the DMR marketplace
(figure 4.5) we utilize the general marketplace structure shown in figure 4.4.
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The DMR contract extends the IndexedMarketplace with the business logic relevant for
the DMR, such as the ability to issue vehicles and to keep track of their ownership status
afterwards. To do so, the DMR contract holds a register of the issued vehicles, their current
owners, and respective license plates. The cars traded on the market are implemented by
the Vehicle contract, which extends the Tradable and supplements properties required
for the registration of vehicles, such as the unique vehicle identification number (VIN) and
other vehicle-specific details. Instead of Ether, which is the cryptocurrency used on the
Ethereum blockchain, we use an [ERC-20-based and tokenized] representation of tradi-
tional fiat currency, such as Danish Kroner, as means of payment. This way, we are able
exclude any exposure to exchange rate risk. Using Danish Kroner however requires a third
party, such as a central bank, a commercial bank, or a credit card company, to back or lock
the value of the amount allocated to the buyer’s blockchain account (Raskin and Yermack,
2016). The same holds for the seller when he or she wants to extract his return from the
system."
FIGURE 4.5: Class diagram of the DMR use case (Notheisen et al., 2017).
In order to "facilitate accessibility, we implement the prototype as web application that
can be accessed via an URI from any Ethereum enabled browser, such as Mist, or by manu-
ally running a local Ethereum client while accessing the URI. Figure 4.6 shows a snapshot
of the web application short before the completion of a transaction.
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To improve privacy and and increase usability, we provide user-specific interfaces to
different parties interacting with the system, namely buyers and sellers, government agen-
cies, and third parties. From a practical perspective, we implement the interfaces as three
different views in the web application: A car registration view, a register lookup, and a
personal view, from which owned cars can be retrieved, offered, and traded.
FIGURE 4.6: Snapshot of the DMR’s user interface (Notheisen et al., 2017).
To mitigate transaction risk, we divide the transaction process into the following four
steps and implement two built-in safeguard mechanisms: In the first step, we match buyers
and sellers and they negotiate the terms of their trade. To reduce complexity and increase
system performance, buyer-seller matching and pricing is not implemented in the proto-
type. Instead, buyers and sellers have to find each other and negotiate terms off-chain in
the real world. In the second step, after they successfully reached an agreement, the seller
can reach out to the buyer through the marketplace contract and provide an on-chain offer
to sell the car by calling extendOffer(). To do so, he or she logs into the DMR blockchain
system via the web-interface and sends an offer (extendOffer()) to the potential buyer
by specifying the buyer’s address, i.e. his public key, and the price. The public key is a
hash representing the buyer’s unique address or account number on the blockchain. In a
real-world setup, public keys would be connected to a personal or corporate ID, enabling
human individuals as well as corporate entities to buy and sell cars. After the seller has ini-
tiated the offer, the buyer has the possibility to either accept it by calling acceptOffer()
or to do nothing, i.e. do not accept the offer.
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In the case of acceptance, the buyer enters into an escrow agreement and acceptOf-
fer() checks whether he or she has a sufficient amount of funds, withdraws the agreed
price from his or her account, deposits it within the market, and notifies the seller about
the acceptance of the offer. In the second case, the seller can revoke the offer via the re-
vokeOffer() method. This is the first safeguard to prevent the provision of offers that
differ from the previous off-chain agreement. In the third step, the transacting parties
meet in person and exchange the physical good off-chain. The actual transfer of owner-
ship however, has not taken place, yet. To conduct this transfer, buyer and seller have to go
back onto the blockchain to complete the transaction by calling completeTransaction(),
releasing the previously deposited funds to the seller while transferring the ownership of
the asset. More specifically, completeTransaction() simultaneously deposits the money
to the seller’s account and transfers the certificate of ownership to the buyer. In line with
this process, the vehicle is automatically deregistered and reregistered with the DMR.
If any problem occurs during the physical meeting, for instance if the car does not
possess the previously advertised qualities, abortTransaction() aborts the transaction,
reimburses the money to the buyer, and cancels the trade. This is the second safeguard
mechanism and within this fourth and final step, each party has the means to cancel
the transaction and withdraw from the agreement by calling revokeOffer() and abort-
Transaction() respectively. Aborting or revoking the transaction will remove the offer,
transfer the funds deposited in the market back to the buyer, and stop the transfer of own-
ership. It is important to note, that the actual transfer of ownership of the asset and the
payment comprise the final step of the two-legged transaction process and eventually set-
tle the transaction. In both cases, the offer is deleted afterwards. As a result, both parties
have the chance to abort an unwanted, unintentional, or erroneous transaction by using
the transaction safeguards in the steps two and four (resaerch question 3). To illustrate the
transaction process in greater detail, figure 4.7 and figure 4.8 depict the sequence of calls
for a successful transaction and the different system states during the transaction process
respectively. Eventually, the transaction data is immutably stored on the blockchain and
publicly visible enforcing transparency (research question 5) and at the same time pro-
viding a complete and consistent record of ownership to the transacting parties, as well
as SKAT and other relevant stakeholders (research question 4). In combination with the
inherited transparency of the blockchain, our market design allows for a full view of issued
vehicles, their current owners, as well as their history, and thus facilitates the reduction of
information asymmetries in used car markets."
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FIGURE 4.7: Sequence of a valid transaction (Notheisen et al., 2017).
FIGURE 4.8: Possible offer states within the transaction process (Notheisen et al., 2017).
4.2.5 Artifact Evaluation
"The proof-of-concept prototype introduced in [Subsection 4.2.4] enables an automated
and secure registration and transaction process. The system is running on Ethereum and
allows users to invoke the DMR contracts to register (issue) and trade vehicles securely
[on] the DMR marketplace with any other registered and authorized user. In total, we
provide a solution to all three research question posed in [Subsection 4.2.2] and the use
case of the DMR highlights the quality, functionality, completeness, and effectiveness of our
IT artifact. Furthermore, the generalized software architecture and the market framework
introduced in [Subsection 4.2.3] ensure the utility of our artifact and the provision of value
beyond this specific use case. To evaluate the utility and efficacy of the prototype in greater
detail, we also conduct extensive structural [...] and functional [...] tests (Hevner et al.,
2004).
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In the first step, we conduct various unit tests within JavaScript using the Chai Assertion
Library as well as the previously introduced Truffle framework. Chai is a JavaScript library
that enables the creation of unit tests and allows for both test setup and teardown before
every test method. Within the structural testing, we create about 1,500 lines of code and
conduct 46 unit tests in order to verify the correctness of the marketplace, the tradable,
and the token. More specifically, the tests are designed to evaluate whether each public
method behaves as expected when called with a correct sequence of inputs (see figure 4.7
for an example of a valid sequence of calls) and to ensure that the system behaves correctly
during state changes. In the second step, the scenarios of issuing, buying, and selling cars
within the use case of the DMR serve as a functional testing environment and illustrate
the execution of the artifact. This way, we aim to detect any failures or potential defects
in the basic marketplace, the DMR extension, and the web application. Moreover, the
execution of our prototype within the testing scenarios yields average computational costs
equal to 403,000 gas for a completed transaction. As a block in our setup accumulates
roughly 3,140,000 gas, our system can process up to 8 transactions per block, assuming
the blockchain is only utilized for the transaction of cars. If we furthermore set the average
latency (i.e., block creation time) to 30 seconds, our prototype can handle up to 22,439
transactions per day9.
Overall, the prototype addresses the transparency and data inconsistency issues related
to the second hand trading of cars and illustrates how a blockchain-based transaction
system approach can help to mitigate transaction risk by introducing escrow-like smart
contracts. Furthermore, it allows third-party integration through observer patterns and
dismantles adverse selection effects and information asymmetries through the transparent
nature of the blockchain."
4.2.6 Discussion
"The IT artifact presented in [Subsection 4.2.4] introduces a novel approach to adminis-
trate registers of real-world assets by converting registration certificates into unique digital
assets that are managed and maintained by the blockchain. Our system allows users to
register vehicles and to trade registered vehicles securely with any other authorized user.
After a transaction is completed, the traded vehicle is automatically de- and reregistered
with the DMR.
9These processing capabilities refer the the specification of the Ethereum blockchain from August 2017.
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As a result, the registry system provides a complete and correct record of each car’s
transactional history to potential buyers, government agencies, and other third parties
without any institutional involvement. The cryptographic interconnection of the data
blocks captures the timely order of past transactions and builds the foundation for data
immutability, which is essential to ensure data integrity and the validity of the historical
record. In combination with the decentralization of the consensus authority, the responsi-
bility for the correctness of the transactional data shifts away from centralized institutions
and towards the stakeholders that are most affected by asymmetrically distributed infor-
mation. This way, our system works as a transparency device that assures the availability
of a complete, valid, and public record of vehicle history and past ownership changes,
thereby disclosing previously private information. More specifically, as blockchain trans-
actions are public, potential buyers of cars are able to access the history of each vehicle,
and thus can improve their assessment of the quality of a potential purchase. Moreover,
no single participant within the system has to be trusted, because the entries are stored
based on a consensual agreement and cannot be altered afterwards.
A clear limitation of this setup is the requirement of trusted third parties to provide
vehicle-specific information following inspections, repairs, or modifications. This depen-
dence reintroduces the potential of fraud and offers the providers of vehicle characteristics
the opportunity to collude with current owners to provide wrong information. As a result,
all actions outside of the transaction process cannot be fully secure and a residual risk
of someone inserting corrupted information about a vehicle’s characteristics remains. Al-
though the system is not able to prevent this kind of fraud, the provision of a tamper-free
historical record limits the fraudsters’ ability to spread false vehicle data. Especially, if
there is a certain fraction of honest nodes present in the system, traversing through the
transactional history enables potential buyers and government agencies to uncover in-
consistencies resulting from frauds, such as mileage manipulation. These inconsistencies
could function as a signal to the buyer that indicates a low-quality vehicle. In addition,
the dependence on third party information is limited to vehicle characteristics, while the
record of car ownership remains unaffected, and thus still provides valuable data for the
assessment of quality. Another way to handle the issue of fraud arises in the combination
of blockchain technology and the Internet of Things (Zhang and Wen, 2017). In context
of our use case, the Internet of Things could relieve trusted third parties from data provi-
sion duties and instead let smart cars directly report their status and changes thereof to
the registry system. This way, data provision could be conducted in an automated and
cryptographically secure manner (Christidis and Devetsikiotis, 2016).
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A prerequisite for this approach however, is the technical ability of a vehicle to deter-
mine and report its current status to the blockchain. From a user perspective, buyers,
sellers, and other parties access the system via a web application and transactions are con-
ducted by an algorithmic process specified by smart contracts. This way, inadequate usage
and misunderstandings are lowered to a minimum (Beck et al., 2016), as the direction of
human behavior is governed by the deployed algorithms. In addition, the web application
provides user-specific views with adequate information visualizations for each stakeholder
facilitating the understanding of the transactional data. In total, these measures aim to
reduce the impact of adverse selection on market efficiency by dismantling the asymmetric
distribution of information between interacting parties and minimizing the buyer’s uncer-
tainty about the characteristics of the traded object.
Besides these use case-specific considerations, blockchain technology and especially the
Ethereum framework are still emergent technologies, and thus face a number of techno-
logical challenges and limitations. One main issue of today’s blockchains is scalability.
Depending on the block’s size and block creation intervals, the actual throughput - mea-
sured by the number of conducted transactions per second - is limited and the execution
of a transaction can be delayed in times with high transaction loads (Gervais et al., 2016).
In the context of the DMR, the focus lies on infrequent transactions of a limited number
of vehicles per time interval, and thus scalability issues do not have a significant impact
in this specific use case. For other use cases however, scalability issues should be taken
into account. If we apply our transaction system to a larger market setup, such as the
German automobile market, or a different scenario, the limited scalability, latency issues,
and query delays could be a prohibitive limitation for the adoption of cryptographic trans-
action systems. In addition, as the distributed ledger accumulates conducted transactions
it continuously grows over time, and thus occupies an increasing amount of disk space.
These constraints however, are likely to be of a transient nature and might be resolved
by further improvements of current and the development of new protocols as blockchain
technology matures (Glaser, 2017). [Besides] technical limitations, public blockchains,
such as the utilized Ethereum framework, also have negative implications for data privacy.
To account for these privacy concerns, we propose an on- and off-chain storage model
(Xu et al., 2016; Zyskind et al., 2015) for vehicle-specific and personal information and
suggest a hash-based representation of personal and corporate IDs. In addition, market
participants access the database via user-specific interfaces [...]. In combination with the
permissioned blockchain setup, the requirement of an authorized ID restricts unauthorized
access and ensures a minimum level of data protection.
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Due to its prototypical character, the absence of real-world blockchain-based systems
other than Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies, and the variety of established IT systems, it
remains challenging to assess our system’s actual large-scale applicability. However, to pro-
vide a general orientation, we provide an abstract and brief distinction between centralized
and distributed databases and point out the advantages of blockchain technology in the
following paragraphs. In centralized databases, data is stored at one physical location and
users access the stored data through an interface. As a result, centralized databases offer
easy data management and maintenance, high performance, and remain scalable. On the
other hand, centralization concentrates costs for setup and maintenance on the database
provider, increases the risk of outages and data losses, and requires the users to trust in the
governing operator (Elmasri and Navathe, 2010; Connolly and Begg, 2015). In distributed
databases, the storage and processing units are kept separately, data is stored at and linked
across multiple locations, and user access the database via a network. To update the nodes
and to maintain the database, data needs to be replicated and duplicated across the net-
work. Central advantages of distributed database systems are the continuous availability
and increased reliability, easy data recovery, and the flexibility of modular growth. These
advantages however come at the costs of a high level of complexity, an increased process-
ing overhead, and the exposure of data integrity to inconsistencies (Elmasri and Navathe,
2010; Connolly and Begg, 2015). Blockchain-based systems combine characteristics of
both systems and offer a resilient distributed database that ensures data integrity by the
consensual agreement of all nodes, and hence provides a reliable database for multiple par-
ties. Especially the openness of the transactional history to the independent scrutiny the
the interacting parties and other involved stakeholders minimizes the risk of duplications,
errors, and data inconsistencies. Building a registry system on a blockchain infrastruc-
ture leverages these key properties and meets the main requirements of modern registries,
which include integrity, availability, accessibility, efficient reading, and immutability (Tran
et al., 2017).
To provide an orientation beyond the use case of registries, we furthermore propose
three prerequisites that arguably should be met for blockchain-based systems to potentially
constitute an improvement over traditional approaches. First, due to its distributed nature
and the integrated consensus mechanism, blockchain technology provides a conceptual
approach to govern transactions between multiple parties in a public and anonymous setup
without the involvement of a central party. As a result, these systems possess the ability to
moderate interactions between agents with conflicting interests and motivations.
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If the conflicting interests provide a strong intrinsic motivation to participate in the
truth revelation process, we can also discard the idea of monetary incentives prevalent in
cryptocurrencies. Second, we propose to utilize the blockchain as an approach to miti-
gate the exposure to asymmetrically distributed information and perceive and apply it as
a toolbox to facilitate the provision, validation, and dissemination of a transactional his-
tory. Consequently, interactions without at least one party with private information cannot
profit from an increase in transparency, and thus the benefits of blockchain-based systems
remain limited. Third, as a distributed system blockchain technology grants multiple par-
ties writing access to a shared database without compromising data integrity. For these
benefits to take effect however, use cases need to comprise at least two conflicting parties
with writing access to the system. If there is only one party with writing access, there is
no need for consensus and therefore the party with the writing access simply constitutes
the equivalent of a central authority. If we map these prerequisites to the use case of the
DMR, we find that all three conditions are met: First, there is a conflict of interest, which
arises between buyers and sellers, as sellers do not want to reveal their private information,
while buyers want to learn about the true quality of the cars on the market. In addition, the
multilateral market environment and the dynamic transaction process requires all parties
involved to contribute data to the system."
4.2.7 Concluding Remarks
"The proof-of-concept prototype developed in this study aims to replace bureaucratic pub-
lic registries with an alternative and illustrates how a blockchain-based transaction system
for real-world assets might look like. In addition, it highlights how the blockchain could
function as a transparency device to mitigate inefficiencies in markets with imperfect infor-
mation. From a technological perspective, we provide a platform that governs the transfer
of ownership of used cars and inherently provides a reliable and complete record of ve-
hicle history to the transacting parties, government agencies, and other third parties. To
implement the prototype, we apply an object-oriented software engineering approach that
facilitates understanding and allows researchers and practitioners to go beyond the use
case of trading cars and adopt the transaction system to other assets, transactional market
setups, and registries systems.
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Aside its practical relevance, our study’s contribution to academic research is threefold:
First, we introduce a mechanism to reduce transaction risk resulting from the irreversibility
of blockchain-based transactions. Second, we replace a trust-based, centralized, and bu-
reaucratic register with a trust-free and autonomous transactional database system, which
provides a secure registration and transaction process without the need for a central gov-
erning authority. Third, we propose a novel solution concept to reduce the uncertainty
about quality and the resulting adverse selection effects in lemon markets by providing a
reliable, transparent, and complete record of each asset’s history. To reduce complexity
and to focus on the research questions at hand, we furthermore forego the integration of
third party services and official processes, such as automobile inspections or permissions
for rebuilds. These and other features however might be included in future versions as the
prototype matures.
Apart from the noted benefits, the applied technology is still at an early development
stage and faces some challenges, such as limited scalability and privacy concerns, that are
not fully mastered yet. Also, users need to trust in the correctness and accuracy of the oper-
ating algorithms (Lustig and Nardi, 2015) and the provision of information about the asset
by trusted third parties is still an important prerequisite. This provision however is limited
to the update of vehicle-specific information following inspections, repairs, modifications,
or accidents. The transaction process is conducted fully on-chain, and thus generating
the transactional history does not require any third party integration. In part, this trust
problem might be solved - at least in the case of cars - by the integration of the Internet
of Things, wherein sensors provide the required data (Gubbi et al., 2013). Irrespective of
those concerns, our prototype provides a valid first step to apply blockchain technology
to the field of public registries and transaction systems and illustrates the opportunities
and challenges of this approach." The impact of the increase in transparency within such
a public registry is analyzed in detail in Chapter 5.
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4.3 An Intermediary-free Market Mechanism
This section is partly based on the article "Trading Stocks on Blocks - Engineering Decentral-
ized Markets". It is co-authored by Magnus Gödde and Christof Weinhardt, was presented at
the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and
Technology (DESRIST) 2017, and was published in volume 10423 of Springer’s Lecture Notes
in Computer Science (LNCS). Direct citations are highlighted by double quotes.
Publication details:
Notheisen, B., Gödde, M. & Weinhardt, C.,
Trading Stocks on Blocks - Engineering Decentralized Markets,
DESRIST 2017: Designing the Digital Transformation,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, May 2017, Volume 10243, pp. 474-478, Springer,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_34.
4.3.1 Introduction
"[...] In the context of markets, the combination of a distributed database, a decentralized
consensus mechanism, and cryptographic security measures allows distributed system ar-
chitectures and intermediary-free market designs by algorithmically enforcing agreements
on the basis of predefined rules (Xu et al., 2016). In addition, the absence of centralized
institutions facilitates disintermediation and allows more cost-efficient transactions (Beck
et al., 2016). As a result, blockchain-based economic systems announce disruptive changes
in financial markets and question the role of traditional financial institutions and market in-
termediaries, such as banks, exchanges, or central securities depositories. To illustrate [the
design] and evaluate [the functional scope of decentralized] market platforms, we build
on the growing body of literature about blockchain-based economic systems (Chapter 3)
and implement a proof-of-concept prototype of a decentralized securities exchange.
Our prototype comprises a blockchain-based market platform that adopts the notion of
trust-free economic systems (Greiner and Hui, 2015) and extends current knowledge on
cryptographic transaction systems (Beck et al., 2016; Notheisen et al., 2017) with a crucial
prerequisite for each transaction - a mechanism to connect demand and supply.
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This way, we introduce a novel way to substitute traditional market institutions and in-
termediaries by transferring the guidance and governance of human interactions to [algo-
rithms] borne by the blockchain’s distributed network [(Lustig and Nardi, 2015)].
From a practical perspective, we provide the design and implementation of a blockchain-
based market mechanism that entails the core functionality to trade stocks and constitutes
a low-cost and resilient decentralized market platform. In combination with the ability of
smart contracts to represent highly customizable financial assets, our prototype illustrates
a new way to resolve inefficiencies, such as high search and bargaining costs, in low-
volume over-the-counter markets (Duffie et al., 2005; Malinova and Park, 2017). Further-
more, token-based equity issuances provide an alternative mechanism for entrepreneurs
to raise venture capital, by lowering regulatory barriers and simultaneously increasing the
investors’ control (Jentzsch, 2016)."
4.3.2 Related Literature
Blockchain-based Market Platforms
So far, academic literature has made little progress in developing and evaluating blockchain-
powered exchanges and market platforms. Together with euroclear, the consulting firm
Oliver Wyman for instance illustrates potential use cases and highlights the benefits of de-
centralized securities exchanges (de Velde et al., 2016). In addition, Patel (2014) presents
a theoretical concept for implementation, while Clark et al. (2014) derive design princi-
ples for matching orders in a decentralized way. Malinova and Park (2017) study how
the increasing transparency that comes with a blockchain-based market affects the trad-
ing behavior of different (large/small) investors. In their theoretical trading model, they
show that despite the risk of front-running, full transparency leads to the highest welfare,
because it decreases the costs of finding liquidity.
From a practical perspective, the stuttering attempts of EtherEx and raidEX highlight
that heaving a (stock) exchange on a blockchain-based system is a challenging task. Aside
of legal concerns and regulatory compliance, shifting the continuous design of traditional
(financial) markets - including double-sided matching and pricing, order books, and dif-
ferent order types - towards the discrete world of blockchain technology is essential to
create a decentralized market mechanism (Clark et al., 2014; Patel, 2014).
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At the same time the lack of a holistic, comprehensible, and transparent framework ex-
cludes non-technical audiences from the discussion, while the potential and implications
of blockchain-based exchanges remain unclear. To address these issues, the following re-
search question aims to shed light on the smart contract design and software architecture
of blockchain-based, decentralized market mechanisms.
Research Question 6. How can smart contracts implement a decentralized market mecha-
nism that incorporates a double auction, keeps distributed order books, and allows traders to
submit limit and market orders?
Use Case: Decentralized Stock Exchange
The motivation to trade stocks via a blockchain is simple and similar to the motivation
to develop cryptocurrencies: Blockchain technology promises a self-sufficient and trans-
parent system with a high settlement speed and low transaction costs (Notheisen et al.,
2019). In contrast, today’s financial markets comprise an interlaced network of intermedi-
aries, which make trading slow, inefficient, and potentially expensive (Harris, 2003). As a
result, multiple stakeholders are involved in a transaction: Custodians manage stock own-
ership, brokers and investment firms forward investor’s orders to exchanges. Exchanges
match buy and sell orders and central counter parties take over settlement risk. Before a
trade, traders acquire information about (trading) costs, the business of the traded firm
(fundamental information), and a stock’s price development to form an expectation about
the risk and return associated with a trade. When a trader makes his or her decision to
trade, he or she forwards the instruction to trade to the market. Usually this happens via
several intermediaries such as brokers and superordinate banks and order flow providers.
However, as a result of technological and regulatory innovation, the boundaries between
intermediaries and markets blurred during the last decades. However, irrespective of their
origin, market operators have to monitor and manage their risks the ensure a reliable
trading environment. After a trade occurred and its trades are fixed, post-trading service
providers (e.g., banks, custodians, or depositories) settle it in a two-legged process (secu-
rities↔ cash). Figure 4.9 summarizes these steps in the value chain of securities trading
and illustrates the roles of different intermediaries in the trading process.
Blockchain technology promises to streamline the trading process by making many of
these stakeholders obsolete (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016; Notheisen et al., 2019). Pre-
trade information for instance would be publicly available via the blockchain’s historic
record.
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Custodians may be replaced by the combination of the consensus mechanism, which out-
sources the management of ownership to the crowd, and the distributed database, which
records the resulting transfers of ownership. Brokers and order flow providers will no
longer be needed as the blockchain’s peer-to-peer network allows investors to directly
access the exchange. In addition, matching, clearing, and settlement can be done au-
tonomously by smart contracts. As a result, post-trade services cease to exist as clearing
becomes obsolete and settlement happens in a simultaneous two-legged process. However,
to evaluate these promises, we formulate the following research question:
Research Question 7. To which extent can a blockchain-based market platform operate the
value chain of securities trading and which technology features limit performance?
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FIGURE 4.9: Illustration of the value chain of securities trading and the trading process (based
on Harris, 2003).
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4.3.3 Artifact Design
"Within the Ethereum framework (Buterin, 2013; Wood, 2014), digital assets such as cur-
rencies or stocks can be realized in the form of standardized smart contracts called tokens.
From a technical perspective a token comprises a database, that enables data transactions
in a distributed setup and allows the definition of arbitrary asset characteristics." To guide
the implementation of the stock tokens and the surrounding market environment, we uti-
lize the DSR and blockchain design principles introduced in Section 4.1. Tables 4.4 and
4.5 summarize the applied approaches and the resulting design choices.
Guideline Contribution
Design as
an artifact
The result of the research presented in this section is a proof-of-concept prototype of a blockchain-based
stock exchange (IT artifact) that allows individual users to issue and trade tokenized stocks.
Problem
relevance
Our prototype presents the design of a mechanism to connect demand and supply in a fully decentral-
ized ecosystem (research question 6) and illustrates the feasibility but also highlights the limitations of
decentralized stock exchanges (research question 7).
Design
evaluation
To evaluate our prototype’s quality and efficacy we use a laboratory-based test setting with structural
and functional testing procedures. To demonstrate its utility and to test and illustrate its features, we
issue various stocks and trade them on the market platform.
Research
contribu-
tions
The contribution of our research is twofold: First, we complement the blockchain-based transaction sys-
tem introduced in Section 4.2 with a mechanism to connect demand and supply in a fully decentralized
fashion. Second, we highlight the potential of decentralized market platforms for low-volume over-
the-counter markets and venture capital platforms and illustrate its shortcomings by benchmarking it
against the requirement of the securities value chain.
Research
rigor
To ensure scientific rigor in the creation of our IT artifact, we employ well established DSR frameworks,
such as Hevner et al. (2004), Peffers et al. (2007), and March and Smith (1995). In addition, we take
blochain-specific design frameworks (Xu et al., 2016; Glaser, 2017; Walsh et al., 2016) into account.
Design as a
search pro-
cess
To find an efficient and effective solution to research questions 6 and 7, we engineer our artifact in a
continuous and iterative creation process (March and Smith, 1995; Hevner et al., 2004) that builds on
existing literature about blockchain-based systems, such as Buterin (2013), or Wood (2014).
Communi-
cation of
research
To maxmize our impact and hilight the multititude of application contexts, we structure our work ac-
cording to Gregor and Hevner (2013) and utilize the use case of a stock exchange to illustrate the
opportunities and limitation of decentralized markets. To ensure the understanding of technology-
oriented readers, we illustrate the prototype’s software architecture, the underlying implementation
logic, and the resulting features in Subsection 4.3.4. To support management-oriented audiences, we
embed our researach in a practical context in Subsection 4.3.2 and discuss central economic implica-
tions and technological limitations in Subsection 4.3.6.
TABLE 4.4: Application of the DSR guidelines to the DEX use case.
To implement the tokenized equity, we use the popular ERC-2010 token standard. It en-
ables the implementation of a standard API for tokens within smart contracts and specifies
the basic functions (i.e., methods) required to issue and transfer tokens.
10A detailed description of the ERC-20 token standard is available in the Ethereum Wiki and on Github.
11These processing capabilities refer the the specification of the Ethereum blockchain from August 2017.
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Blockchain appropriateness (Wüst and Gervais, 2017)
Operating a fully decentralized market includes the determination of prices as well as updating and storing states
of ownership (i.e., the system’s state). An update results from a trade between at least two parties that interact with
each other (multiple writers) independent of a trusted third party by design. In these interactions trade partners
remain unknown (by regulation) and aim to maximize their individual gains. As a result, blockchain technology
offers an appropriate toolbox to implement our prototype.
Blockchain design decisions (Xu et al., 2016)
Decision 1: Transac-
tion processing rate
Executing a trade [...] costs roughly 200,000 gas. In combination with a gas limit of 4.7
million gas/block (at the time of publication), our prototype can process 24 trades per block
and 2 trades per second11. However, modern financial markets exceed this limit and adjust-
ments of the blockchain parameters (block creation time, block size) are required. How
such an adjustment would affect market outcomes is subject to the analysis in Chapter 6.
Decision 2: Block se-
lection
To provide reliable order books and a robust market mechanism to traders in a public setup,
we utilize a proof-of-work-based block selection mechanism. This way, we aim to impede
market manipulations by malicious traders.
Application design decisions (Xu et al., 2016)
Decision 1: On- and
off-chain data storage
To explore the opportunities and risks that come with a fully decentralized market mecha-
nism, we compute and store all trade-related data on-chain.
Decision 2: Public vs.
private chain
To facilitate the peer-to-peer character of our decentralized exchange, we choose a public
blockchain setup. Thus, individual traders and firms can join or retract from the market
independently and issue and trade equity independent of intermediaries.
Decision 3: Single vs.
multiple chains
To take the different characteristics of assets (e.g., privately or publicly traded instruments,
equity and debt features, or varying trading volumes) into account, we propose a multi-chain
setup. However, to facilitate data consistency and improve chain and risk management we
refrain from using multiple chains for one asset and limit our setup a single chain on the
asset-level.
Decision 4: Validation
oracles
We use external validation oracles, such as information providers or regulators, to enrich
trading data with additional information about the traded assets and the issuing firms. In
addition, validation oracles would allow the inclusion of reference prices.
Decision 5: Permis-
sioned vs. permission-
less
To minimize opportunistic behavior and to facilitate regulatory compliance, we require a
permission to access our market platform. For trades permission is granted with a passport
ID, a personal ID number, or a registered corporate ID. To issue new assets a corporate
ID is required. Similar to the previous section, the ERC-725 standard offers a toolbox to
implement this.
TABLE 4.5: Blockchain design of the DEX prototype.
In contrast to built-in crypto coins that originate directly from the blockchain protocol,
the tokenized stocks on our market platform are subsequently issued on top of the pro-
tocol by third parties. In addition, ERC-20 only standardizes the basic functionality and
allows the addition of convenience features such as elections or the distribution of divi-
dends. "Eventually the token contract is stored on the blockchain and the Ethereum virtual
machine executes the code fragments, while the token logic provides an immutable set of
rules governing the actions of the issuers and holders of tokens without [...] a centralized
third party."
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To implement the underlying market place, we combine the generalized market archi-
tecture introduced in figure 4.4 in the previous section (4.2) with a decentralized market
mechanism. The market mechanism implements the matching engine (see algorithm 1
in appendix B.2) and invokes an order book structure to processes the market and limit
orders submitted by traders. An auction is executed every time a new order is submitted to
the market. In order to prevent front running, newly submitted orders are only matched
with orders that are already incorporated into the blockchain. In addition, we automati-
cally delete orders that are not incorporated in the next block (i.e., that are not stored on
the blockchain).
4.3.4 Artifact Features
"In the context of a stock exchange, a token represents the shares of one specific firm
and implements storage and transfer functionalities. In addition, we allow convenience
features, such as elections on annual general meetings or the distribution of dividends. In
the case of venture capital investments, the total amount of funded capital could be locked
into the contract and released piecewise subject to milestones in the business plan or the
collective will of the investors promoting investor protection. Overall, we implement the
DEX as a combination of two smart contracts, in which the exchange contract utilizes the
token contract’s functions to trade shares on the users’ behalf. Figure 4.10 shows the full
software structure of our prototype including its contracts and storage structures [...].
In the first step, a newly created token contract (TokenStandard) needs to be registered
with the exchange contract (DSX) by passing the token’s address to the registerToken()
function. Upon the reception of the information, the DSX creates a Market containing the
order book for the associated token. In order to make his or her shares tradeable, the
token owner furthermore needs to grant the DSX control over some tokens, and thus de-
termine the number of shares in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) (deposit()). Now the
DSX is able to credit tokens to the accounts of investors and keeps track of stock owner-
ship. To actually raise capital, companies need to sell their tokens (sell()). Figure 4.11
illustrates the steps of the funding process in greater detail. [...]. After the IPO, sell()
and buy() allow investors to place market or limit orders to trade shares and implicitly
performs clearing by ensuring that the seller has enough stocks and the buyer has enough
money. All information associated with an order, such as volume, price, marketId, or the
blockNumber, is saved in the Order.
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Following their submission, we use the orders’ unique OrderIds to collect all orders for
a share and create a globally distributed limit order book for each token within the Market.
Every time a new order is submitted, the DSX triggers a continuous double auction, that
facilitates order execution based on best price matching (match()). Eventually, shares and
funds get transferred directly between the users as matching, clearing, and settlement is
unified in one joint step, and recorded by the blockchain’s immutable transaction log. This
log provides a history of all transactions, facilitating transparency and preventing fraud."
FIGURE 4.10: Class diagram of the DEX use case (Notheisen et al., 2017)
4.3.5 Artifact Evaluation
"To evaluate the formal correctness and the accurate functioning of the prototype, we
choose a laboratory-based test setting and apply structural and functional testing proce-
dures (Hevner et al., 2004). [More specifically], to verify the prototype’s correctness, we
conduct 12 unit tests using the Truffle framework and the Chai Assertian Library. [Refer-
ences to the specific procedures are available in appendix B].
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Furthermore, the test scenarios of issuing equity and placing and executing limit and
market orders to buy and sell shares, enable us to identify flaws in the software struc-
ture and yield an upper limit of two transactions per second. Eventually, these testing
procedures demonstrate the validity, efficacy and formal correctness of our IT artifact and
provide the foundation to [evaluate the quality of decentralized markets]."
FIGURE 4.11: Sequential illustration of the security emission process (Notheisen et al., 2017)
4.3.6 Discussion
In total, the IT artifact presented in subsections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 illustrates a potential design
of a market environment that functions without central authorities (research question 6).
More specifically, our proof-of-concept prototype allows entrepreneurs to raise capital and
users to trade the resulting stocks on a secondary market. To do so, we implement a
blockchain-based matching engine that matches orders decentralized, implicitly clears,
and immediately settles the resulting agreements.
For entrepreneurs this offers a transparent way to bypass the hurdles of traditional IPOs,
such as high costs or exaggerated regulatory requirements. Raising capital as tokenized
assets is fast, cheap, and allows targeting a large audience (Ante et al., 2018). In addi-
tion, investor services, such as voting and subscription rights or dividend payouts can be
formalized in the process of tokenization.
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Furthermore, risky investments in start-ups can be hedged by locking in funds in the
smart contract and releasing them after certain milestones are met. On the other hand, the
lack of regulation may be a central motivation of opportunistic entrepreneurs to do an ICO
(Amsden and Schweizer, 2018). From a resiliency and security perspective the absence of
a single point of failure increases robustness towards outages and the duplication of data
centers becomes obsolete. In addition, hacking the underlying smart contracts is highly
impractical, as it requires control over the majority of the network’s computing power.
However, the discrete, distributed, and open nature of blockchain-based systems also
raises concerns with respect to the requirements of modern financial markets (research
question 7). First, the dependence on fixed block creation times increases the latency of
matching from milliseconds to several seconds or even minutes. In addition, it impedes
the implementation of commonly applied price time precedence rules. Second, in combi-
nation with the limited size of blocks these effects increase (Notheisen et al., 2018) and
furthermore limit the throughput of blockchain-based markets. A possible solution may
be payment channels, a technology currently under development (Croman et al., 2016).
Third, the public availability of trade information facilitates coordination among stake-
holders during the ICO process (Catalini and Gans, 2018) and enables manipulative trad-
ing strategies afterwards. More specifically, the visibility of pending orders in the block-
chain’s memory pool enables front running (Malinova and Park, 2017), insider trading,
spoofing, and other market manipulations (Weaver, 2018).
4.3.7 Concluding Remarks
"Overall, we contribute to existing research by introducing a blockchain-based market
mechanism, that facilitates low-cost and intermediary-free asset transactions in an algo-
rithmically governed and thus trust-free, easily accessible, resilient, and decentralized way.
As a result, blockchain-based market platforms enable the resolution of inefficiencies in
over-the-counter markets and support novel forms of venture capital. However, the block-
chain is still an emergent technology, and thus exhibits some problems, such as a limited
number of transactions per second or the provision of information by trusted third parties.
In addition, its distributed nature prevents the implementation of time precedence rules.
Keeping this in mind, our prototype is only an initial step towards decentralized market
setups and economic, technological, and regulatory aspects need to be addressed in fu-
ture research efforts." The quality of blockchain-based decentralized market mechanisms
is subject to Chapter 6.
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4.4 The Building Blocks of Decentralized Markets
In combination, the building blocks introduced and implemented in the previous sections
can form the backbone of decentralized market platforms. The transaction system intro-
duced in Section 4.2 enables interacting parties to overcome the trust frontier (see Section
3.5) with the help of fiduciary transaction safeguards. As a result, they can transact dig-
ital as well as physical assets in market environments prone of asymmetric information.
In addition, the transparent, reliable, and complete record of historic transactions func-
tions as a transparency device and supplies traders and other third parties with valuable
information about the market, potential counterparties, and assets before a trade. The
intermediary-free market mechanism introduced in Section 4.3 connects demand and sup-
ply by matching and executing orders in a fully decentralized fashion. As a result, market
operators and other intermediaries required to connect traders to the market are replaced
by the a blockchain-based infrastructure. In addition, clearing and settling a transaction
becomes an integral part of the trading process. More specifically, Figure 4.12 illustrates
the resulting functional scope and arranges the role of the market mechanism (4.3) and
the transaction system (4.2) within a decentralized market platform.
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(Section 4.3)
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FIGURE 4.12: Conceptual arrangement of the building blocks of decentralized markets
To illustrate the building blocks of decentralized markets, this figure integrates the prototypes
from Sections 4.2 and 4.3 and illustrates the resulting transaction and information flows.
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Information Asymmetries &
Transparency
This chapter is based on the working paper "The Blockchain, Plums, and Lemons - Infor-
mation Asymmetries & Transparency in Decentralized Markets". The paper is co-authored by
Christof Weinhardt, part of the KIT working paper series in economics, and available on SSRN.
It was furthermore presented at the Herrenhausen Conference 2018, FinteQC 2018, and the
7th Karlsruhe Service Summit 2018. Direct citations are highlighted by double quotes.
Manuscript details:
Notheisen, B. & Weinhardt, C.,
The Blockchain, Plums, and Lemons,
KIT Working Paper in Economics No. 130, SSRN Electronic Journal, 31 July 2018,
https://doi.org/10.5445/IR/1000092486, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202667.
5.1 Introduction
"Despite their growing interest, researchers and practitioners still struggle to transfer the
blockchain concept to the broader context of market-oriented applications. While few suc-
cess stories, such as Bitcoin12, pioneer financial markets, many initiatives fail to leverage
the technology’s potential efficiently.
12Another example is the Australian Stock Exchange’s effort to replace the current post-trade system with
a blockchain-based alternative. After several testing phases and stakeholder consultations, they announced
in a media release that the current post-trade system "CHESS" will be replaced with a blockchain-based
alternative that will take over the clearing and settling equity transactions.
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One major reason for this stuttering development is the limited knowledge about the
economic implications of the underlying technological concepts and their relationship with
the socio-economic environment, market mechanisms, and player rationales. In conse-
quence, we aim to shed light on the technology’s capability to function in market environ-
ments with information asymmetries, quality differences, and opportunistic behavior. To
do so, we examine how a core feature of blockchain-based information systems - the cur-
rent, complete, and publicly available record of historic transactions (Chapter 4; Notheisen
et al., 2017) - affects the behavioral patterns of market participants and the resulting im-
pact on market outcomes.
From a technical perspective, the public record of past transactions enables the mem-
bers of the blockchain network to validate the correctness of database updates within the
consensus process. By auditing the past, they can evaluate the correctness of transac-
tional data and determine whether the interacting parties possess rightful ownership of
a transacted object. To facilitate overall data integrity, every user can participate in this
process and has access to the historic record. In market environments with asymmetric
information and quality differences, this new form of transparency does not only reduce
uncertainty within interactions but also enables individual users to exploit the publicly dis-
closed information about peers and business partners to maximize their own gains. In this
study, we determine under which circumstances such behavior occurs and how it affects a
market in total. Thereby, we aim to identify factors blockchain adopters should consider
before applying blockchain technology in market-oriented contexts and use cases.
To examine behavioral changes that come with a different information system con-
figuration, we utilize a two-period lending game with incomplete information and en-
trepreneurs that choose effort levels (moral hazard) and differ in their disutility of effort
(adverse selection). Our model comprises a loan market with a competitive banking sec-
tor that shares the market equally and a continuum of entrepreneurs, which is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs live for two periods, can be either good (a
plum) or bad (a lemon), have access to a one-period project in each period, and apply for
loans at a bank to fund these projects. At the end of period 1, the banks learn about the
project outcomes of entrepreneurs and share this information via an information system.
Eventually, dependent on the informativeness and access scope of the information system,
banks and entrepreneurs can use this information to asses entrepreneurial quality.
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In line with prior research, our findings indicate that sharing information about en-
trepreneurial performance mitigates the impact of adverse selection on the banking side
and reduces moral hazard of plums by generating a disciplinary effect. In this study, we
furthermore identify an incentive for lemons to behave opportunistically in the presence
of value-adding information brokers. They can improve utility by using the information
from the blockchain’s public record to learn about the quality of plums and mimic them
accordingly. Moreover, their opportunistic behavior is more pronounced for greater price
improvements, lower quality differences, and lower quality in general. In opaque mar-
kets (i.e., markets without the analytic service of an information broker), neither plums
nor lemons behave opportunistically. Irrespective of the information regime, plums and
lemons are both locked-in to behavioral changes, and thus committed to inefficient equi-
libria in subsequent periods. While rational agents are not affected by this effect, the
consequences of irrational decisions spill over to future periods. From a market perspec-
tive, mimicking lemons create a welfare gain under perfect information. However, their
opportunistic behavior also violates the break-even condition of the banking sector, leads
to a market collapse, and denies future generations access to credit. In total, this indicates
that using blockchain-based information systems in highly competitive and transparent
markets with irrational agents should be considered carefully. The same holds for imple-
menting analytic, information-generating services on the infrastructure level (e.g. with
smart contracts).
In consequence, the contribution of this study is threefold: First, we extend the growing
body of research on the economics of blockchain by analyzing the effects of the blockchain’s
public transparency paradigm in market environments with asymmetric information. Sec-
ond, we contribute to the field of banking research by examining the impact of publicly
shared quality information on credit markets. And third, we add to the literature on block-
chain adoption by highlighting the risks of blockchain-based transparency."
5.2 Related Literature
"This chapter relates to previous research about blockchain design and examines the eco-
nomic implications of the public disclosure of information essential for the technology’s
functioning. In this aspect, our findings relate to the growing body of research on the
economics of blockchain.
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From a broader perspective, the transparency that comes with blockchain adoption also
resembles features of information sharing arrangements present in modern financial mar-
kets. To take these commonalities into account, we embed our analyses within the context
of information sharing arrangements in credit markets - a well-studied example of markets
with asymmetric information - and extract blockchain-relevant implications from this body
of research. In consequence, this section introduces the technological and economic as-
pects of transparency in the blockchain concept, briefly illustrates how credit information
is currently shared, reviews the most important theoretical and empirical findings about
information sharing arrangements, summarizes the resulting research gap, and formulates
three research questions. A detailed overview of the characteristics of information sharing
arrangements [...] is available in appendix A.4."
5.2.1 The Role of Transparency in the Blockchain Concept
"From a technical perspective, most blockchain systems comprise three core building blocks:
A distributed database, cryptographic algorithms, and a consensus mechanism (Notheisen
et al., 2017). The distributed database consists of cryptographically interconnected blocks
that aggregate and store transactional data and provide a copy of the ledger to every user
of the system. This distributed character of the blockchain’s ledger disseminates infor-
mation equally to all users of the network thereby creating a new form of transparency
(Catalini and Gans, 2016). Asymmetric encryption enables users to interact with the data-
base, allows them to specify and authorize transactions via public and private keys, and
ensures the unambiguous assignment of past transactions based on their unique address
in the system (public key). The decentralized consensus mechanism empowers users to
consensually verify and append new transactions by securely voting on their correctness
based on the historical data stored in the distributed database. More specifically, within
the consensus process each participating user verifies each transaction’s formal correctness
by checking whether it was signed by the right entities and auditing whether the sender
actually owns what he or she transacts via the historical record. In the context of Bit-
coin for instance, the transparency over past transactions ensures that the sender of a new
transaction owns a sufficient amount of Bitcoin to cover the sending amount (Nakamoto,
2008). In more complex interactions that comprise a two-legged transaction process, the
review is not limited to the solvency of each counterparty but may include the transacted
assets’ attributes as well (Notheisen et al., 2017).
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In the case of physical assets, transaction management furthermore requires overcoming
the trust frontier between the physical and digital world via a trusted interface to prevent
the incorporation of corrupted information (Hawlitschek et al., 2018).
To conduct a blockchain transaction, a user denominates a transactional object (e.g.,
a specific amount of money or an asset), specifies a recipient (via his or her public key),
references past transactions to proof ownership, signs the transaction (with his or her own
private key), and broadcasts it to the peer-to-peer network. Across the network, other
users collect, verify, and aggregate broadcasted transactions and propose the resulting data
blocks as database updates to their peers (Eyal, 2015)13. Whenever such a verified update
is proposed, each participant of the consensus process checks its validity as described above
before casting a vote. If a majority of the users agrees with the proposed update, the
proposer appends his or her block to the blockchain, broadcasts the update to the network,
and earns a reward (Nakamoto, 2008).
Building on the paradigm of public transparency, these building blocks and their func-
tioning ensure the integrity, consistency, and correctness of data within a blockchain system
and enable users to interact in the absence of a governing central authority. In markets
with asymmetric information, transparency has implications that go beyond pure techno-
logical functionality and can lead to hidden information in the pre-contractual and hidden
action problems in the post-contractual stage (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). In consequence, we have to take transparency implications
into account, if we aim to use blockchain technology in such environments.
On one hand, the increased transparency about asset portfolios helps traders to iden-
tify suitable counterparties thereby increasing liquidity and welfare (Malinova and Park,
2017). In repeated interactions information about past behavior facilitates the stability
of reputation effects by ensuring that historical records (e.g., in form of reviews and rat-
ings) correctly reflect actual interactions and improves the auditability of digital activity
trails (Catalini and Gans, 2016). From a governance perspective, blockchain technology
increases transparency over ownership, and thus alleviates opportunistic behavior of indi-
vidual stakeholders (Yermack, 2017).
13In many blockchain systems a fraction of specialized users - often called miners - focuses on the update
process, while others only send and receive transactions. For the sake of simplicity, we limit our analyses to
a network of homogeneous nodes that all participate in the consensus process. Introducing different roles
in the network would require the examination of user’s incentives to fulfill those roles. This could be part
of future research efforts as this study only aims to provide a first intuition of user rationales and welfare
effects in market environments with asymmetric information (Eyal, 2015).
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On the other hand, the revelation of previously private information about assets’ at-
tributes and the characteristics and behavior of interacting parties may change market dy-
namics and induce adverse behavior of individual users. These changes can affect market
equilibria, the profits and utility of individual market participants, and eventually welfare
(Bloomfield and O’Hara, 1999). As a result, it is crucial to consider technology-specific
transparency effects in the decision whether and how to use blockchain technology in
environments plagued by information asymmetries. More specifically, this includes under-
standing how the new transparency paradigm that comes with blockchain adoption affects
economic interactions, market outcomes, and the welfare of an economy."
5.2.2 Lessons from Information Sharing Arrangements in Credit
Markets
"The information sharing arrangements used in today’s credit markets allow a first glimpse
on these transparency effects and their impact. In credit markets asymmetric information
and the resulting uncertainty about quality lead to inefficient allocations of capital that
can cause profit reductions, welfare losses, and market failures (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). For small and medium enterprises for instance, empirical
evidence indicates that credit rationing is more severe for more opaque firms at the begin-
ning of their banking relationship (Kirschenmann, 2016; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004)
This effect is furthermore driven by adverse selection issues and is inversely related to
firm age (Hyytinen and Väänänen, 2006). For consumer credit on the other side, Karlan
and Zinman (2009) find strong evidence for moral hazard and weaker evidence for hid-
den information issues, while informational barriers to lender competition persist (Calem
et al., 2006). To mitigate the resulting issues various institutions, such as collateral (Bester,
1987), complete contingency contracts (Sharpe, 1990), or reputation systems (Diamond,
1989) developed over time. Besides these approaches, the sharing of previously private re-
lationship information also helps to dismantle information asymmetries and alleviate the
issues outlined above (Millon and Thakor, 1985). In a similar fashion, the blockchain’s
distributed and complete record facilitates the sharing of information - irrespective of its
actually intended use.
In practice, information sharing arrangements institutionalize the provision, scope, and
disclosure of information about lenders to banks and other stakeholders. Public credit
registries are centralized databases established, owned, and managed by public entities to
support their supervisory duties.
104
5.2 Related Literature
As such, they provide universal coverage of loans above a specified threshold, impose par-
ticipation by law, and disseminate consolidated information about an entrepreneur’s risk-
iness to current and potential lenders and regulators. Private credit bureaus on the other
hand are privately owned organizations that add significant value to credit information
(Kallberg and Udell, 2003) and thereby cater to the needs of commercial lenders in their
assessment of entrepreneurial risk. Participation is voluntary and based on a reciprocal
agreement that offers incomplete but detailed information about loans, repayment histo-
ries, and personal backgrounds. In theory, public credit registries are set up to compen-
sate for the lack of private arrangements (Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Jappelli and Pagano,
2002). However, in some countries both systems coexist and cater to different segments
of the market (World Bank, 2013).
Theoretical predictions. Economic theory predicts that while sharing information helps
to dissolve adverse selection problems and to prevent moral hazard, strategic rationales on
both sides of the market are crucial factors that determine the actual effect induced by the
increase in transparency. In their seminal study, Pagano and Jappelli (1993) investigate
individual banks’ motivation to share information and identify borrower mobility and het-
erogeneity, market size, and advances in information technology as positive incentives to
share information. The fear of competition on the other hand impedes information sharing.
In total, their model indicates that information sharing is an efficient means to mitigate
adverse selection. Padilla and Pagano (1997) build on Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and
find that information sharing lowers future profits by homogenizing information among
banks, while raising the chances for success today. Eventually, the resulting trade-off be-
tween increasing competition on the future and higher rents today determines the banks’
willingness to share information. Bouckaert and Degryse (2006) emphasize the strate-
gic dimension of information sharing and show that incumbent lenders limit information
sharing to project outcomes in order to discourage potential entrants. Consistent with
this rationale, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) suggest that information sharing reduces in-
formational monopoly rents earned from relationship information but also highlight that
it makes poaching more profitable (Bennardo et al., 2015). However, Karapetyan and
Stacescu (2014) also emphasize that this loss of informational rents induces lenders to
increase their investment in the acquisition of additional information in order to regain
their monopoly. From a market perspective, Bennardo et al. (2015) predict that sharing
information improves coordination among lenders and thereby decreases entrepreneurs
incentive to overborrow when lending from multiple banks.
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As a result, interest and default rates decrease and the access to credit improves. In the
case of distress however, intensified lender coordination increases default probabilities
even further (Hertzberg et al., 2011).
In contrast to these studies, Padilla and Pagano (2000) focus on the entrepreneurial
effects of information sharing. While sharing information about entrepreneurs raises their
incentive to perform, it also creates a disciplinary effect as hazardous behavior impedes
the ability to obtain credit from other sources as well. However, Padilla and Pagano (2000)
also find that sharing too much information can eliminate any disciplinary effects, because
entrepreneurs’ true types are revealed. In consequence, lenders need to tailor the type and
accuracy of information to balance the trade-off between adverse selection and moral haz-
ard effects in order to incentive entrepreneurs to perform on their optimal level. Diamond
(1989) and Vercammen (1995) examine on specific aspects of such disciplinary effects in
greater detail: Diamond (1989) studies the formation and evolution of reputation effects
and indicates that reputation needs time to establish. In contrast, Vercammen (1995) -
who assesses the impact of credit bureau policy on entrepreneurial efforts - finds that the
resulting improvement of welfare does not hold over time, because lenders become increas-
ingly aware of entrepreneurial types as credit histories lengthen. A similar effect emerges
with the increasing informativeness of consumer credit reports. More specifically, Sharma
(2017) illustrates that the probability of strategic defaults is higher when the information
content of credit reports is more likely to reveal entrepreneurial types.
Empirical evidence. Empirical studies aim to provide complementary evidence for these
theoretical predictions and evaluate the economic impact of information sharing arrange-
ments in a broader context. Brown and Zehnder (2010) for instance transfer the model of
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) to an experimental setup and confirm their findings as more
asymmetric information facilitates information sharing, while stronger competition has
an impeding effect. In addition, Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) utilize contract-level
data from the US to study the effects predicted by Padilla and Pagano (1997) and Padilla
and Pagano (2000) and find - consistent with theory - that the entry into a credit bu-
reau reduces contract delinquencies and defaults. Similarly, Jappelli and Pagano (2002)
demonstrate that lending volume is higher and credit risk lower in countries where lenders
share information.
From an individual’s perspective, the existence of efficient information sharing arrange-
ments reduces firms’ financing obstacles (Beck et al., 2004), as credit bureaus add signifi-
cant explanatory power to failure prediction models (Kallberg and Udell, 2003).
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Dierkes et al. (2013) confirm this effect channel and indicate that a prediction’s accuracy
increases with firm age, credit bureau experience, and the spatial distance between firm
and credit bureau and decreases with firm size. With respect to private credit, Djankov
et al. (2007) find that private credit bureaus are more likely in richer and public credit
registries are more likely in poorer countries. Moreover, the introduction of an informa-
tion sharing arrangement increases the volume of private credit in both. In total, these
results support previous findings (e.g., Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Pagano and Jappelli,
1993; Padilla and Pagano, 1997) and highlight the beneficial role of information sharing
in developing countries with poor creditor rights. However, Bos et al. (2018) also identify
a causal effect of negative credit information on employment and wage levels.
Brown et al. (2009) find similar effects for corporate loans and provide empirical ev-
idence that information sharing improves the access to and lowers the cost of credit -
especially for opaque ventures. However, Behr and Sonnekalb (2012) are not able to con-
firm these results for public credit registries but find a positive effect on loan performance.
This effect is more pronounced for repeated interactions and areas with low competition,
which supports the disciplinary effect predicted by Padilla and Pagano (2000). A similar
ambiguity prevails for the volume effects identified in theoretical and empirical research
(e.g., Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Djankov et al., 2007; Allen and Santomero, 1997). Grajzl
and Laptieva (2016) find no evidence for a volume effect with respect to public credit reg-
istries whereas, private credit bureaus on the other hand are associated with an increase in
lending volume. Furthermore, extending the provision of credit information to borrowers
creates an awareness about financing costs and reduces credit volume and overborrowing
issues (Bertrand and Morse, 2011).
In addition, there are several studies that examine the effects of information sharing
arrangements from a banking perspective. Barth et al. (2009) for instance, provide strong
evidence that private credit bureaus reduce lending corruption and enhance the curtail-
ing effect of bank competition on lending corruption. Moreover, Houston et al. (2010)
support Hertzberg et al. (2011)’s coordination hypothesis and indicate that information
sharing decreases banks’ risk-taking. This leads to positive effects on bank profitability,
bank risk, the likelihood of financial crises, and economic growth. Buyukkarabacak and
Valev (2012) furthermore confirm the positive effect on banking crises for both, public and
private information sharing arrangements. On the other hand, Giannetti et al. (2017) un-
derline the strategic rationales illustrated by Bouckaert and Degryse (2006) and show that
banks manipulate shared credit information to protect profitable customer segments.
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Blockchain implications. In total, the reviewed literature on information sharing ar-
rangements offers several valuable insights with respect to blockchain technology: First,
it helps us to understand the capability of the blockchain’s record to share information.
The studies of Kallberg and Udell (2003) and Dierkes et al. (2013) for instance indi-
cate that sharing information via the blockchain’s distributed and complete record of past
transactions may provide an efficient tool to mitigate problems caused by pre- and post-
contractual information asymmetries (Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Beck et al., 2004) and fa-
cilitate coordination among users (Bennardo et al., 2015; Hertzberg et al., 2011; Bertrand
and Morse, 2011; Brown and Zehnder, 2010). However, to ensure a positive impact, it
is important to fine-tune the (time) scale (Diamond, 1989; Vercammen, 1995) and (con-
tent) scope (Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Bouckaert and Degryse, 2006) of disclosed infor-
mation carefully. A special challenge for instance poses the impossibility to delete past
transactions, because the disciplinary effects fade with lengthening records (Vercammen,
1995). On the other hand, the blockchain’s immutable and tamper-free nature prevents
and thereby reduces the effects of data manipulation (Giannetti et al., 2017) - at least
in the digital world (Hawlitschek et al., 2018). Second, it outlines potential channels
through which a change in transparency characteristics might influence behavioral pat-
terns and market outcomes. More specifically, using a consensually updated and shared
database tightens competition (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993), dilutes informational monopo-
lies (Padilla and Pagano, 1997, 2000; Bouckaert and Degryse, 2006), and improves market
access, volume, and efficiency (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009). In addition, shar-
ing previously private information on the supply side redistributes rents to the demand side
(Padilla and Pagano, 1997) and creates a disciplinary effect that alleviates opportunistic
behavior (Padilla and Pagano, 2000). The trade-off between those effects determines the
impact on welfare, the motivation to share information, and strategic rationales on both
sides of the market (Bouckaert and Degryse, 2006; Sharma, 2017)."
5.2.3 Research Gap & Research Questions
"Despite these commonalities, there is also a crucial difference between the traditional in-
formation sharing arrangements and blockchain-based information systems: Traditional
arrangements built on centralized information systems provide a specific scope of infor-
mation to a selected group of users. In consequence, banks have access to information
about the complete market, while entrepreneurs can only access information about them-
selves.
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The blockchain concept on the other hand does not curtail the access rights of individual
users and discloses the stored information publicly. This way, blockchain-based systems
ensure data integrity and facilitate the validity of database updates in the absence of a
central authority. As a result, all users have the same level of information.
Thus, to fully leverage the blockchain’s potential, it is crucial to understand potential
side effects that come with the shift to public transparency. More specifically, in markets
with asymmetric information and quality differences increasing transparency does not only
reduce uncertainty but also enables opportunistic users to exploit quality information in
order to maximize their individual gains. To shed light on the underlying behavioral pat-
terns and outcomes and to identify potential risks of blockchain adoption, we formulate
the following research questions:
Research Question 8. Which participants of a market with asymmetric information are
affected by the blockchain’s shift towards public transparency? When and how does their
behavior change?
Within the related analyses, we investigate who changes behavior, how and why these
changes occur, and evaluate the resulting outcomes. To do so, we take the perspective of
both plums and lemons and examine the incentives to change behavior, the consequences
that come with changes and dismantle effect channels over time. In addition, we consider
different system configurations and connect individual outcomes to characteristics of the
socio-economic environment. However, the effect of behavioral changes is not limited to
individuals but also spills over to the market and the economy as a whole.
Research Question 9. How do the behavioral changes of opportunistic market participants
affect their counterparties, market outcomes in total, and the welfare of the economy?
This research question covers welfare effects as well as the impact on the supply (bank-
ing) side of the market. In consequence, we examine whether the aggregated behavioral
changes of individual market participants improve or impede welfare and which factors
drive these effects. To analyze the markets functioning, we furthermore take a closer look
at the impact of behavioral changes on the supply side (i.e., banks) of the market. Even-
tually, it is also important to transfer the findings from research questions 8 and 9 to a
practical application context to support researchers and practitioners in their blockchain
endeavors."
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5.3 The Model
Economy. "There is a loan market with a competitive banking sector with b > 1 immortal
banks and a continuum of entrepreneurs, which are uniformly distributed on the interval
[0,1]. Entrepreneurs live for two periods, are either plums (good) or lemons (bad), have
access to one-period investment projects in each period, and apply for loans at the banks
to fund these projects. They furthermore can choose a bank at the beginning of each pe-
riod at zero costs. When new entrepreneurs come to a bank, the bank has no knowledge
about their type. However, banks can gather information about entrepreneurial charac-
teristics through their lending relationship (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Boot, 2000), as they
observe project outcomes at the end of each period. In addition, banks share the observed
default information via an information system at the end of period 1. This way they aim to
reduce the information asymmetries they face when entrepreneurs switch banks and use
the information acquired from the information system to approximate types (Padilla and
Pagano, 2000). All actors are risk-neutral and act as rational economic agents. Figure 5.1
illustrates the sequence of actions in the economy in detail.
t
Nature chooses the
distribution of en-
trepreneurial types.
Entrepreneurs choose
banks and effort
levels for period 1.
Banks set period 1 interest
rates, entrepreneurs
accept offers and
implement projects.
Period 1 payoffs are
realized, banks observe
project outcomes and
share default information.
Entrepreneurs choose
banks and effort
levels for period 2.
Banks set period 2 interest
rates, entrepreneurs
accept offers and
implement projects.
Period 2 pay-
offs are realized.
t = 0
t = 1
t = 2
Period 1 Period 2
FIGURE 5.1: Timeline of actions
Information system. The information system functions as a means to periodically share
information, stores default information over time, and makes it available to its users. This
way it enables banks to assess entrepreneurs based on historic averages of past genera-
tions.
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However, the accuracy of this assessment depends on the informativeness of the conveyed
data. To represent this dependency in our model we define two information regimes:
Imperfect and perfect information. In the imperfect information regime, the information
system supplies plain default information. Under perfect information on the other hand,
an information broker - for instance in form of a private credit bureau or a rating agency
- adds value in form of type information to the default data. As a result of this analytic
assessment, banks can identify entrepreneurial types by comparing actual period 1 efforts
with historic averages. In addition, the system can either be deployed as a traditional data
base or as a blockchain-based information system. In the first case, banks have full access,
while entrepreneurs can only see their own performance record. In the blockchain case
on the other hand, all users have access to all data.
Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have no initial funds and access to a one-period invest-
ment project in each period. This project requires an initial investment of 1 at the begin-
ning of a period and yields a positive return R > 1 at the end of a period, if successful.
In the case of failure, it yields a return of 0 and the entrepreneur defaults. A project’s
probability of success p
i
∈ [0,1] depends on the entrepreneur’s type i ∈ {H, L}, is mono-
tonic in the effort exercised by an entrepreneur and creates a quadratic disutility of effort
Vi(p(i)) = ai p
2
i with a cost parameter aL > aH > 0. Similar to Padilla and Pagano (1997)
this allows us to interpret p as the entrepreneurs choice variable. The disutility of effort is
a strictly convex function with V ′ ≥ 0 and V ′′ > 0 and represents the costs an entrepreneur
has to bear to achieve a specific success probability pi. Intuitively, this reflects the idea that
plums posses greater entrepreneurial skills compared to lemons. As a result, effort is al-
ways cheaper for plums but never costless for both types. More specifically, plums’ greater
talent ∆a = a
L
− a
H
> 0 allows them to achieve either greater productivity levels p
H
> p
L
at a given cost V¯ = VH(pH ) = VL(pL) or some success probability p¯ ∈ (0, 1] at lower costs
VH(p¯) < VL(p¯). In addition, the marginal costs of effort are higher for bad than for good
entrepreneurs V ′L(p¯) > V
′
H(p¯). For p = 0, the disutility of effort is equal to zero for both
types (VL(0) = VH(0) = 0).
In total, entrepreneurs experience utility from successful projects and choose their indi-
vidual levels of effort p
i
to maximize their expected utility over both periods, while taking
the effort choices of other entrepreneurs as given. They furthermore act as price takers
and take the interest rates offered by the banks as given. Eventually, an individual en-
trepreneur’s utility is equal to:
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Ui(pi,1 , pi,2) = pi,1(R− R1)− Vi(pi,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net return period 1
+ p
i,2
 
R− E[R2]
− Vi(pi,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected net return period 2
, with i ∈ {H, L}.
(5.1)
In period 1, p
i,1
denotes effort, Vi(pi,1) the corresponding disutility, and R1 the repayment
(principal and interest) to the bank. The same logic applies to period 2, while E[R2]
represents the expected repayment given the behavior in period 1. If an entrepreneur does
not get any credit, his or her expected utility is equal to zero. Figure 5.2 illustrates the
1-period cost (panel A) and utility (panel B) functions of plums and lemons respectively.
Vi(pi)
pi
VH(pH)
VL(pL)
(A) Disutility of effort
Ui(pi))
pi
UH(pH)
UL(pL)
(B) Utility
FIGURE 5.2: Entrepreneurial disutility and utility
Functional form of the partial disutility of effort and partial utility for one period.
As illustrated in figure 5.1, entrepreneurs choose their effort levels prior to borrowing
in each period, while their effort is non-observable and non-contractible14. As a result,
interest rates cannot be conditioned on an individual entrepreneur’s probability of repay-
ment. However, interest rates will depend on the average ex-ante repayment probability of
previous generations, which is accessible via the information system. In addition, project
returns are observable and contractible by the lending bank15.
14Practical examples include hiring a good manager, preparing a good business plan, or the potential of a
project itself. For outsiders and non-experts, such as lending banks, these activities and project characteristics
are hard to verify. In addition, their qualitative nature makes them hard to enforce in court (Padilla and
Pagano, 2000).
15Contractibility of project returns ensures that in case of success the entrepreneur must repay the loan,
while their observability ensures that the actual project outcome (i.e., success or default at the end of a
period) is only observed by the lending bank and not any outside banks.
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Eventually, the fraction of plums in the market is denoted by the uniformly distributed ran-
dom variable θ ∈ (0,1)16. This distribution of plums and lemons is common knowledge.
The historic average success probabilities of each type are known to the lending banks
in the traditional information sharing regime and common knowledge in the blockchain
regime.
Banks. Banks can raise funds for one period at a gross interest rate of R ∈ (1, R] (prin-
cipal and interest) at the beginning of each period17, offer one-period loan contracts to
the entrepreneurs, and compete in interest rates. Consequently, each bank maximizes its
expected profits given the average probability of success of plums and lemons by setting
the interest rates in period 1 and 2.
While providing credit, banks face adverse selection ex-ante due to the non-observable
and moral hazard ex-post due to the non-contractible nature of entrepreneurial effort lev-
els. During the initial engagement with an entrepreneur in period 1, banks can observe
project outcomes and share this information with each other at the end of period 1. To
mitigate the adverse selection problems in the imperfect information regime, they use the
Bayes’ Rule to update their beliefs based on shared default information. In the case of
perfect information, they can acquire type information at zero costs. Conditional on the
level of information about entrepreneurial quality, their expected profit in each period of
a bank is equal to
E

Πt

=
1
b

θ p
H
R j,t + (1− θ )pL R j,t − R¯

, with j ∈ {H, L, P} and t ∈ {1, 2}.(5.2)
At the beginning of period 1, banks have no information about entrepreneurial quality
and compete for the whole market. As a result banks are unable to differentiate between
plums and lemons, offer a pooling rate RP,1, and share the market equally. In period 2,
banks still compete in prices and share the market equally but have more information
about entrepreneurs. In consequence, they offer either risk-adjusted pooling rates RP,2(0)
and RP,2(R) conditioned on default under imperfect or type-specific rates RH,2 and RL,2
under perfect information.
16This ensures that there is at least one plum or lemon in the market.
17This assumption requires banks to pay back their funds at the end of each period and roll over to new
funding at the beginning of the next period. If they cannot repay funds at the end of a period, they go
bankrupt an have to quit business. As a result they set their interest rates to break even in each period
independently of other previous or following periods.
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Solution concept. In order to analyze the impact of the blockchain’s public record, we
examine the following combinations of information regimes and access scopes: While
banks have either imperfect or perfect information and always have access to the infor-
mation system, entrepreneurs stay uninformed with a traditional access scope. In the
blockchain regime on the other hand, public access to the information system enables
entrepreneurs to learn about the average success probabilities of plums and lemons. Com-
paring these two information regimes and access scopes allows us to examine the extent
to which the quality and availability of information provokes behavioral changes of plums
and lemons. To do so, we look for subgame perfect equilibria by the following rationale:
• Banks act simultaneously and maximize their profits by setting period 1 and 2 in-
terest rates given the average historic success probabilities of plums and lemons pH
and pL. In consequence, the vectors (RP,1), (RH,2, RL,2), and (RP,2(0), RP,2(R)) con-
stitute a subgame perfect equilibrium for the banking subgames in period 1 and 2
respectively.
• Entrepreneurs choose their individual effort levels p
i,t
simultaneously to maximize
their expected utility over both periods, correctly anticipating the interest rates in
period 1 and 2, while taking the effort levels of the other entrepreneurs as given.
Remarks. Note that while the distribution of entrepreneurial types and their average
success probabilities are common knowledge among banks, the allocation of good and
bad entrepreneurs to the market fractions [0,θ] and (θ , 1] needs to be observed in period
1. Intuitively speaking, banks know how many plums and lemons are in the market and
the difference ∆a between them but are not able to distinguish between them on an in-
dividual level. To focus on the impact of the non-discriminatory disclosure of information
that comes with blockchain usage, we do not vary the scope of the information sharing
arrangement. To keep the model simple, neither banks nor entrepreneurs discount profits
or utility, we do not consider costs for information acquisition or sharing, and each en-
trepreneur’s wealth is equal to zero when applying for a loan18. Furthermore, note that
while past defaults do not have any impact on the investors’ wealth level, information
about past defaults does as it is recorded and shared by the lending bank. To improve
accessibility, a list of variables including their scope is given in the appendix C.1."
18More specifically, we assume that the entrepreneurs consume the profits of successful projects immedi-
ately, and thus start with no collateral or any other capital from previous projects. In case of default, the bank
forgives the debt at the end of each period as an investment project represents a separate limited liability
company.
114
5.4 Analyses
5.4 Analyses
"As stated before, a core feature that enables blockchain-based systems to function inde-
pendently from central authorities is the public availability of the underlying transactional
database. However, besides reducing adverse selection effects and moral hazard on the
banking side, access to the blockchain’s historic record also enables entrepreneurs to gather
information about each others qualities. As a result, public system access allows individual
entrepreneurs to direct their behavior in order to deceive banks and facilitate misjudgment.
To analyze whether and how this potential for deception might affect markets’ functioning
and outcomes, we establish the banking perspective in the first subsection (5.4.1). In Sec-
tion 5.4.2, we build on the resulting interest rates to investigate the motivation of switching
and staying plums and lemons to mimic their respective counterparts given different infor-
mation system configurations. Eventually, Section 5.4.3 combines both perspectives and
examines the welfare effects of the increased transparency that comes with blockchain
adoption on a market level. Appendix C provides proofs of propositions 1 to 12 (C.2) and
supportive calculus for the profits and the utility of banks and entrepreneurs (C.3)".
5.4.1 Banking Perspective
"To establish the market environment for entrepreneurs, we characterize the banking equi-
librium first. To find the equilibrium rates charged in a partly competitive market with
shared default information, we build on the approaches of Padilla and Pagano (1997) and
Padilla and Pagano (2000) and use backward induction, while taking entrepreneurial ef-
fort levels and quality differences as given. To simplify our analyses, we assume that the
entrepreneurial effort levels p
H
and p
L
are exogenously given and that p
H
> p
L
.
The banks set period 1 and period 2 interest rates to break even given their cost of capital
R¯ and entrepreneurial efforts p
H
and p
L
, while competition erodes monopoly rents. At the
beginning of period 2, entrepreneurs can switch banks and banks use the information
about period 1 to assess entrepreneurial quality and charge risk-adjusted interest rates in
period 2. In the case of imperfect information (i.e., default information), the information
system allows the banks to separate defaulters and non-defaulters and Bayesian learning
leads to two pooling equilibria. For perfect information on the other hand, banks can
acquire type information based on period 1 performance to separate plums and lemons
perfectly. In period 1, the absence of information leads to a uniform pooling rate.
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Assessment of Entrepreneurs with Imperfect Information
Suppose that the banks share the market equally in period 1, each bank observes project
outcomes at the end of period 1, and shares default information consequently. At the
beginning of period 2, each bank accesses the information system and utilizes the default
information to offer entrepreneurs a pooling rate conditional on period 1 project outcomes.
More specifically, the bank uses Bayes’ rule, to approximate whether a customer is good or
bad conditional on period 1 default and given the distribution of types and their average
success probabilities. Figure 5.3 illustrates the resulting probability structure.
Nature
L
0
µ(0|L) = 1− p
L
R> 0
µ(R|L) =
p Lµ(L) = 1− θ
H
0
µ(0|H) = 1− p
H
R> 0
µ(R|H) =
p H
µ(H
) =
θ
FIGURE 5.3: Structure of a priori success probabilities of plums and lemons
Based on this structure, µ(H|R) denotes a bank’s posterior belief at the beginning of
period 2 that an entrepreneur who was successful in period 1 is a plum. Conversely, µ(H|0)
is the posterior probability of being a plum conditional on failure in period 1. The posterior
probabilities for lemons follow the same idea. Using Bayes’ theorem, the posterior success
probabilities of plums and lemons are equal to equations 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 conditional
on success and default in period 1. Moreover, the updated beliefs can be interpreted as
the probability that a bank identifies plums and lemons correctly given period 1 project
outcomes.
(5.3) µ(H|R) = µ(R|H)µ(H)
µ(R)
=
p
H
θ
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
,
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(5.4) µ(L|R) = 1−µ(H|R) = pL(1− θ )
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
,
(5.5) µ(H|0) = µ(0|H)µ(H)
µ(0)
=
(1− p
H
)θ
θ (1− p
H
) + (1− θ )(1− p
L
)
,
(5.6) µ(L|0) = 1−µ(H|0) = (1− pL)(1− θ )
θ (1− p
H
) + (1− θ )(1− p
L
)
.
Proposition 1 implements this notion and formalizes the banks’ perception of project
risk in period 2. Intuitively speaking, this means that in a market with both types and
lending not all plums will be successful and not all lemons will default, while the proba-
bility for success (default) is higher for plums (lemons). As a result, default information
is helpful to approximate effort levels but not as good as having perfect information.
Proposition 1. Sharing default information at the end of period 1 enables banks to approx-
imate the quality of entrepreneurs but still bears the risk of an incorrect assessment. As a
result, banks regard defaulted entrepreneurs as riskier, underestimate the success probabili-
ties of defaulters, and overestimate the one of non-defaulters on average.
p
H
> µ(H|R)p
H
+µ(L|R)p
L
> θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
> µ(H|0)p
H
+µ(L|0)p
L
> p
L
.
Period 2 Interest Rates
Imperfect information. To determine the interest rates offered in period 2, the banks
utilize the default information from the information system to adjust their beliefs about
plums and lemons. In consequence, they weight the success probabilities of defaulters
with µ(H|0) and µ(L|0) and the success probabilities of non-defaulters with µ(H|R) and
µ(L|R) and a bank’s expected period 2 profits are equal to:
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E

Π2

=
1
b
 
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction non-defaulters
 
µ(H|R)p
H
+µ(L|R)p
L

RP,2(R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit non-defaulters
+
 
θ (1− p
H
) + (1− θ )(1− p
L
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction defaulters
 
µ(H|0)p
H
+µ(L|0)p
L

RP,2(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit defaulters
−R¯.(5.7)
Competitive pressure ensures that expected profits are equal to 0 and each bank offers
the following pooling rate to defaulters:
RP,2(0) =

R¯
µ(H|0)pH +µ(L|0)pL , if p
′
i ≤ pi ≤ p′′i ,
R, if R¯R ≤ pi < p′i(0) or p′′i < pi ≤ 1,
no lending, otherwise.
(5.8)
In equation 5.8, p′i and p
′′
i represent the minimum success probabilities that solve the
quadratic break-even condition
 
µ(H|0)p
H
+ µ(L|0)p
L

RP,2(0) − R¯ != 0 when both types
exercise positive effort levels (p
H
> p
L
> 0). For success probabilities outside of these
intervals, the pooling rate would exceed the expected return to successful entrepreneurs,
and thus the banks cannot charge more than the project return R.
The same logic applies to successful entrepreneurs, and thus the interest rate offered
to them is equal to
RP,2(R) =

R¯
µ(H|R)pH +µ(L|R)pL , if p
′′
i ≤ pi ≤ p′′i ,
R, if R¯R ≤ pi < p′i or p′′i < pi ≤ 1,
no lending, otherwise.
(5.9)
p′i and p
′′
i solve the bank’s break-even condition for successful entrepreneurs
 
µ(H|R)p
H
+
µ(L|R)p
L

RP,2(R)− R¯ != 0. Again, banks cannot charge more than the full project return R
for values of pi outside the optimal intervals. In both cases, default and success, no lending
occurs for effort levels below R¯R . This also includes situations, where only one type exerts
positive effort and the other exerts no effort at all (i.e. p
H
= 0 or p
L
= 0).
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If one bank would undercut its rivals and charge interest rates below RP,2(0) or RP,2(R)
it would win the competition but make a loss on average. More specifically, undercutting
RP,2(0) would draw all defaulters and undercutting RP,2(R) all successful entrepreneurs.
However, neither of these rates complies with the bank’s break-even condition, as they both
would underestimate the actual distribution of plums and lemons among defaulters and
non-defaulters. For interest rates greater than RP,2(0) or RP,2(R), no entrepreneur would
agree to lend and the offering bank would not be able to repay its funding and simply go
out of business. In total, banks do not earn any rents on entrepreneurs as the expected
gains on plums are offset by the expected losses generated by lemons mixed in the pools
of defaulters and non-defaulters.
Perfect information. In contrast to imperfect information, an information system with a
value-adding information broker allows each bank learn about the types of entrepreneurs
before offering interest rates in period 2. This type information enables them to separate
plums and lemons and charge perfectly discriminatory prices conditional on the type as-
sessment in period 1. In consequence, period 2 profits in the perfect information regime
add up to
(5.10) E

Π2

=
1
b

θ p
H
RH,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit plums
+ (1− θ )p
L
RL,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit lemons
−R¯.
Solving the linear break-even condition θ (p
H
RH,2 − R¯) != 0 yields the interest rate of-
fered to plums 5.11, while competition prevents efficient undercutting or the extraction of
informational rents.
RH,2 =
(
R¯
pH
, if p
H
≥ R¯R ,
no lending, otherwise.
(5.11)
Consistent with the approach for plums, we find the type-specific interest rate offered
to lemons by solving the break-even condition (1− θ )(p
L
RL,2 − R¯) != 0 for RL,2.
RL,2 =
(
R¯
pL
, if p
L
≥ R¯R ,
no lending, otherwise.
(5.12)
119
Chapter 5 Information Asymmetries & Transparency
Similar to imperfect information, lending at a rate better (i.e., lower) than RH,2 or RL,2
would allow a bank to win the competition for plums or lemons while serving them at a
loss. Charging an interest rate higher than R (i.e., more than a project creates) on the
other hand would push entrepreneurs out of the market, and thus no lending would occur
at all. As a result banks earn zero profits on both types.
Period 1 Interest Rates
In period 1, a new generation of entrepreneurs enters the market and engages in a busi-
ness relationship with the banks for the first time. As a result, banks do not posses any
knowledge about individual characteristics of entrepreneurs and and thus offer an uniform
pooling rate to plums and lemons to compensate this lack of information. This leads to
the following expected profits for period 1:
E

Π1

=
1
b
 
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L

RP,1 − R¯

.(5.13)
Again, competition erodes monopoly rents, enforces zero profits for all banks, and leads
to
RP,1 =
(
R¯
θ pH +(1−θ )pL , if pH + pL
(1−θ )
θ ≥ R¯θR ,
no lending, otherwise.
(5.14)
where the lower bounds for p
H
and p
L
formalize the bank’s break-even thresholds for all
combinations of entrepreneurial efforts (i.e., p
i
∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {H, L}). As indicated above,
charging a rate higher than RP,1 would allow competing banks to undercut profitably, while
offering a rate below RP,1 would create a loss on average. In addition, for lending to occur,
the period 1 interest must not exceed the total return R entrepreneurs can extract from
projects in the case of success. With respect to their funding, banks have to pay back their
investors at the end of each period and roll over their funding. As a result, they have to
break even in each period, and thus cannot take a loss in period 1 in order to win the
competition for plums in period 2. Furthermore, period 1 interests between banks are
equal in equilibrium, and thus banks share the market equally while making zero profits.
More specifically, banks earn a profit on plums, which is offset by the loss incurred from
lending to lemons.
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Proposition 2. In equilibrium, interest rates vary with the information available to the banks
and rates under perfect information bracket less transparent regimes. In addition, banks can
never charge more than the project return without risking a market collapse.
R¯≤ RH,2 ≤ RP,2(R)≤ RP,1 ≤ RP,2(0)≤ RL,2 ≤ R.”
5.4.2 Entrepreneurial Perspective
"In contrast to the assumption in Section 5.4.1, entrepreneurial success is not exogenous
but determined by the effort an individual entrepreneur invests in his or her project. As
a result, effort choices arise endogenously and depend on the disutility a specific level of
effort creates, the interest rates charged by the banks, and project returns. As a result, we
characterize the equilibrium efforts of plums and lemons in this section and examine how
the public transparency that comes with the use of a blockchain-based information system
affects individual choices.
For our comparative analyses, we distinguish between the choices of uninformed and in-
formed entrepreneurs given imperfect and perfect information: Uninformed entrepreneurs
maximize their total utility without any information about their peers. This baseline setup
represents the characteristics of an information system with a traditional access scope. In-
formed entrepreneurs on the other hand, can costlessly acquire information about the aver-
age success probabilities of plums and lemons from past generations. This setup formalizes
the characteristics of a blockchain-based information system, which does not discriminate
between users and disseminates (historic) information equally among banks, plums, and
lemons. This knowledge allows entrepreneurs to mimic their respective counterparts in
period 1 in order to change the banks’ perception, and thus interest rates in period 2.
Note that the ability to mimic does not depend on the presence of an information broker
as entrepreneurs know their own type. Instead, they simply compute the average success
probabilities from the default information of past generations to guide their behavior and
set period 1 efforts. As a result, the potential behavioral changes are solely driven by the
information system’s access scope and not its informativeness.
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In the following subsections, we derive the equilibrium effort levels and the resulting
utility of individual entrepreneurs given imperfect and perfect information on the banking
side and a limited and full access scope on the entrepreneurial side. In addition, we utilize
comparative statics to investigate, how changing behavior in period 1 affects effort levels
in period 2 and under which system configurations (information regimes/access scopes)
utility improves. Figure 5.4 summarizes the underlying scenarios, highlights the level
of information on each side of the market, and indicates the rationale for the following
comparative analysis.
Traditional Blockchain
Imperfect
information
Perfect infor-
mation
Access scope
Information
regime
Banks: Default
information
Entrepreneurs:
Uninformed
Banks: Type
information
Entrepreneurs:
Uninformed
Banks: Default
information
Entrepreneurs:
Informed
Banks: Type
information
Entrepreneurs:
Informed
FIGURE 5.4: Information system configurations and analytic scenarios
This matrix illustrates the scope of our comparative analysis and summarizes how the informa-
tion regime and access scope vary with the system’s configuration. Arrows indicate comparative
analyses.
Uninformed Entrepreneurs
Effort choices under imperfect information. In the imperfect information regime, banks
cannot distinguish between plums and lemons but try to approximate entrepreneurial qual-
ity based on the observed and shared default information from period 1. As a result, banks
offer the pooling rates RP,2(0) and RP,2(R) conditional on period 1 project outcomes. Both,
plums and lemons, incorporate this in their individual rationale and the utility over two
periods is equal to equation 5.15, where ∆R = RP,2(0) − RP,2(R) represents the price im-
provement that results from project success in period 1.
Ui
 
p
i,1
, p
i,2

= p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
 
R− E[RP,2]
− a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
=p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1
+ p
i,2
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
− a
i
p2
i,2
.
(5.15)
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In addition, entrepreneurs do not posses any knowledge about the success probabilities
of their peers. As a result, they have no means to guide behavioral changes and choose
their efforts to maximize total utility. In consequence, deriving and solving the first order
condition for period 1 and period 2 respectively yields the following effort choices:
pU
i,1
=
R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R− RP,2(0)

2a
i
− (∆R)22a
i
, pU
i,2
=
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i
.(5.16)
Note that pU
i,t
takes the value of 1, if the prospect of high net returns in period 2 would
push effort beyond 100% and the value of 0 if no lending occurs19. Figure 5.5 picks up
the rationale of entrepreneurs outlined in equations 5.15 and 5.16 by illustrating marginal
costs (MCi,t), revenues (MRi,t), and the resulting equilibrium effort levels of plums and
lemons in periods 1 and 220. It also highlights that plums always choose higher effort levels
than lemons as success is cheaper for them. The magnitude of this difference depends on
the quality difference ∆a > 0 between both types. In addition, the prospect of a lower
price in period 2 incentivizes entrepreneurs to invest more effort than in period 1.
Proposition 3. In the imperfect information equilibrium, uninformed plums always exert
more effort than uninformed lemons and pU
H,t
> pU
L,t
∀t ∈ {1,2}. In addition, both types
decrease effort levels in period 2 and pU
i,1
> pU
i,2
∀i ∈ {H, L}.
Effort choices under perfect information. In the perfect information regime, an in-
formation broker evaluates period 1 performance of entrepreneurs and thereby allows
banks to separate plums and lemons and offer type-specific interest rates to them. In
consequence, their behavior in period 1 qualifies entrepreneurs to lend at either RH,2 or
RL,2 ≥ RH,2 in period 2 and total utility is equal to
Ui
 
p
i,1
, p
i,2

= p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
 
R− Ri,2
− a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
.(5.17)
19No lending occurs in cases, whenever pU
i,t
is too low to allow the banks to break even.
20The linearity of marginal costs and revenues, and thus the uniqueness of equilibria arises from the
quadratic nature of the disutility of effort chosen for this study. Note that more cost functions with a higher
degree or other functional forms may lead to multiple equilibria. However, we are confident that for this
initial study a simple cost function suffices and leave model setups with more complex or more general
functional forms to future research.
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MRi,1, MCi,1
p
i,1
1
R
MRH,1
MCH,1
pU
H,1
H
MRL,1
MCL,1
pU
L,1
L
(A) Period 1
MRi,2, MCi,2
p
i,2
1
R
MRH,2
MCH,2
pU
H,2
H
MRL,2
MCL,2
pU
L,2
L
(B) Period 2
FIGURE 5.5: Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs under imperfect information
The loci MRi,t depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H, L} and period t ∈ {1, 2}.
Similarly MCi,t illustrates the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (i.e., cost) of effort. Solid
lines represent plums and dashed lines lemons. The intersection points H and L define equilibria
for plums and lemons, respectively. The horizontal line at R represents the social return to effort
in each period.
However, without access to the information system entrepreneurs do not have any in-
formation how to behave in period 1, in order to qualify for a lower rate. In consequence,
they anticipate interest rates offered in period 2 correctly and in compliance with their
type and maximize total utility accordingly. Similar to the imperfect information regime,
deriving the resulting first order conditions for both periods and solving them for p
i,1
and
p
i,2
respectively yields the equilibrium choices for plums and lemons:
pU
i,1
=
R− RP,1
2a
i
, pU
i,2
=
R− Ri,2
2a
i
.(5.18)
Again, pU
i,t
assumes the value of 0 without lending and 1 if net returns are too high. Fig-
ure 5.6 illustrates the equilibrium effort choices of plums and lemons in periods 1 and 2
and highlights differences between types and periods. While entrepreneurs are pooled in
period 1, the separating equilibrium in period 2 enhances the impact of quality differences
and induces plums to increase and lemons to lower their period 2 effort. More specifi-
cally, offering discriminatory interest rates disables the stochastic price effect and thereby
prevents entrepreneurs from indirectly profiting from higher efforts in period 1.
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Proposition 4. Under perfect information, plums always exert greater equilibrium effort than
lemons and pU
H,t
> pU
L,t
∀t ∈ {1,2}. In addition, the separation in period 2 prevents plums
from decreasing (pU
H,2
≥ pU
H,1
) and lemons from increasing (pU
H,2
≤ pU
H,1
) effort levels.
MRi,1, MCi,1
p
i,1
1
R
MRH,1
MCi,1
pU
H,1
H
MCL,1
pU
L,1
L
(A) Period 1
MRi,2, MCi,2
p
i,2
1
R
MRH,2
MCH,2
pU
H,2
H
MRL,2
MCL,2
pU
L,2
L
(B) Period 2
FIGURE 5.6: Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs under perfect information
The loci MRi,t depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H, L} and period t ∈ {1,2}.
Similarly MCi,t illustrates the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (i.e., cost) of effort. Solid
lines represent plums and dashed lines lemons. The intersection points H and L define equilibria
for plums and lemons, respectively. The horizontal line at R represents the social return to effort
in each period.
Informed Entrepreneurs
In contrast to uninformed entrepreneurs, informed plums and lemons have access to in-
formation about the average success probabilities of previous generations stored in the
historic record of the blockchain-based information system. This information allows them
to direct their behavior in period 1 and mimic the respective other type −i in order to
deceive the bank they are lending from. Formally, we implement this notion by setting
period 1 effort levels of informed entrepreneurs to period 1 choices of the respective other
type from the uninformed scenario. This way a lemon can look like a plum at the end of
period 1 and vice versa.
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To investigate whether such behavior occurs, we examine its potential impact on utility
in period 1 (∆Ui,1) and period 2 (∆Ui,2). In period 1, mimicking always creates a utility
loss, because it requires a shift away from the optimal choices identified in Section 5.4.2.
In consequence, period 2 gains have to outweigh this period 1 loss for a given set of ef-
fort choices (p
i,1
, p
i,2
) to make mimicking profitable. Eventually, the total change in utility
∆Ui =
∑
t∈{1,2}∆Ui,t quantifies this net impact of mimicking over time. If total utility
increases, mimicking is a dominant strategy. In addition to the motivation to mimic, we
dismantle utility effects into their components and identify changes in the realized return
to effort, the related cost, and period 2 prices as effect channels.
Recall that the ability to mimic does not depend on the information regime. However,
perfect and imperfect information still affect the banking equilibrium (i.e., interest rates),
and thus indirectly affect mimicking. Also note that setting period 1 efforts to a fixed value
limits the choice of entrepreneurs to the effort exerted in period 2. To find these period 2
choices, we apply the first order condition to entrepreneurial utility and solve it for p
i,2
.
Effort choices under imperfect information. Under imperfect information, banks have
to rely on default information to approximate the characteristics of plums and lemons. As
a result, they offer the pooling rates RP,2(0) and RP,2(R) conditional on period 1 project out-
comes. From an entrepreneurial perspective, the uncertainty on the banking side creates
a stochastic price effect ∆P that translates the impact of behavioral changes from period
1 to period 2. Consequently, utility over two periods is equal to
Ui
 
pU−i,1 , pi,2

= pU−i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
(pU−i,1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
 
R− E[RP,2]
− a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
=pU−i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
(pU−i,1)
2 + p
i,2
 
R+ pU−i,1∆R︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆P
−RP,2(0)
− a
i
p2
i,2
.
(5.19)
In addition, access to the information system supplies them with behavioral information
about plums and lemons and thereby enables mimicking in period 1 by setting period 1
efforts to pI
i,1
:= pU−i,1 . Solving the resulting first order condition with fixed period 1 efforts
yields the period effort choices of mimicking entrepreneurs:
pI
i,2
(pU−i,1) =
R+ pU−i,1∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i
.(5.20)
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Again, pI
i,2
takes the value 0 without lending and is capped at 1. In period 1, the
imbalance between the realized return and the corresponding costs, created by chang-
ing efforts, pushes entrepreneurs out of their equilibrium as MRi,1(pU−i,1) 6= MCi,1(pU−i,1).
Moreover, changing period 1 efforts shifts entrepreneurs to a new equilibrium in period 2,
where realized returns and costs change according to the new effort choice pI
i,2
(pU−i,1). How-
ever, this new equilibrium is still influenced by the behavioral change in period 1, as the
inter-temporal stochastic price effect indirectly affects the direction and strength of effort
changes to period 2. In conjunction with proposition 3 this indicates that plums continue
to lower their effort levels in period 2 after behaving like lemons in period 1. The same
logic applies to lemons but with an inverse direction as they raise their efforts to mimic
plums.
Proposition 5. When entrepreneurs commit to mimicking under imperfect information and
set pI
i,1
:= pU−i,1 , they are locked-in to exert inefficiently low (plums) or high (lemons) effort
levels pI
H,2
< pU
H,2
and pI
L,2
> pU
L,2
in period 2 as well.
To examine the impact on utility, we take a closer look at utility changes in periods 1
and 2. For plums, utility in period 1 decreases as the deviation from equilibrium effort
to pI
H,1
= pU
L,1
< pU
H,1
(proposition 3) creates an imbalance between marginal costs and
returns MRi,1(pU−i,1) < MCi,1(p
U
−i,1). As a result, the positive cost effect that comes with
lower efforts cannot offset the associated negative return effect. In period 2, plums are
furthermore locked-in to their inefficient behavior in period 1 via the price effect and the
utility loss spills over to period 2 (∆UH,2 < 0). In total, the utility losses in periods 1 and 2
sum up to∆UH < 0 and indicate that mimicking does not provide any benefits to plums.
For lemons, the analysis is a bit more complex: While deviation from equilibrium also
leads to utility losses ∆UL,1 < 0 in period 1
21, increasing efforts pI
L,1
> pU
L,1
shifts them to a
lower expected interest rate in period 2 (proposition 5). Moreover, the costs for reaching
this new equilibrium are borne in period 1, and a utility gain ∆UL,2 > 0 occurs in period
2. More specifically, the price effect outweighs the increasing costs associated with higher
efforts. However, in total these gains cannot outweigh the loss in period 1, and thus the
net utility change ∆UL = ∆UUL,1 +∆U
U
L,2 remains negative as period 1 costs dominate. In
consequence, lemons do not profit from changing their behavior in period 1 either.
Proposition 6. Mimicking does not constitute a dominant strategy under imperfect informa-
tion as it leads to equilibria with inferior utility Ui
 
pU−i,1 , p
I
i,2

< Ui
 
pU
i,1
, pU
i,2
 ∀i ∈ {H, L}.
21In contrast to plums, the increasing efforts of lemons lead to inefficient high productivity levels, where
MRi,1(pU−i,1)> MCi,1(p
U
−i,1).
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As result, proposition 6 indicates that the introduction of a blockchain-based informa-
tion system does not induce entrepreneurs to deviate from their equilibrium efforts without
the analytic service of an information broker. Moreover, if they would exhibit deceptive
behavior in period 1 they are locked-in to their inefficient choice and their utility would
decrease even further. Figure 5.7 illustrates the behavioral changes of plums and lemons
in period 1, their impact on period 2 efforts, the related trade-offs, and the utility gains
and losses in an exemplary manner.
Effort choices under perfect information. Under perfect information, the banks can
distinguish between plums and lemons and are able to offer type-specific interest rates
RH,2 ≤ RL,2 in period 2. As a result, behavioral changes in period 1 create a deterministic
price effect ∆P in period 2 and total utility is equal to
Ui
 
pU−i,1 , pi,2

= pU−i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
(pU−i,1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
∆P︷ ︸︸ ︷ 
R− R−i,2
−a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
.(5.21)
Moreover, the extended access scope of the information system enables plums to learn
about the average success probabilities of their respective counterparts and eventually
mimic them. In consequence, fixing period 1 efforts to pI
i,1
:= pU−i,1 and solving the resulting
first order condition for p
i,2
yields the period 2 choices mimicking entrepreneurs (5.22).
pI
i,2
=
R− R−i,2
2a
i
.(5.22)
Like before, pI
i,2
takes the value of 0 without lending and cannot be higher than 1.
However, the deviation from the uninformed equilibrium in period 1 creates an imbalance
between returns and costs as MRi,1(pU−i,1) 6= MCi,1(pU−i,1) and leads to new period 2 equilibria
for both types. In these equilibria, banks charge either RH,2 or RL,2 to entrepreneurs who
pretended to be plums or lemons in period 1. As a result, decreasing period 1 efforts to pU
L,1
crushes plums’ and increasing period 1 efforts to pU
H,1
boosts lemons’ net returns in period
2. Similar to the imperfect information regime, this indicates that mimicking in period 1
is followed by a behavioral change with the same direction in period 2.
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FIGURE 5.7: Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs under imperfect information
The loci MRi,t depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H, L}, period t ∈ {1, 2}. Sim-
ilarly MCi,t illustrates the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (cost) of effort. Solid lines
represent plums and dashed lines lemons. If marginal returns or costs change with the informa-
tion regime we indicate this difference with U for uninformed and I for informed entrepreneurs.
Otherwise, no indication is given. Behavioral changes that come with the blockchain regime in
period 1 and the resulting impact in period 2 are marked in red. More specifically, the utility
changes∆U ji,t of plums and lemons are illustrated by a filling with a red pattern, while red arrows
indicate the direction of changes and corresponding effects. In period 1, the intersection point
U defines the equilibrium before blockchain usage, whereas I represents the adjusted behavior
of mimicking entrepreneurs. Similarly, in period 2 U highlights the equilibrium efforts before
blockchain usage and I the equilibrium outcomes that result from deceptive behavior in period
1. The horizontal line at R represents the social return to effort in each period.
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Proposition 7. Consistent with the imperfect information regime, entrepreneurs who commit
to mimicking under perfect information and set pI
i,1
:= pU−i,1 , are locked-in to their behavior and
furthermore decrease (plums) or increase (lemons) period 2 effort. In consequence, pI
H,2
< pU
H,2
and pI
L,2
> pU
L,2
.
From a utility perspective, plums still experience a utility loss ∆UH,1 < 0 when they
lower period 1 effort to an inefficiently low return level MRi,1(pU−i,1) < MCi,1(p
U
−i,1). The
same holds true in period 2, where the inefficient behavior from period 1 spills over to
period 2 via an increased interest rate RL,2 ≤ RH,2 and creates an additional utility loss
∆UH,2 < 0. In total, this finding is consistent with the prediction for imperfect informa-
tion and highlights that plums are not able to derive any utility gains from mimicking -
independent of the information regime.
Proposition 8. Under perfect information, mimicking does not constitute a dominant strategy
for plums as it leads to an equilibrium with inferior utility UH
 
pI
H,1
, pI
H,2

< UH
 
pU
H,1
, pU
H,2

.
Similar to plums, lemons also make a suboptimal choice in period 1 (MRL,1(pUH,1) >
MCL,1(pUH,1)) and loose utility as a result (∆UL,1 < 0). However, the deterministic nature of
the inter-temporal price effect allows them to maximize their gains from mimicking. More
specifically, in combination with the resulting return effect, the price effect outweighs the
costs associated with higher efforts and creates a utility gain in period 2 (∆UL,2 > 0).
Eventually, the utility gains in period 2 are strong enough to offset the costs of mimicking
from period 1 and total utility increases ∆UL > 0.
Proposition 9. In contrast to plums, the historic performance information disclosed by a
blockchain-based system enables informed lemons to reach a new equilibrium with UL
 
pI
L,1
, pI
H,2

>
UL
 
pU
L,1
, pU
L,2

. In consequence, mimicking is a dominant strategy under imperfect information.
Moreover, the resulting net utility gain depends on the difference between the relative
interest rate improvement (relative price effect) and the increase in the disutility of effort
it entails (relative cost effect).
∆UL =
(R− RP,1)2
4a
L

(RL,2 − RH,2)(2R− RH,2 − RL,2)
(R− RP,1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative price effect
− (aL − aH )
2
a2
H︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative cost effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net utility gain

> 0.(5.23)
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In total, this indicates that the introduction of a blockchain-based information system
only induces lemons to mimic plums if banks can be deceived (i.e., when they have type
information). Plums on the other hand, do not experience any benefits from additional
information. In addition, mimicking entrepreneurs are locked-in to their inefficient choice
- irrespective of their type. Figure 5.8 summarizes these findings and illustrates the be-
havioral changes of plums and lemons in period 1, their impact on period 2 efforts, and
indicates the utility gains and losses incurred in both periods."
5.4.3 Market Perspective
"Section 5.4.2 highlights that entrepreneurs - or more specifically lemons - only have an
incentive to mimic their counterparts when banks can observe type information. Plums on
the other hand have no incentive to do so, irrespective of the information regime. In con-
sequence, we focus on the perfect information regime in our welfare analysis. Moreover,
we set the interest rates offered and consequently charged by banks as exogenously given,
while their order is defined by proposition 2. This ensures the validity of our comparative
analysis and formalizes the notion that banks use the information from past generations to
determine the interest rates offered to the current one. In addition, banks act as mediators
between the capital market and entrepreneurs, and thus do not generate welfare directly.
Taking these considerations into account, we define total welfare as the aggregate utility
(Lange, 1942) of all mimicking lemons and unmodified plums:
W

pU
H,1
, pU
H,2
, pI
L,1
, pI
L,2

=θ

pU
H,1
R− R¯− VH(pUH,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1
+ pU
H,2
R− R¯− VH(pUH,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare from plums
+ (1− θ )pI
L,1
R− R¯− VL(pIL,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1
+ pI
L,2
R− R¯− VL(pIL,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare from lemons
(5.24)
To evaluate the welfare effects of blockchain adoption, we compare equation 5.24 with
the welfare generated by uninformed entrepreneurs while holding the information regime
fixed (perfect information). The resulting welfare change ∆W is defined as the difference
between welfare in the informed scenario and completely uninformed entrepreneurs.
∆W = W (pU
H,1
, pU
H,2
, pI
L,1
, pI
L,2
)−W (pU
H,1
, pU
H,2
, pU
L,1
, pU
L,2
) = (1− θ )∆UL.(5.25)
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FIGURE 5.8: Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs under perfect information
The loci MRi,t depict the marginal return to effort for each type i ∈ {H, L}, period t ∈ {1,2}. Sim-
ilarly MCi,t illustrates the type- and time-specific marginal disutility (cost) of effort. Solid lines
represent plums and dashed lines lemons. If marginal returns or costs change with the informa-
tion regime we indicate this difference with U for uninformed and I for informed entrepreneurs.
Otherwise, no indication is given. Behavioral changes that come with the blockchain regime in
period 1 and the resulting impact in period 2 are marked in red. More specifically, the utility
changes∆U ji,t of plums and lemons are illustrated by a filling with a red pattern, while red arrows
indicate the direction of changes and corresponding effects. In period 1, the intersection point
U defines the equilibrium before blockchain usage, whereas I represents the adjusted behavior
of mimicking entrepreneurs. Similarly, in period 2 U highlights the equilibrium efforts before
blockchain usage and I the equilibrium outcomes that result from deceptive behavior in period
1. The horizontal line at R represents the social return to effort in each period.
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Eventually, ∆W depends on the share of lemons in the market (1 − θ ) and is driven
by the utility gains they experience from mimicking (equation 5.23). The utility of plums
does not affect welfare, because they do not change their behavior. In addition, there is
no welfare effect on the banking side, as banks earn zero profits in their role as mediators
and their costs of capital are constant and equal to R¯.
Proposition 10. Driven by the utility gains of mimicking lemons, the introduction of a
blockchain-based information system increases the total welfare of our economy as ∆W > 0.
However, this entrepreneurial perspective on welfare does not consider the special role
of banks and how they are affected by the behavioral changes of informed lemons. As
mediators between the capital market and entrepreneurs, they manage entrepreneurial
risks and distribute funds to plums and lemons in each period. To do so, they assess en-
trepreneurial quality, pool and separate risk accordingly, and offer credit conditional on
their assessment, while perfect competition enforces the zero profit constraint. In con-
sequence, they build their assessment on the historic information acquired from the in-
formation system and offer risk-adjusted interest rates to break-even given the average
success probabilities learned from past generations. In the current generation, the intro-
duction of a blockchain-based information system supplies entrepreneurs with additional
information that induces lemons to change their behavior. As a result, the actual effort
levels exerted in period 1 and 2 do not comply with the break-even conditions E[Π1]
!
= 0
and E[Π2]
!
= 0 anymore. In the period 1 pooling equilibrium this is not harmful as efforts
of lemons increase (pI
L,1
> pU
L,2
) and thus the realized profit ΠI1 > 0. In period 2 however,
the realized profit ΠU2 < 0 as mimicking lemons wrongfully qualify for RH,2 and the quality
difference ∆a > 0 prevents risk-adequate effort levels.
Proposition 11. While the behavioral change of lemons improves welfare for the current
generation, it also hurts the zero-profit constraint of the lending banks in period 2 as pU
H,2
>
pI
L,2
. As result banks are not able to roll over funding at the end of period 2, go bankrupt, and
future generations of entrepreneurs are cut off the capital market.
Note that in all other scenarios, the introduction of a blockchain-based information
system does not affect welfare as there is no incentive for rational agents to adapt their
behavior given additional quality information.
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However, when entrepreneurs are prone to irrational behavior - as it is often the case in
retail markets22 - deviation from the uniformed equilibrium can harm welfare significantly
ceteris paribus. For mimicking plums this is always the case, because they have to lower
effort levels in period 1 to mimic lemons (proposition 3 and 4) and the resulting lock-in
effects (proposition 5 and 7) push them to equilibria with lower utility in both periods
(proposition 6 and 8). In addition, banks are not able to break even on them anymore,
go bankrupt at the end of period 1, and the market collapses. Lemons on the other hand
always experience a utility gain in period 2, because they receive a better price when
mimicking plums in period 1. Under imperfect information however, this gain does not
outweigh the costs of mimicking created in period 1 and total utility decreases (proposition
6). While raising effort levels in period 1 is beneficial for banks, the same rationale as
in proposition 11 drives them into banruptcy in period 2. Possible reasons for irrational
behavior include the misinterpretation (i.e., wrong assessment) of historic data, the limited
ability of entrepreneurs to access and process the information from the blockchain-based
information system, or simply flawed strategic rationales."
5.5 Discussion
"However, the analysis in Section 5.4 does not consider long term effects that may arise
with a longer lifespan of individual generations or overlapping generations. Figure 5.9
illustrates these model variations and forms a foundation for the following discussion of
related effects.
In the case of a longer lifespan, generations live for m ∈ (2,∞) periods instead of two.
As a result, lemons can choose to change their behavior and mimic plums at the beginning
of each period. Panel A of figure 5.9 illustrates a generation with a m period lifespan and
highlights potential timings for opportunistic behavior. If they decide to mimic before the
first period, they can improve loan conditions in period 2 but cut themselves off the capital
market for all subsequent periods (I). A behavioral change before some intermediate period
m− n− 1 where 2 < n < m creates a positive utility in each period including m− n− 1
and an additional utility improvement in period m− n (II). However, as a a result of the
market collapse at the end of period m− n, entrepreneurs are not able to implement any
more projects and utility is equal to zero for the rest of their life.
22There is a multitude of studies that show the existence of irrational behavior empirically (Poteshman
and Serbin, 2003; Shapira and Venezia, 2001) and analyze the underlying biases and effects (Patel et al.,
1991; Subrahmanyam, 2007).
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If lemons deceive banks in penultimate period m − 2, they can fund and implement a
project in each period and increase their utility in the last period (III). In addition, they
are not affected by the market collapse at the end of period m and the following generations
have to suffer the consequences. Equation 5.26 summarizes the total utility generated in
each case (I - III). Moreover, from t2 < tm−n−1 < tm directly follows that betraying in the
penultimate period m−2 is the best strategy to maximize utility, if we assume that interest
rates are constant over time.
(5.26)
t2∑
t=t1
UL,t +∆UL︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
<
tm−n−1∑
t=t1
UL,t +∆UL︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
<
tm∑
t=t1
UL,t +∆UL︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III)
.
Proposition 12. If the lifespan of a generation increases to m<∞, mimicking in the penul-
timate period m− 2 is a dominant strategy for lemons.
t = 0
. . .
t = t0 t = t1
. . .
t = tm−n−1
. . .
t = tm−2 t = tm
. . .
t = T
Lifespan m<∞
(I) (II) (III)
(A) Generations with a longer lifespan
t = 0
. . .
t = t0 t = t1 t = t2 t = t3 t = t4
. . .
t = T
First generation
Second generation
(IV) (V)
(B) Overlapping generations
FIGURE 5.9: Model variations
This figure illustrates the timelines of actions of opportunistic lemons with a lifespan of m<∞
periods as well as lemons with overlapping generations. In addition, 2 < n < m. Different cases
of opportunistic behavior are highlighted with arrows and superscripts (I) to (V).
To discuss to effects of overlapping generations, we assume that each generation lives
for three periods and a new generation arrives at the market in every period. Panel B
illustrates resulting population structure for two generations. Each generation has the
chance to mimic the respective other type within their own generation in each period.
However, according to proposition 12, lemons do not mimic plums between t = t0 and
t = t1 (IV).
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Instead, they increase their effort levels between t1 and t2 to extract the utility gain ∆UL
at the end of the third and last period of their life (V). As a result, the market collapses at
t = t3 and the second generation is not able to get funding for the third and last project.
If the lemons of the second generation are aware of this behavioral pattern, it is optimal
for them to deceive banks and mimic plums between t1 and t2 (i.e., the first period of
their life) as well (V). The resulting utility is equal to UL,t2 + UL,t3 +∆UL, which is greater
than UL,t2 + UL,t3 . Note that this notion of overlapping generations does not consider in-
terconnections between generations, such as ancestry or heritage. In addition, we do not
consider changing average success probabilities as a result of the behavioral changes of
the first generation.
Proposition 13. If entrepreneurial generations overlap each other, the first generation of
lemons that reaches the last period of their life triggers a cascade of opportunistic behavior.
As a result, all subsequent generations that still overlap with the first one will mimic in the
same period.
In addition, there are some other minor model variations and limitations, we will dis-
cuss briefly here. First, repeating the two-period lending game with an infinite number
of generations does not affect our findings in the long run. The market collapses, when
one generation of lemons decides to mimic plums and consequently all subsequent genera-
tions loose access to the capital market. It is also important to note that the first generation
is not able to deceive, because there is no information to guide their behavioral change
stored in the information system at t = 0. Second, in Section 5.3 we assumed that nei-
ther banks nor entrepreneurs discount profits or utility. Introducing a positive discount
rate on the entrepreneurial side would emphasize the timing of utility changes as today’s
utility becomes more valuable than tomorrow’s. In consequence, the costs of mimicking
in period 1 would increase, while its gains in period 2, and thus ∆UL would decrease.
Third, relaxing competition in the banking sector - for instance via relationship informa-
tion - would allow banks to extract rents from an informational monopoly, and thereby
increase their ability to compensate violations of their break-even condition. Similarly, a
risk averse banking sector would incorporate a safety cushion in the break-even condition,
and thus become more robust towards opportunistic behavior. Finally, good entrepreneurs
do not drop out of the market, because they remain unaffected by the behavior of lemons
and always experience positive utility when implementing a project - if their effort levels
are high enough to get a funding. In a dynamic world however, this may change as banks
adapt their behavior to take the consequences of misbehaving lemons into account."
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5.6 Concluding Remarks
"In total, the analyses in Section 5.4 and the extensions discussed in Section 5.5 help us
to derive several lessons for blockchain ventures in research and practice. First and fore-
most, they relate to research question 8 and indicate that the public disclosure of quality
information can give rise to opportunistic behavior. More specifically, we find that lemons
can increase their utility by behaving opportunistically, when information brokers, such as
credit bureaus or rating agencies, enhance the informativeness of the stored and shared
data. In such market environments, increasing period 1 efforts gives lemons access to bet-
ter prices in period 2. To determine which effort levels qualify them as plums, they use
the information from the blockchain’s public record to learn about the average quality of
plums and lemons and adapt their behavior accordingly. The resulting utility gain is more
pronounced for greater price improvements, lower quality differences, and lower quality
in general. In contrast, we do not find any incentives for plums to behave opportunistically.
Moreover, their decreasing utility over both periods is in line with prior research such as
Padilla and Pagano (2000) and outlines the disciplinary effect increasing transparency can
have. In opaque markets, banks pool plums and lemons conditional in period 1 project
outcomes and neither type has an incentive to behave opportunistically.
Irrespective of the information regime, we furthermore observe lock-in effects across
all analytic scenarios and entrepreneurial types. As a result, plums (lemons) who lower
(increase) their efforts in the first period will do the same in the subsequent one. The
severity of this effect is driven by the transparency of a market as well as price and quality
differences and reinforces the consequences of opportunistic behavior in period 1. While
extraneous for rational agents, erroneous decisions made by irrational agents can spill
over to period 2 and harm utility permanently as entrepreneurs are committed to their
inefficient choice from period 1.
From the market perspective taken in research question 9, the opportunistic behavior of
lemons creates a welfare gain within their own generation. This gain depends on the share
of lemons (1−θ ) and is driven by their utility gains of mimicking. However, the resulting
unjustified access to better loan conditions harms the break-even condition of banks and
prevents them from breaking even. As a result, the banks are not able to roll over funding,
the supply side of the market collapses, and future generations are cut off from funding.
In all other scenarios, the combination of irrational behavior of entrepreneurs and the
following lock-in effects would harm welfare through a negative utility, while the market
still collapses.
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Eventually, the findings hold across various model variations, while generations with a
longer lifespan experience an endgame effect and opportunistic behavior cascades through
overlapping generations. In addition, we are confident that they hold implications that go
beyond the market for credit and apply to other lemon markets, such as the used car or
the insurance market, as well.
With respect to practical considerations, these findings indicate that blockchain adop-
tion can lead to market collapses in markets with a high level of transparency and intense
competition. To mitigate these issues, blockchain designers could refrain from using smart
contracts to implement value-adding services and analytic applications on the infrastruc-
ture level. In addition, using blockchain-based systems in environments prone to irrational
behavior - such as retail markets - can harm welfare and impede a market’s functioning
permanently.
In aggregate, we contribute to three research streams: First, we contribute to the grow-
ing body of literature on the economics of blockchain by shedding light on the impact of
the blockchain’s public transparency paradigm on behavioral patterns in markets exposed
asymmetric information. Second, we contribute to the field of banking research by exam-
ining the effect of the disclosure of quality information to the broad public. As a result,
our findings hold implications for the design of information sharing arrangements as well
open-banking initiatives and transparency regulations (Gomber et al., 2018; Gozman et al.,
2018; Anagnostopoulos, 2018). Third, we contribute to the body of blockchain adoption
literature by highlighting the risks of market-oriented application contexts.
However, this initial study is limited in various ways and calls for a multitude of model
extensions: First and foremost, we limit our analyses to comparative statics and believe
that considering dynamic interactions between banks and entrepreneurs could add another
interesting dimensions to our results. We also set the cost for information sharing and
acquisition - and thus the information system itself - to zero for both sides of the market.
While adding a constant cost factor on both sides of the market would simply shift interest
rates to a higher and utility to a lower level, modelling the actual costs of a blockchain-
based systems is more complex. In addition, we do not consider switching costs, refrain
from using a generalized functional form of the disutility of effort, and exclude evolution of
wealth on the entrepreneurial side and the role relationship information and opportunistic
behavior on the banking side. These aspects are interesting and relevant extensions to
consider in the context of public transparency and provide great opportunities for future
research."
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The Quality of Decentralized Markets
This chapter is based on the working paper "Trading Stocks on Blocks - The Quality of Decen-
tralized Markets". The paper is co-authored by Vincenzo Marino, Daniel Englert, and Christof
Weinhardt, part of the KIT working paper series in economics, and available on SSRN. It was
furthermore presented at FinteQC 2018 and CCConf 2018. Direct citations are highlighted
by double quotes.
Manuscript details:
Notheisen, B., Marino, V., Englert, D., & Weinhardt, C.,
Trading Stocks on Blocks - The Quality of Decentralized Markets,
KIT Working Paper in Economics No. 129, SSRN Electronic Journal, 18 January 2019,
https://doi.org/10.5445/IR/1000092485, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3318181.
6.1 Introduction
"As an infrastructure for economic systems, blockchain technology challenges the role of
traditional intermediaries and enables the creation of novel market designs that disrupt
the traditional value chain of securities trading. Fully and partially decentralized market
setups, such as Polymath, IDEX, or Sharevest, claim to utilize this potential to enable users
to trade financial and crypto assets and settle their trades without the involvement of
intermediaries. In addition, first academic studies such as Malinova and Park (2017),
Notheisen et al. (2017), and Daian et al. (2019) begin to explore trader behavior, market
design, and technological issues.
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However, while practical approaches promise fair and transparent trading (Daian et al.,
2019), the decentralization’s impact on market quality remains unclear. This study aims to
fill this gap by examining the impact of performance-related design parameters - namely
the block size (BS) and the block creation time (BCT) - on the quality of decentralized
markets. This includes the identification of quality drivers and inhibitors, the assess-
ment of trade-offs between design parameters, and the derivation of design implications to
guide market engineers (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007). To do so, we replicate 5 years of
blockchain-based equity trading with the help of time-stamped order-level data from the
Stuttgart stock exchange. This detailed information enables us to conduct a technology-
agnostic evaluation of the performance-quality relationship on blockchain-based platforms
from a real-world perspective that covers the scope of modern financial markets.
In consequence, our study design comprises a three-step approach: The first step fo-
cuses on the data generation process. This includes the development and implementa-
tion of a decentralized market mechanism that formalizes and integrates the technologi-
cal characteristics of blockchain-based infrastructures. To minimize confounding effects,
we closely follow the implementation and exchange rules of the Stuttgart stock exchange.
Then, we utilize the order-level data to replicate market outcomes under 9 parameter com-
binations that represent different blockchain configurations. To ensure the fit between the
input sample and the blockchain parameters, we furthermore set BCTs according to promi-
nent blockchain protocols and previous findings from periodic auctions and calibrate BSs
based on the trading data from Stuttgart. To measure the quality of the resulting market
outcomes, the second step builds on the market quality framework of Zhang et al. (2011)
and adapts activity, liquidity, and information measures from established market quality
literature. In addition, we derive an empirical strategy to guide our analyses. In the third
and final step, we use the data panel generated in step 1 to compute the 6 market qual-
ity measures defined in step 2 and investigate the quality effects of parameter variations.
More specifically, we study the time and size effects that come with different blockchain
configurations as well as interactions with activity and quality controls.
In these analyses, we find evidence that decreasing the blocks’ capacity increases the
daily number of trades but also limits daily trading volume and the average size of a trade.
In addition, increasing the block frequency boosts the number of trades and turnover per
day but reduces the number of shares included in a trade. As a result, higher BSs offer a
means to improve market activity, while lowering BCTs remains ambiguous and imposes
a trade-off between rising turnovers and declining trade sizes.
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With respect to the liquidity of decentralized markets, we furthermore identify the
blocks’ intervals and size as drivers of daily and intraday liquidity, respectively. As a result,
improving liquidity goes hand in hand with increasing throughput, while market engineers
can exercise control over daily and intraday liquidity almost separately.
Eventually, our analysis on a market’s information processing capability indicates that
the price impact of a new block is stronger for larger and more frequent blocks. In con-
sequence, blockchain configurations that facilitate activity and liquidity also intensify the
price impact of a block, and thus may lead to higher volatility. Moreover, our evidence
indicates a reciprocal relationship between blockchain parameters across all quality di-
mensions.
In total, these findings highlight that increasing the BS and decreasing the BCT is no
silver bullet to scale decentralized markets and illustrates the need for a holistic block-
chain engineering approach that combines all three quality dimensions with the market’s
objectives (Notheisen et al., 2017; Hawlitschek et al., 2018). In consequence, our contri-
bution is threefold: First, we contribute to the growing body of interdisciplinary research
on blockchain-based economic systems by providing a first technology-agnostic quantita-
tive analysis of the relationship between performance-related blockchain parameters and
market quality. Second, we pave the way for future research that examines decentralized
markets by highlighting points of interest, such as changes in investor behavior or the
detailed analysis of the liquidity of decentralized markets. Third, we utilize real-world
data that resembles the scale and scope of modern financial markets to offer some ini-
tial guidance for innovate practitioners to engineer and design new and enhance existing
decentralized market platforms."
6.2 Related Literature
"This paper builds on multiple streams of research and utilizes findings from market quality
and market design literature to examine the impact of the underlying blockchain’s param-
eter configuration on the quality of decentralized markets. In order to establish a common
understanding for the analysis in Section 6.5, we introduce the concept of blockchain-
based markets, outline the current state of research regarding the quality of decentralized
markets, and briefly review related literature on market quality and frequent batch auc-
tions in this section. Eventually, we integrate these views to illustrate our study design,
identify a research gap, and highlight our contribution."
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6.2.1 The Concept of Blockchain-based Markets
"In financial markets, the potential of decentralized applications goes beyond the tok-
enization of assets and crypto assets (Catalini and Gans, 2018; Peterson, 2018) and in-
clude transparent transaction systems (Notheisen et al., 2017), efficient settlement systems
(Mills et al., 2016; Chiu and Koeppl, 2018), and decentralized stock markets (Lee, 2016;
Jessel and Marshall, 2016; Notheisen et al., 2017; Workie and Jain, 2017). As a result,
blockchain technology promises improvements in corporate governance, transparency, and
liquidity (Catalini and Gans, 2016; Yermack, 2017; Malinova and Park, 2017). However,
fully decentralizing securities trading is a challenging task, while the actual consequences
remain unclear. On one hand, the underlying value chain is rather complex and includes
many process steps, such as matching, clearing, and settlement, the blockchain engineer
needs to take into account. On the other hand, the technology’s block-based nature limits
the transaction throughput and shifts trading from continuous to discrete time (Section
4.3; Notheisen et al., 2017).
In consequence, the first practical decentralization efforts focus on the clearing and
settlement processes instead of market mechanisms. In 2015 for instance, the Australian
stock exchange ASX commenced to settle equity transactions with a blockchain-based sys-
tem23 in the near future. In recent years, we furthermore observe a growing number of
DEX concepts and market platforms that trade a variety of assets. These DEXs operate
continuous limit order books in a decentralized fashion, while smart contracts assume the
role of traditional market operators (Daian et al., 2019).
Augur and Gnosis for instance, aim to decentralize prediction markets24 by building market
frameworks based on the Ethereum platform. In addition, there are multiple decentral-
ized market platforms - such as Bancor, Bitsquares, CryptoBridge, OpenLedger DEX, or
the Waves platform - that claim to enable investors to trade crypto assets and currencies
without the involvement of intermediaries. In the financial sector, start ups - such as Bit-
Shares, Polymath, or Sharevest - aim to enable users to trade financial assets in a fully
decentralized environment. In addition, there are hybrid approaches that combine decen-
tralized and centralized elements. IDEX, for instance, limits blockchain-based processes to
the settlement of transactions and uses a centralized server to update account balances and
match orders. Table A.4 in appendix A.5 provides a brief overview of selected ventures.
23More information about the ASX’s efforts to replace their current post-trading system CHESS with a
blockchain-based alternative is available under https://www.asx.com.au/services/chess-replacement.htm.
24For an introduction to the concept of prediction markets, we kindly refer to Kranz (2015).
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Academic literature, on the other side, has only started to explore the increasingly pop-
ular phenomenon of DEXs25 Patel (2014), for instance, presents a theoretical implemen-
tation concept, while Clark et al. (2014) derive design principles for matching orders in
a decentralized way. In addition, Malinova and Park (2017) study how the increasing
transparency that comes with a blockchain-based market affects the trading behavior of
different (large/small) investors. In their theoretic model, they show that despite the risk
of front-running full transparency improves welfare by decreasing the costs of finding liq-
uidity. Daian et al. (2019) furthermore show that malicious users use arbitrage bots to
exploit the distributed and discrete nature of DEXs to frontrun. Notheisen et al. (2017)
implement a proof-of-concept prototype of a blockchain-based exchange and identify the
number of transactions processed per block - the block size (BS) - and the periodic creation
of new data blocks - the block creation time (BCT) - as obstacles to decentralized trading.
More specifically, these parameters limit the transaction throughput of a blockchain-based
exchange, and thus affect the way new orders are processed. In the following, we define
the BS as the maximum number of trades that fit into one block and the BCT as the fixed
time interval between two blocks.
The Bitcoin BS, for instance, is currently limited to one megabyte (Kogias et al., 2016).
In Ethereum, the size of a block is also affected by the gas limit and currently between 20
and 30 kilobytes (Buterin, 2013). In the case of Bitcoin, a new block is created every 10
minutes, whereas the Ethereum protocol requires approximately 15 seconds to create a
block (Kogias et al., 2016). In combination, the BS and the BCT determine the through-
put of a blockchain-based system. For the Bitcoin system this leads to 7 transactions per
second, while Ethereum reaches up to 15 transactions within the same amount of time26.
However, in blockchain-based markets, the impact of the underlying blockchain configu-
ration goes beyond scalability but also affects market outcomes."
25Besides DEXs, recent research about decentralized markets centers on financial intermediation and
search and bargaining costs in over-the-counter markets. For assets traded on multiple exchanges for in-
stance, Malamud and Rostek (2017) find that decentralization improves the allocation of risk to traders and
increases price impact. Albin and Foley (1992) simulate bilateral trades (i.e., the communication of trade
intentions and bargaining efforts) among geographically dispersed agents and find a positive relationship
between decentralization and the allocation of resources. The resulting outcomes depend on information
and communication costs (Albin and Foley, 1992) and heterogeneity among traders’ valuations intensifies
the price impact of search frictions (Hugonnier et al., 2014). From a market perspective, intermediation
is costly (Babus and Hu, 2017) but alleviates search frictions (Li and Schürhoff, 2019) and improves in-
formation diffusion (Babus and Kondor, 2018). However, to our knowledge the studies in this field focus
mostly on trader characteristics and macroeconomic effects. Thus, the implications for the microstructure
of blockchain-based markets are limited.
26For information on average BSs we refer to blockchain.com for Bitcoin and etherscan.io for Ethereum.
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6.2.2 Market Quality
"To assess the outcomes of decentralized markets, we build on established market quality
literature. In consequence, the following paragraphs create a basic understanding of the
concept of market quality, outline its dimensions, and briefly describe their measurement.
To do so, we utilize the market quality framework introduced by Zhang et al. (2011)
and illustrated in figure 6.1. According to this framework, market quality has three di-
mensions - activity, liquidity, and information - and depends on the business structure,
IT systems, a market’s microstructure, and its socio-economic environment. The business
structure comprises the business model of market operator and defines revenue models,
target groups, and products and services offered to them. The trading system is borne by
the exchange’s IT system, which allows traders to connect to the market platform, imple-
ments the matching engine, and determines a market’s degree of automation. Eventually,
a market’S microstructure formalizes the rules for the exchange of assets (O’Hara, 1998).
The resulting trading mechanism transforms latent demand and supply of investors into
actual transactions (Madhavan, 1992), while the market model specifies the utilized auc-
tion model (Zhang et al., 2011). In combination, the trading mechanism and the market
model determine the attributes of a market, such as trading times, matching algorithms,
price determination, or order types (Madhavan, 1992). In total, the characteristics of these
components affect trading behavior, price formation, transaction costs, and information
disclosure (O’Hara, 1998; Pagano and Röell, 1996). In addition, platform characteristics
and market outcomes are shaped by external factors, such as regulatory constraints, the
current state of technology, and competition.
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FIGURE 6.1: Market quality framework
This figure illustrates the market quality framework introduced by Zhang et al. (2011) and
presents the three dimensions of market quality as well as their determinants .
144
6.2 Related Literature
The activity dimension captures the trading intensity and can be measured by the num-
ber, average size, or the total volume of trades conducted within a specific period of time
(e.g., a day). In addition, price-based measures, such as the stock-return volatility and
the stock-price momentum shed light on the impact of new information on market activity
(Barclay et al., 2003).
Liquidity refers to a market’s ability to execute a trade without affecting the price (Has-
brouck, 1991b) and can be characterized by a immediacy, width, depth, and resiliency
(Harris, 2003). Immediacy captures how fast a trade of a given size and cost can be ex-
ecuted. Moreover, wide markets are characterized by the presence of many orders close
to the current price, while deep markets are characterized by the presence of large orders
close to the current price. Finally, resiliency refers to a market’s ability to revert to prior
price levels following uninformed order flow. Liquidity is a central element of market qual-
ity and a principal criterion for attractiveness and success of securities exchanges (Zhang
et al., 2011). However, liquidity is also an elusive concept that comprises multiple aspects,
and thus is hard to measure with a single indicator (Amihud, 2002). In consequence, a
variety of measures is required to capture the multi-faceted nature of liquidity (Hasbrouck,
1991b). Spread measures for instance use microstructure data such as bid and ask prices
to capture the impact of orderflow on prices (Copeland and Galai, 1983). More specifically,
spread measures provide ex-ante and ex-post measures of liquidity that enable traders to
assess transaction costs (Huang and Stoll, 1996) and (potential) losses due to inferior in-
formation (Hasbrouck, 1991a). However, while spread measures are easy to calculate and
interpret, the required order-level data may be hard to obtain (Hasbrouck, 1991b). In con-
trast, volume- or quantity-based measures such as Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure or
the order book imbalance (Cao et al., 2009; Brogaard et al., 2014) provide a more coarse
but robust and readily available means to study market quality developments.
The third and last dimension of market quality refers to the information content of
prices and the way new information is incorporated. Price discovery describes the com-
petitive process by which informed traders drive prices to their efficient value (Hasbrouck,
1991b). Moreover, this process can happen on multiple exchanges simultaneously, while
the information share measures the relative contribution of each exchange (Hasbrouck,
1995). Measures to capture the information content of a trade include the price impact
and the permanent information impact. The price impact is based on the idea that af-
ter a certain period of time only the actual information remains, while inventory effects,
other temporary effects, and noise vanish over time (Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012;
Hendershott et al., 2011).
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The permanent information impact on the other hand, utilizes a vector autoregressive
model to analyze the unanticipated component of a trade (Hasbrouck, 1991a). Moreover,
the decomposition of the price variance into trade-correlated and trade-uncorrelated com-
ponents allows a differentiated perspective on the informativeness of a trade (Hasbrouck,
1991c).
To examine the quality of decentralized markets, we consider all three dimensions and
include activity, liquidity and information measures in our analysis. A introduction of the
applied measures follows in Section 6.4.1."
6.2.3 Periodic Auctions
"In blockchain-based markets, order matching and price determination is tied to the dis-
crete consensus process that limits the addition of new data blocks to periodic time inter-
vals. As a result, the growing body of research on periodic and frequent batch auctions
allows a first peak on the impact of blockchain-based market mechanisms on a market’s
quality.
In contrast to continuous market models, periodic and frequent batch auctions differ
in one central aspect: They treat time as a discrete variable (Budish et al., 2015). Con-
sequently, orders are not processed serially but in batches. Within each batch, an auction
determines a uniform price, which then applies to all orders accumulated and executed in
that batch (Budish et al., 2014). Similar to continuous limit order markets, orders com-
prise a limit, a quantity, and a trade direction and can be submitted, modified, and deleted.
The list of orders also contains previously submitted orders that could not be executed in
preceding auctions. Based on this list, the auction mechanism determines a uniform price
that maximizes the executed quantity. To manage excess demand or supply, Budish et al.
(2014) suggest pro-rata execution with time priority across but not within batch inter-
vals. Eventually, the resulting price, the traded quantities, and the remaining orders are
disclosed.
With respect to market quality, Madhavan (1992) shows that periodic auctions offer
greater price efficiency than continuous market models, while the unobservability of order
books before a trade increases information costs. In comparison with dealer markets, price
and execution risk increases as execution depends on the price limit instead of guaranteed
quotes (Pagano and Röell, 1996).
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In addition, discrete market models may lead to lower commission costs due to easier
order handling, are less susceptible to manipulations, and simplify governance by less
complex audit trails (Economides and Schwartz, 1995). The theoretic model of Pancs
(2012) supports these findings but also indicates that continuous markets offer a higher
allocative efficiency, when information asymmetries are low and traders are impatient.
However, if batch intervals are too short, prices may not reach equilibrium as the num-
ber of orders within each auction is too low. If on the other hand intervals are too long,
prices may not reach equilibrium, because the market equilibrium might have changed in
the meantime (Fricke and Gerig, 2018). As a result, it is important to determine the op-
timal batch interval and Fricke and Gerig (2018) indicate that intervals should be shorter
for securities with higher trading intensities, higher volatility, a higher correlation with the
market, and more concentrated reservation prices. Based on these factors, they estimate
the optimal batch interval for S&P 500 stocks and find that intermediate batch intervals
in the range of a few seconds maximize market quality. Budish et al. (2014) aim to sup-
port the implementation of frequent batch auctions by providing practical details. More
specifically, they highlight the elimination of speed advantages and the shift from speed
to price competition as core drivers of liquidity and welfare improvements. Budish et al.
(2015) build on this study and propose frequent batch auctions as a countermeasure to
prevent mechanical arbitrage by high frequency traders and suggest an optimal time in-
terval from 10 to 100 milliseconds to improve liquidity provision and social welfare. More
specifically, the welfare of slow traders increases in frequent call markets, while they seek
protection from faster traders (Wah et al., 2016). Farmer and Skouras (2012) also support
the negative value of speed from a regulatory perspective and propose to replace continu-
ous markets with frequent call auctions with randomized interval lengths. By setting the
average batch interval length to one second while keeping the length of each single inter-
val unpredictable they hope to prevent a last-mover advantage of high frequency traders.
In contrast, Economides and Schwartz (1995) propose to incorporate batch auctions into
continuous markets. More precisely, the authors suggest to use three auctions per day:
One auction to open the market, one auction during the trading day, and one auction to
close the market. One of their key arguments is that opening and closing the trading day
this way may facilitate price discovery.
However, a blockchain-based market mechanism is not only restricted by time but also
by the number of transactions processed per batch, as each block has a maximum capac-
ity. In consequence, we utilize these findings as a foundation, complement them with a
capacity restriction, and formulate our research question."
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6.2.4 Research Gap & Research Question
"After establishing a common understanding of the concept of blockchain-based markets,
the dimensions of market quality, and periodic auctions, we highlight the resulting re-
search gap in this section and formulate a research question. While some papers, such
as Urquhart (2016) or Wei (2018), analyze the liquidity and efficiency of cryptocurrency
markets, other studies, such as Hendershott and Moulton (2011), focus on the impact
of technological advancements and automation on market quality. In addition, there is
a growing number of studies on the quality effects of periodic auctions that offer some
implications for blockchain-based markets. More specifically, these studies indicate that
the quality of decentralized markets should be highest for intermediate auction intervals
(Budish et al., 2015; Fricke and Gerig, 2018; Farmer and Skouras, 2012). In consequence,
improving performance by lowering BCTs may not be a preferable solution from a market
quality perspective. However, despite the growing number of DEXs, none of these streams
of literature takes the specific infra- and microstructure features of blockchain-based ex-
changes into account. In consequence, the current research on the quality of decentralized
markets can be summarized as follows: First, blockchain research mainly focuses on the-
oretical concepts and rarely considers the implementation of securities markets and the
resulting implications on an economic level. Second, market quality literature offers a
valuable toolbox to examine the quality of decentralized markets but has not been applied
to this area, yet. Third, studies on periodic call auctions offer an initial foundation to study
the quality of decentralized markets but do not consider the impact of blockchain design
features, such as the BS or the relationship between the BS and auction intervals (BCT).
Within this study, we take a first step towards filling this research gap by using data from
real-world financial markets to empirically investigate the following research question:
Research Question 10. How do the size and frequency of database updates (i.e., blocks)
impact the activity, liquidity, and price formation on blockchain-based markets?
By answering this research question, we aim to evaluate the potential of intermediary-
free market setups, assess their quality characteristics, and identify facilitating and imped-
ing factors as well as trade-offs between blockchain design parameters (BS, BCT). Based
on these findings, we furthermore hope to identify and quantify quality-performance trade-
offs that come with different blockchain configurations and derive implications to guide
the engineers of decentralized markets. To do so, we replicate five years of equity trading
from the Stuttgart stock exchange, while taking different blockchain configurations - i.e.
combinations of different BSs and BCTs - into account.
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Based on the resulting market outcomes, we then assess the impact of blockchain param-
eter variations on the activity, liquidity, and price formation on decentralized markets."
6.3 Data
"To examine the quality of decentralized markets, we utilize message-level data from the
Boerse Stuttgart Research Database to replicate market outcomes in a blockchain-based
setup. The Boerse Stuttgart Research Database is jointly managed and maintained by the
Stuttgart stock exchange and the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and provides detailed
time-stamped (milliseconds) order and trade data for all instruments traded in Stuttgart.
For our analysis, we obtain order data for German blue chips listed in the DAX27 index from
this database. To ensure consistency throughout our observation period, we focus on the
30 stocks included in the DAX as of December 31, 2017. In this section, we describe the
data generation process and provide summary statistics to illustrate the data panel used
to conduct our empirical analyses in Section 6.5."
6.3.1 Data Generation Process
"The data generation process comprises the following steps: First, we refine the raw data
acquired from the Boerse Stuttgart Research Database to create the input sample for the
market mechanism. Based on this input sample, we calibrate the size and time parameters
of 9 different blockchain configurations and replicate 5 years of equity trading. Eventu-
ally, the output data is refined in a last step. The following paragraphs report the pre-
processing procedures, illustrate the resulting input sample, outline the calibration of the
blockchain parameters, specify the blockchain-based market mechanism, and describe the
post-processing procedures.
27The index is composed of the 30 most liquid stocks with respect to the free-float market capitalization
and the total order book turnover. For further details, we kindly refer to the website of Deutsche Börse.
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Pre-processing & Input Sample
The raw data initially acquired from the Stuttgart stock exchange contains 5.63 million
transaction messages including order submissions, updates, and cancellations, trade exe-
cutions, and messages related to the initialization and closing of the trading system. Each
message comprises a time stamp, an order and stock identifier, a trade direction, an order
quantity and limit, a limit type, the traded quantity, a trade price, and other fields.
At the beginning of the pre-processing, we drop irrelevant fields and delete initializa-
tion and closing messages. To reduce computational complexity, we furthermore exclude
cancellations from the input sample and condense the remaining orders. In addition, we
translate stop orders and other event-driven orders into limit or market orders, if the trig-
gering time and all other needed information could be derived from the raw data. If this
was not the case, we delete these observations. Jointly with the existing market and limit
orders, the translated orders are condensed to the most recent specification. This includes
updating each (limit) order to the most recently submitted quantity (and price limit), re-
placing its time stamp with the time stamp of the update, and deleting all changes. As
a result, every order is represented by a single data tupel that comprises a unique order
number, the stock’s name and identifier, a buy-sell flag, and the limit price. Based on this
sample, we finally adjust trade prices, quantities, and limits by stock splits that occurred
during the observation period28. This way, we ensure that prices remain comparable over
time. In this last step, we also remove corrupted data as well as duplicates.
The resulting input sample comprises 1,231 trading days, and covers a period from
January 1, 2013 to December 31, 201729. Within this period, 0.79 million market orders
and 0.61 million limit orders have been submitted. On a daily level, this corresponds to
an average of 1,138 orders per day. From the perspective of the Stuttgart stock exchange,
these 1.40 million submissions resulted in 1.32 million trade executions and 1,075 trades
per day. On average, each trade comprised a traded quantity of 552 shares. The median
of 150 shares per trade is considerably lower. Eventually, the trading volume sums up to
EUR 22.57 billion over 5 years, which corresponds to a daily trading volume of EUR 18.34
million.
28Within our observation period there were two relevant stock splits: The first one was a 10:1 reverse
split of the Commerzbank stock (ISIN: DE000CBK1001), which was conducted on March 23, 2013. The
second one happened on August 4, 2014 and splitted the Fresenius stock (ISIN: DE0005785604) in a ratio
of 1:3. In addition, there was a third split (Merck, DE0006599905, June 30, 2014) that retained a ratio of
1:1, and thus no adjustments were required.
29Due to a server problem, the data contains a gap from December 16, 2016 to January 13, 2017.
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Parameter Calibration & Blockchain Configurations
To capture the impact of changing blockchain parameters on market quality, we create 9
blockchain configurations that combine a low, medium, and high BS with a low, medium,
and high BCT. To take the variations in trading volumes and quantities of the DAX stocks
into account and minimize confounding effects that arise from incorporating blockchain
parameters in Stuttgart’s market model, we fit the BSs and BCTs to the actual trading data
from the Stuttgart stock exchange (Budish et al., 2015; Fricke and Gerig, 2018). More
specifically, we utilize the trades corresponding to the orders from the input sample to set
both blockchain parameters to reach a specific throughput for each stock i.
To do so, we compute the average number of trades per day for each stock between
2013 and 2017. In order to remove outliers, we winsorize the daily number of trades by
replacing values below the first percentile by the value of the first percentile and values
above the 99th percentile by the value of the 99th percentile. Columns 2 to 4 in table 6.1
report the number of trading days as well as the resulting average number of trades per day
and corresponding standard deviations. In addition, the example of Daimler (129 trades
per day) and Beiersdorf (5 trades per day) highlights the need to calibrate the simulation
parameters on the stock-level. From a technical perspective, this calibration setup also
represents a DEX with a separate blockchain for each stock.
In the next step, we set the BCT to constant intervals of 10, 60, or 300 minutes for
each stock. The minimum and maximum specifications are based on the average BCT
of Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and the study of Economides and Schwartz (1995), who
suggest to conduct three auctions per day to maximize market quality. More specifically
and consistent with Stuttgart’s trading time of 14 hours, we set the BCT to 300 minutes
in the maximum scenario. Eventually, we also include a BCT of 60 minutes to create an
intermediate scenario30.
In addition, we set the BS for a stock i to achieve a minimum, medium, and maximum
daily throughput at a given BCT. The medium throughput is equal to the average amount
of trades per day given in column 3 in table 6.1. The minimum and maximum configura-
tions also consider shifts by one standard deviation (column 4 in table 6.1). As a result,
we calibrate the minimum, medium, and maximum BS for stock i’s market by equation
6.1, where x¯ i denotes the average number of trades per day and σi the corresponding
standard deviation.
30Note that we discarded Ethereum’s BCT of 10 to 20 seconds (or other protocols with a BCT below 10
minutes), because of the substantially lower trade frequency in our data.
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In combination with a BCT ∈ {10,60, 300}, this leads to 9 blockchain configurations for
each stock. For instance, BSmax(60) for the Daimler stock is computed as follows: Based on
a trading time of 14 hours there is a new block every 60 minutes, while 128.65+ 86.63 = 215.28
trades have to be processed within these 14 blocks (i.e., 15.38 trades per block). However,
as a block cannot contain fractions of trades, we set the BS to 15. In some cases - espe-
cially in the min-configurations - the calibration yields BSs below 2. In these cases, we set
the BS to 2, since an execution requires at least one buy and one sell order to be feasible.
Columns 5 to 13 in table 6.1 report the BS of all 9 configurations and 30 stocks.
Replication of Market Outcomes
To replicate market outcomes, we extend the market model of the Stuttgart stock exchange
with the blockchain parameters BS and BCT, set them according to the calibrated block-
chain configurations from table 6.1, and feed the resulting market mechanism with the
input sample from the previous subsection. In consequence, the replication of market
outcomes is guided by the following steps:
First, the pre-processed time-stamped buy and sell orders from the input sample are
submitted to the market, while order books collect them in ascending order (time). Based
on this list, the first order of a day triggers and sets the schedule for the rest of the day. As-
suming a BCT of 10 (60, 300) minutes, the auction mechanism then determines a price and
executes trades every 10 (60, 300) minutes. Consistent with the trading days at Stuttgart,
we furthermore halt trading during the night, on weekends, and on public holidays. To
realize these halts, we set the market’s clock to the time stamp of the next incoming order,
if there is a gap of at least 5 hours between 2 orders and continue trading at this time.
152
6.3 Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
BCT = 10 BCT = 60 BCT = 300
Stock i
Number of
trading
days
Daily
average
( x¯ i)
Standard
deviation
(σi)
BSmini BS
med
i BS
max
i BS
min
i BS
med
i BS
max
i BS
min
i BS
med
i BS
max
i
High Trading Volume
Daimler AG 1,231 128.65 86.63 2 2 3 3 9 15 15 46 77
BASF SE 1,231 74.79 50.31 2 2 2 2 5 9 9 27 45
Allianz SE 1,231 63.11 40.69 2 2 2 2 5 7 8 23 37
Volkswagen AG 1,231 64.14 67.21 2 2 2 2 5 9 2 23 47
Deutsche Bank AG 1,231 77.00 55.98 2 2 2 2 5 9 8 27 47
Commerzbank AG 1,153 74.59 54.53 2 2 2 2 5 9 7 27 46
Siemens AG 1,231 48.68 34.01 2 2 2 2 3 6 5 17 30
Deutsche Telekom AG 1,231 59.70 41.49 2 2 2 2 4 7 7 21 36
E.ON SE 1,231 56.88 42.25 2 2 2 2 4 7 5 20 35
Munich Re AG 1,231 29.75 19.06 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 11 17
Medium Trading Volume
Bayer AG 1,231 30.73 18.98 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 11 18
Deutsche Post AG 1,231 36.61 25.07 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 13 22
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 1,230 39.15 29.57 2 2 2 2 3 5 3 14 25
BMW AG 1,231 27.08 17.81 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 10 16
Infineon Technologies AG 1,231 29.58 18.31 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 11 17
SAP SE 1,231 29.51 19.65 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 11 18
RWE AG 1,229 29.03 24.00 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 10 19
Linde AG 1,231 18.76 14.79 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 12
Adidas AG 1,229 21.03 17.02 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 8 14
Continental AG 1,227 14.26 9.49 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 8
Low Trading Volume
thyssenkrupp AG 1,231 21.76 16.78 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 8 14
Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA 1,228 15.94 11.80 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 10
ProSiebenSat.1 Media SE 1,060 15.11 14.12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 10
HeidelbergCement AG 1,221 9.63 7.08 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 6
Fresenius Medical Care AG 1,213 9.85 8.47 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 7
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA 1,216 9.18 7.76 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 6
Merck KGaA 1,202 8.43 7.13 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 6
Deutsche Börse AG 1,187 9.21 7.93 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 6
Vonovia SE 961 10.03 8.54 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 7
Beiersdorf AG 1,161 5.10 4.33 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Average 1,207 35.58 26.03 2.00 2.00 2.03 2.03 2.97 4.53 4.00 12.77 22.03
TABLE 6.1: BS calibration
This table illustrates the data basis for the parameter calibration as well as the resulting BS for each
configuration. More specifically, column 1 presents the respective stock i and assigns it to the high,
medium, or low trading volume tertiary. Columns 2 to 4 comprise the number of trading days, the
average number of trades per day, and the daily standard deviation for each stock. Columns 5 to
13 report the BS for all 9 blockchain configurations based on equation 6.1.
Second, To align the market mechanism with our input sample, we utilize the exchange
and implementation rules published on the Stuttgart stock exchange’s website to imple-
ment priority rules, price determination, and the execution algorithm. In consequence, the
price determination algorithm scans all orders gathered in the order book, sets a price to
maximize turnover, and returns this price as well as the corresponding executable quanti-
ties. To take the maximum BS into account, an intermediate step determines the number of
ask and bid trades that fit into one block and ensures that the traded bid and ask quantities
are the same.
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Finally, the execution algorithm finalizes the trades according to the price-time priority
principle and outputs the resulting trade data including an uniform clearing price, a traded
quantity, an unique trade ID, a time stamp reflecting the time of a block’s creation, and
a remaining quantity31. If two orders have the same price limit, the one with the older
time stamp is prioritized. In addition, market orders are prioritized over limit orders.
Partially executed orders are updated and stay in the order book for the next auction along
with unexecuted orders, while fully executed orders are removed. Figure 6.2 summarizes
these steps and highlights the integration of the BS and the BCT parameters within the
replication of market outcomes.
Blockchain parameter
Block creation time 
(BCT)
Blockchain parameter
Block size 
(BS)
Order input
Pre-processed order data from the 
Stuttgart stock exchange forms 
the input sample.
Time-stamped orders are 
submitted to the market and 
written in order books in 
ascending order (time).
Price determination
Implements the Stuttgart stock 
exchange’s trading rules to 
determine the price that 
maximizes turnover within each 
block.
Considers the whole order book.
Return: Price with the highest
turnover and corresponding 
orders.
Market outcomes
Trade database including a trade 
id, price, traded quantity, time 
stamp, and other trade 
information.
Post-processed data forms the 
basis for the empirical analysis.
Execution
Determines, which orders are 
included in a block (price-time-
priority) and redirects unexecuted 
or the remainder of partially 
executed orders back to the order 
book.
Return: Final order matching and 
order book updates.
Generates
Forwards tradeable
orders
Restricts 
number 
of trades
per auction
Provides order
data and starts 
the trading day
Periodically 
triggers
an auction
Controls timing of 
order input
FIGURE 6.2: Process steps to replicate market outcomes
The following paragraphs introduce the price determination, the following execution,
and the resulting market outcomes in detail. In addition, appendix B.3 illustrates the
software structure of the market mechanism in detail.
31If an order was fully executed, the remaining quantity is equal to 0.
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Price Determination. Stuttgart’s exchange rules state that the price levels ’that have the
largest turnover within the given framework [...] must be identified’. In addition, ’if there
are several possible price levels, the price level with the lowest surplus must be identified’.
To minimize frictions that arise from the integration of the blockchain parameters in the
market mechanism, we use these and other rules to guide the implementation of the price
determination. However, there are also some aspects, where our algorithm differs from
Stuttgart’s implementation rules. First and foremost, we determine prices independently
from any reference price, in order to remain fully decentralized and prevent dependen-
cies on central authorities. Second, at Stuttgart, specialized market makers called ’Quality
Liquidity Providers’ offer quotes that constitute lower and upper price limits for each in-
strument. However, the data acquired from the Boerse Stuttgart Research Database is
already cleansed and does not contain their orders or trades. In consequence, we neglect
them in the replication.
Figure B.2 in appendix B.3 summarizes the resulting price determination algorithm,
illustrates potential matching schemes in form of 10 cases, and indicates the resulting
market outcomes in each case (price, quantity). In the first attempt, we always try to
determine the price with limit orders. However, this is only possible, if either the bid
or the ask side crosses the spread and either the highest bid is at least as high as the
lowest ask or vice versa. If neither is the case, we extend our scope and include market
orders as well. The 10 cases describe the approaches utilized to determine prices given
different order book situations. In addition, it is possible that no orders in the book are
executable. If this is the case, no price can be determined, no trades occur, and all orders
remain in the order book for the next auction in 10, 60, or 300 minutes. Each time a new
block is created, the price determination algorithm goes through all cases and returns the
determined price along with the tradeable quantity. The BS however, is not considered in
this step, yet. Instead, it is incorporated in the execution algorithm, which is introduced
in the next paragraph.
Execution. Before orders are executed, we take the BS parameter into account. To do
so, we limit the number of trades to the respective BS given in table 6.1, while the total
ask and bid volumes at the uniform clearing price have to be equal. Note that there can
be an imbalance between the number of bid and ask orders within a block.
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In addition, we iterate through all possible combinations of bid and ask orders within a
block to find the order matching with the highest turnover32. To ensure price-time priority
during this process, we fill the blocks with the most recent orders that maximize the price.
Eventually, the execution algorithm returns the bid and ask orders included in a block,
determines the corresponding trades, and generates the resulting output data.
Market Outcomes. To illustrate the market outcomes, figure 6.3 depicts the daily aver-
age trade prices and total volumes throughout 2013 in an exemplary manner. Panels A,
C, and E highlight that prices vary substantially across blockchain configurations, while
panels B, D, and F indicate that larger blocks increase turnover at a given BCT. More
specifically, a high volatility and the occurrence of extreme prices seem more pronounced
in boundary scenarios such as (Min, 10) or (Max , 300). The reason for this can be found
in the order books: If there are multiple market orders on one side of the market, one odd
limit order (e.g., with a limit of 1 EUR) can disturb prices and lead to abrupt and extreme
returns33. This effect becomes even more severe for small BSs, because incoming market
orders have a higher priority. As a result, the limit order remains in the order book and
may trigger a similar price movement in the future. In addition, the chance that an odd
order sets the price is higher for scenarios with a high throughput as orders are processed
faster and order books become thinner. However, a detailed analysis of the relationship
between prices and blockchain parameters follows in Section 6.5.
Furthermore, we can observe a constant price between September and December in
Deutsche Börse’s (Min, 10) configuration. This effect is caused by a relatively large ask
limit order with a quantity of 18,700 (compared to an average of 275) and a limit of
50 EUR, which is partially executed over time. After the first execution, its limit serves
as a reference price (i.e., the last determined price), while mostly bid market orders are
submitted to the market. As a result, the price determination algorithm has to erode the
surplus, until the price can be determined by other limit orders again. In total, these issues
highlight the need to post-process the replicated data.
32If we assume a BS of 5 trades for instance, the execution algorithm tries to fill a block with 4 asks and
1 bid order in the first and ask-bid ratios of 3:2, 2:3, and 1:4 in the following iterations. Eventually, the
algorithm terminates, after checking all possible combinations or when turnover goes down (because then
we are outside of the maximum identified in the price determination).
33We are aware that exchanges use circuit breakers and reference prices to prevent such effects. However,
for the sake of simplicity and computational efficiency of the replication, we deal with these issues outside
of the market mechanism by post-processing the market outcomes (see Section 6.3.1).
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FIGURE 6.3: Market outcomes
This figure illustrates the replicated average trade prices and volumes for BASF (high volume
tertiary), SAP (intermediate volume tertiary), and Deutsche Börse (low volume tertiary) in 2013
(253 trading days). Prices are computed as daily averages and volumes as daily totals. The
line color indicates the respective blockchain configuration (BS, BCT). In the case of redundant
configurations, only the first configuration is included.
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Post-processing
To accommodate for the shortcomings of our market mechanism, such as the lack of refer-
ence prices or circuit breakers, we post-process the trade data in several ways: To prevent
the most extreme prices from distorting our analysis in Section 6.5, we remove all obser-
vations with a price difference of at least four standard deviations compared to the actual
stock price observed at Stuttgart. This way, we aim to compensate for the absence of ref-
erence prices and replicate the impact of circuit breakers (Subrahmanyam, 1994), while
preserving price variations. In addition, if the first order of a day was submitted late,
this could lead to block creations shortly after midnight in 300 minute configurations. To
correct these time stamps, we set them to 11.59 p.m. of the previous day."
6.3.2 Summary Statistics
"Eventually, the data generation process described in the previous subsection (6.3.1) spans
the data panel for the empirical analysis over a cross-section of 9 blockchain configurations
and 30 DAX stocks. It is based on 5 years of trading activity at Stuttgart and covers a period
from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2017. During this period 12.5 million real-world
submissions result in 12 million replicated executions with a turnover of EUR 122 billion.
Eventually, the final data panel comprises 302,493 stock-day-34 and 4,546,605 stock-block-
configurations. Within each trading day, 9,818 trades lead to a turnover of EUR 100 million
on average. Within each block, a mean of 4.67 trades generates a turnover of EUR 59,121
per block. In addition, each trade comprises an average amount of 340 stocks.
Note that the variation of the blockchain parameters across different configuration re-
sults in a substantial variation of the number of shares per trade (SD 857.32) and the
turnover per block (SD EUR 80,528). Table 6.2 presents summary statistics on the replica-
tion’s input sample from Stuttgart (column 2), all 9 blockchain configurations (columns 2
to 11), and the aggregated data panel (columns 12 to 14). Another noteworthy aspect is
that none of the 9 blockchain configurations reaches the actual trading volume observed
at Stuttgart35. However, this effect may be due to the winsorization and rounding proce-
dures within the calibration and the removal of simulation outliers in the post-processing.
In addition, (min, min)-configurations restrict the maximum turnover by design.
34Note that this is below 332,370 (= 1, 231 days ∗ 30 DAX stocks ∗ 9 configurations) days, since some
shares are not traded daily.
35The most productive scenario (Max , 10) creates a turnover of EUR 17.92, which is substantially below
the actual turnover of EUR 22.57 billion at Stuttgart.
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ata
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Input sample Market outcomes (BS, BCT) Data panel
Stuttgart (Min, 10) (Med, 10) (Max , 10) (Min, 60) (Med, 60) (Max , 60) (Min, 300) (Med, 300) (Max , 300) Total Mean Median
Total Submissions 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 1,400,444 12,603,996 1,400,444 1,400,444
Total Executions 1,323,857 2,100,934 2,100,934 2,109,755 803,027 1,139,912 1,365,068 371,944 979,934 1,114,968 12,086,476 1,342,942 1,139,912
Total Trading Volume [EUR] 22,574,487,089 17,329,482,335 17,329,482,335 17,924,368,004 5,768,869,557 11,849,980,042 16,549,085,490 3,933,958,256 14,456,286,388 16,901,262,445 122,042,774,852 13,560,308,317 16,549,085,490
Trading Days 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 11,079 1,231 1,231
Executions per Day
Mean 1,075.43 1,706.69 1,706.69 1,713.85 652.34 926.00 1,108.91 302.15 796.05 905.74 9,818.42 1,090.94 926.00
Median 997.00 1,742.00 1,742.00 1,755.00 689.00 984.00 1,160.00 318.00 843.00 921.00 10,154.00 1,128.22 984.00
Standard Deviation 487.57 645.14 645.14 661.69 180.79 268.04 365.44 76.29 249.38 349.64 3,441.55 382.39 349.64
Trading Volume per Day
Mean [EUR] 18,338,332 14,077,565 14,077,565 14,560,819 4,686,328 9,626,304 13,443,611 3,195,742 11,743,531 13,729,701 99,141,166 11,015,685 13,443,611
Median [EUR] 16,925,251 14,327,298 14,327,298 14,722,189 4,915,441 10,082,046 13,813,772 3,259,503 12,153,912 13,893,371 101,494,830 11,277,203 13,813,772
Standard Deviation [EUR] 8,241,854 5,232,808 5,232,808 5,562,499 1,353,566 2,980,153 4,687,971 895,737 3,828,617 5,500,881 35,275,040 3,919,449 4,687,971
Shares per Trade
Mean 551.91 277.94 277.94 280.71 198.13 319.20 402.27 317.85 483.08 505.29 340.27 317.85
Median 150.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 79.00 100.00 110.00 100.00 135.00 150.00 108.22 100.00
Standard Deviation 1,761.46 674.79 674.79 674.40 462.90 755.59 988.90 756.33 1,318.39 1,409.80 857.32 755.59
Executions per Block
Mean 2.00 2.00 2.05 2.04 2.93 3.81 3.98 10.65 12.61 4.67 2.93
Median 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 8.00 9.00 3.67 2.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.19 1.48 2.42 2.88 8.58 11.52 3.03 1.48
Trading Volume per Block
Mean [EUR] 16,497 16,497 17,407 14,639 30,411 46,184 42,074 157,178 191,202 59,121 30,411
Median [EUR] 8,324 8,324 8,791 7,738 13,889 21,904 18,840 88,992 107,083 31,543 13,889
Standard Deviation [EUR] 26,599 26,599 27,944 22,390 48,358 69,102 63,523 194,991 245,246 80,528 48,358
TABLE 6.2: Summary Statistics
This table summarizes the trade data from Stuttgart (column 2), the replicated market outcomes (columns 3 to 11), and the resulting aggregated
data panel (columns 12 to 14). The parameters of the blockchain configurations are reported in parentheses (BS, BCT). Column 1 specifies
the respective measures and indicates whether a measure was computed on a daily or block-level (intraday). To provide a benchmark, column
2 reports statistics on submissions, executions, trading volume, and shares per trade of the input sample from Stuttgart. Columns 3 to 5
comprise blockchain configurations with a BCT of 10 minutes, 6 to 8 with 60 minutes, and 9 to 11 with 300 minutes, respectively. The BS
varies according to the calibration (table 6.1). Columns 12 to 14 show the total, mean, and median measures of the final data panel. If a
measure was not applicable, the corresponding cells are left empty.
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In total, these summary statistics provide some initial insights into the impact of dif-
ferent blockchain configurations on market activity. A comparison between the different
scenarios indicates that increasing the BS is beneficial for total trading volume, the total
number of executions, and the average trade size. In addition, the impact of a lower BCT
seems more pronounced in scenarios with a smaller BS. On the block-level, the turnover
per block increases with a larger BS, while a longer BCT also has a positive effect. In ad-
dition, the number of executions per block increases in larger blocks. Surprisingly, we can
also see that in the scenario with the longest BCT (column 11), the BS is not a limiting fac-
tor. More specifically, the average number of executions per block (12.61) is substantially
smaller than the calibrated average BS of 22.03 (table 6.1, column 13)."
6.4 Methodology
"This section introduces the methodology used to assess the quality of decentralized mar-
kets. In consequence, we present the utilized market quality measures in Subsection 6.4.1
and embed them into our empirical strategy in Subsection 6.4.2."
6.4.1 Market Quality Measures
"To perform a holistic analysis of blockchain-based exchanges, we consider all three di-
mensions of market quality. To do so, we utilize established quality, liquidity, and price
measures and adapt them to take the specific characteristics of the input sample, the data
generation process, and the resulting data panel into account. However, Stuttgart’s hybrid
market design and the blockchain’s discrete nature complicate the use of traditional depth
and spread measures. In consequence, we introduce 6 market quality measures (3 activity,
2 liquidity, 1 information) in the following paragraphs and summarize them in appendix
A.6.
Activity
To assess market activity, we follow Barclay et al. (2003) and Hendershott et al. (2011)
and use the trade count (TC) and the turnover (TO) as well as an adapted version of the
average trade size (ATS) as activity measures. For each measure, a high value indicates a
high level of activity. In combination, all three measures facilitate an integrated analysis.
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Trade count. The TC is defined as the daily number of trades and measures the execution
frequency within a market. Equation 6.2 formalizes this definition, while ni,d,s denotes the
number of trades on day d for stock i under configuration s.
(6.2) T Ci,d,s = ni,d,s.
As a result, a higher TC implies a higher level of market activity. However, the TC’s
meaningfulness is also limited, because it does not consider prices or traded quantities. In
consequence, we need additional measures to take these aspects into account.
Turnover. One of these measures is the TO. It measures the aggregated daily trading
volume and is specified as
(6.3) TOi,d,s =
T Ci,d,s∑
j=1
Pricei,d,s, j ·Quanti t y Ti,d,s, j,
where Pricei,d,s, j and Quanti t y
T
i,d,s, j denote the price and the number of traded (T)
stocks of a trade j on day d and in a stock i. In addition, s represents the underlying
blockchain configuration. Similar to the TC, a higher value indicates a higher level of
market activity.
Moreover, it comprises both price and quantity information and therefore improves the
activity assessment. However, a drawback of the TO measure is that it may be biased by
very large trades. To avoid a misleading interpretation, we consider both the TO and TC.
Average trade size. Eventually, the ATS measures the average amount of shares included
in a trade. To tailor this measure and to study the activity of blockchain-based markets,
we compute the ATS on the block-level. As a result, the ATS is equal to the ratio of the
total trade quantity within a specific block b to the amount of trades within that block:
(6.4) ATSi,b,s =
T Ci,b,s∑
j=1
Quanti t y Ti,b,s, j
T Ci,b,s
.
Analogous to TC and TO, a higher ATS corresponds to a more active market.
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Liquidity
To assess the second market quality dimension, we use the daily Amihud illiquidity mea-
sure (DILLIQ) and the remaining quantity proportion (RQP) to approximate liquidity. A
high value for either measure, indicates low levels of liquidity. Note that we do not con-
sider spread-based liquidity measures as they may be biased by large market orders that
are eroded over time. More specifically, the limited BS prevents that large market orders
are filled immediately and their remaining quantity stays in the order book, while smaller
orders from the other side of the market fill it over time. As a result, spreads are equal to
zero, despite the illiquid situation on the other side of the market.
Daily illiquidity. The DILLIQ measure formalizes the notion of liquidity as the ability
to trade without affecting prices and quantifies the elasticity of liquidity as the ratio of
stock returns to trading volume. In other words, it captures the daily price contribution
associated with one monetary unit of trading volume (Næs et al., 2011). In consequence,
we follow Amihud (2002) and define DILLIQ as
(6.5) DI LLIQ i,d,s =
|Returni,d,s|
TOi,d,s
.
The Returni,d,s represents the daily logarithmic return of stock i under configuration s.
To compute returns, we furthermore compare the last price of day d with the closing price
of the previous day d − 1. In general, a security with a lower DILLIQ can be interpreted
as more liquid, while high values indicate a low liquidity, and thus a high price impact of
trades (Næs et al., 2011). The main advantage of the DILLIQ measure is its simplicity and
robustness, as well as the fact that daily trade data is sufficient for the calculation. On the
other hand, this implies that short-term microstructure aspects cannot be considered.
162
6.4 Methodology
Remaining quantity proportion. To facilitate the analysis of shorter time intervals, we
utilize the RQP measure. It follows Cao et al. (2009) and Brogaard et al. (2014)36 and cap-
tures the proportion of unexecuted orders on the block-level on a scale from 0 to 1. More
specifically, the RQP is defined as the ratio of the total remaining quantity (Quanti t yRi,b,s, j)
within a specific block b to its total submitted quantity (Quanti t ySi,b,s, j):
(6.6) RQPi,b,s =
T Ci,b,s∑
j=1
Quanti t yRi,b,s, j
T Ci,b,s∑
j=1
Quanti t ySi,b,s, j
.
In equation 6.6, i denotes the stock, b the block of the trades, and s the underlying
blockchain configuration. In addition, j enumerates the orders within a block, while T Ci,b,s
specifies the number of potentially included orders. The remaining quantity Quanti t yRi,b,s, j
is equal to the remaining quantity of partially or fully executed orders within a block. The
submitted quantity Quanti t ySi,b,s, j is equal to the trade quantity specified in the order. If
an order is partially executed within a block, we update Quanti t ySi,b,s, j accordingly for the
following blocks.
Consistent with Cao et al. (2009) and Brogaard et al. (2014), we utilize the ’scaled im-
balances in quantity between demand and supply’ to approximate imbalances in the order
books across different blockchain configurations and over time. More precisely, a RQP of
0 indicates that all orders included in a block are fully executed (i.e., Quanti t yRi,b,s, j = 0),
while a RQP of 1 implies that all submitted orders were neither partially nor fully executed
(Quanti t yRi,b,s, j = Quanti t y
S
i,b,s, j). In consequence, values closer to 1 indicate lower liq-
uidity (Quanti t yRi,b,s, j < Quanti t y
S
i,b,s, j). If no orders were submitted to the order books
(Quanti t ySi,b,s, j = 0), the RQP is not defined and set to 1, because there is no trading
and the market is not liquid. This way, we aim to measure a traders ability to trade in
a market and within a block. In liquid markets, even large orders can be filled almost
immediately, while illiquid markets are characterized by a high fraction of un- or partially
executed orders. As a result, the RQP captures the ability to trade a large market order or
a competitive limit order, while lower vlaues indicate higher liquidity and vice versa. In
addition, figure 6.4 summarizes the interpretation of the RQP.
36Brogaard et al. (2014), for instance, define the limit order book imbalance as LOBIi,t =
(SizeO f f eri,t −SizeBidi,t )
(SizeO f f eri,t +Size
Bid
i,t )
,
where Size is the dollar volume of orders, i the stock, and t the respective period.
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FIGURE 6.4: Interpretation remaining quantity proportion (RQP)
This figure illustrates the interpretation of the RQP. A high value implies low and a low value
implies high liquidity. More specifically, if less of the ordered quantity remains after an execution,
the ability to trade is higher and vice versa. QRi,b,s and Q
S
i,b,s denote the total remaining (unexe-
cuted) and submitted order quantities, while i, b, s indicate the stock, block, and configuration.
Information
Block impact. Finally, we build on Hendershott et al. (2011)’s price impact measure to
analyze price formation and capture volatility effects on the block-level. The resulting
block impact (BI) measures the logarithmic price change that comes with a block b and is
equal to
(6.7) BIi,b,s = BDi,b,s · ln

Pricei,b,s
Pricei,b−1,s

.
Pricei,b,s and Pricei,b−1,s denote the uniform clearing prices of the current and the pre-
vious block of stock i and configuration s. The block direction BDi,b,s furthermore indicates
whether buy or sell orders dominate within block b. To determine a block’s direction, we
apply a heuristic approach that sets BDi,b,s = −1, when supply exceeds demand within the
current block. If on the other hand, demand exceeds supply BDi,b,s is set to 1. If demand
equals supply, we set BDi,b,s = 0. In total, this allows us to identify buyer and seller dom-
inated blocks and disentangle the price effects of bullish and bearish markets. In total,
the BI represents the price movement between two blocks and a higher value indicates a
greater price impact of a block. This way, the BI allows us to capture volatility effects that
come with different blockchain configurations (see figure 6.3)."
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6.4.2 Empirical Strategy
"To analyze how different parameter combinations affect market quality, we apply linear
OLS regressions with stock and time fixed effects to the data panel generated in Section
6.3.1 and summarized in table 6.2. Within this panel, the cross-sections of 9 blockchain
configurations and 30 DAX stocks enable us to measure the impact of a varying BS and
BCT on a market’s activity, liquidity, and price formation.
To do so, we evaluate the impact of variations in the BS and BCT on the 6 market
quality measures (MQMs) introduced in Section 6.4.1 with the help of multiple regression
models. More specifically, TC, TO, and DILLIQ measure market quality on a daily and ATS,
RQP, and BI on an intraday block-level. Equation 6.8 provides the full specification of our
empirical model:
MQMi,t,s = α+ β1BSi,s + β2BC Ti,s + β3BSi,sBC Ti,s
+ β4V Gi + β5V GiBSi,s + β6V GiBC Ti,s
+ β7OQ i,t,s + β8OQ i,t,sBSi,s + β9OQ i,t,sBC Ti,s
+ β10 LnReturni,t,s + β11SDPricei,t,s + β12 LnSizei
+ ~γS + ~δT + ~ωD + "i,t,s
(6.8)
The dependent variable MQM denotes the market quality measure at hand, while i and
s indicate the underlying stock and and blockchain configuration. t represents either a
block b or a day d depending on the MQM’s frequency. For each measure, we perform 8
regressions (model 1 to 8) that build towards the full specification given in equation 6.8
(model 6) and relax the included fixed effects (model 7 and 8). In the first stage, we limit
our analyses to the blockchain parameters at hand and focus on the effect of the BS (model
1), the BCT (model 2), the combination of both (model 3), and their interaction (model
4). The fourth specification furthermore serves as the basis for the second stage, where
we sequentially add controls.
The fist group of control variables comprises activity controls and leads to model 5.
More specifically, the corresponding model specification adds the variables volume group
(VG) and order quantity (OQ) as well as interactions with the BS and the BCT.
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The VGi ∈ {1, 2,3} of stock i is equal to 1 for stocks in the low-volume tertiary, equal
to 2 for stocks in medium-volume tertiary, and equal to 3 for stocks in the high-volume
tertiary37. In addition, we add the OQ of a block b or day d as well as its interaction
with BS and BCT. A stock-block’s or stock-day’s OQ is equal to the total submitted order
quantity of completely and partially executed orders.
Adding the second group of control variables incorporates established controls from
market quality literature and yields the full specification (model 6). The logarithmic daily
return (LnReturn) of day d and stock i is computed as the logarithm of the ratio of a day’s
closing price to the closing price of the previous day. In addition, we include the daily
standard deviation of the uniform price (SDPrice) to control for unobservable volatility
patterns. Note that the LnReturn and the SDPrice are always measured on a daily basis
and are computed with the replicated trade data. Eventually, we use the total logarithmic
market capitalization (LnSize) of stock i to control for firm size38. Eventually, model 6
comprises all variables, controls, and fixed effects, and thus is equal to equation 6.8.
Across models 1 to 6, we control for stock, year, and intraday fixed effects through
the terms ~γS, ~δT , ~ωD.39 By including stock and time fixed effects, we aim to control for
unobserved heterogeneity across the DAX 30 stocks and over time. On the stock-level,
this may be due to investor preferences in Stuttgart (e.g., a local preference for Daimler),
differences in risk, the opinions of analysts, and other stock-specific characteristics. With
the help of year fixed effects, we aim to take the development of Stuttgart’s market share
as well as long-term economic trends into account. Intraday fixed effects absorb hetero-
geneity due to the extended trading hours at Stuttgart and the time of the day (e.g., lunch
breaks, etc.). Note that intraday effects are only included for measures on the block-level.
In models 7 and 8, we relax the fixed effects included in the regression and drop time fixed
effects (7) and both time and stock fixed effects (8), respectively. Eventually, "i,t,s denotes
the error term included in each specification."
37We classify the 30 DAX stocks into tertiaries based on the actual EUR trading volume observed at the
Stuttgart stock exchange during the sample period. Table D.1 in appendix D.1 provides details on the re-
sulting classification.
38Market capitalization data for all 30 DAX stocks was gathered as of December 31, 2017 from either the
annual report or the investor relations website of the corresponding company.
39S, T , and D represent identity matrices. While S is a 30×30 matrix accounting for each stock individu-
ally, T is a 5×5 matrix considering each year of the sample period. D is a 24×24 matrix, which takes 24 hours
of a day into account. Note that we allow for 24 hours, because in some configurations (BCT = 300) the
last block creation can happen in the late evening. Also recall that block creations that happen on the early
morning of the following day were backdated accordingly (see Section 6.3.1). Accordingly, the regression
parameters ~γ, and ~δ, ~ω are vectors with 30, 5, and 24 dimensions, respectively.
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6.5 Empirical Results
"In the following section, we present and interpret the results of our panel regressions. To
do so, we apply model 1 to 8 to the MQMs introduced in Section 6.4.1 and analyze each
quality dimension in a separate subsection. Hence, Subsection 6.5.1 evaluates market
activity (TC, TO, and ATS), Subsection 6.5.2 presents our findings on liquidity (DILLIQ
and RQP), and Subsection 6.5.3 investigates price formation (BI). In addition, we ensure
the robustness of our findings in Subsection 6.5.4, by aggregating block-based measures
to days, considering alternative trading hours, adding additional controls, taking a closer
look at trade directions, and disentangling BCT effects."
6.5.1 Activity
"To assess the first dimension of market quality, we examine how different blockchain
configurations affect the daily number of trades (TC), daily turnover (TO), and the average
trade size on the block-level (ATS). In total, we find that increasing the BS affects market
activity in various ways: First, the amount of trades per day is higher for smaller blocks.
Second, a larger BS results in an increased trading volume per day. Third, increasing blocks
leads to a higher average amount of shares per trade. With respect to the BCT, we identify
the following effects: First, the number of trades per day increases with the number of
blocks created (lower BCT). Second, increasing the block frequency results in a higher
turnover per day. Third, a shorter BCT reduces the average amount of shares per trade.
The following subsections introduce and discuss these findings in detail.
Trade Count
First, we take a closer look at the TC regressions and examine how the TC is affected by the
BS, BCT, and their interaction. Each regression model is based on 392,493 observations,
while the average number of trades per stock-day is equal to 39.96. Table 6.3 summarizes
the regression outputs for models 1 to 8.
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Dependent Variable: Size Time Blockchain Size-Time Robustness Full Full Full
TC (per Day) Effect Effect Configuration Interaction Market Activity Specification Specification Specification
(no TFE) (no FE)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 17.22 *** 28.66 *** 29.43 *** 34.98 *** -9.04 *** 629.50 *** 739.28 *** -85.59 ***
(40.09) (70.34) (72.35) (82.78) (-15.54) (15.19) (17.70) (-38.85)
0.43 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.58 41.45 41.78 2.20
Blockchain Parameters
BS -0.64 *** 0.34 *** -2.26 *** -0.91 *** -0.97 *** -0.96 *** 1.01 ***
(-88.43) (40.77) (-40.05) (-12.38) (-13.31) (-13.06) (13.48)
0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
BCT -0.10 *** -0.12 *** -0.14 *** -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 ***
(-221.56) (-205.21) (-192.70) (-0.48) (0.50) (0.37) (28.48)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BS·BCT 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 ***
(46.50) (65.53) (65.81) (64.92) (17.81)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Activity Controls
VG 32.62 *** 51.78 *** 55.80 *** 30.18 ***
(135.14) (35.75) (38.23) (256.40)
0.24 1.45 1.46 0.12
VG·BS -0.68 *** -0.67 *** -0.67 *** -0.30 ***
(-36.26) (-35.72) (-35.45) (-16.28)
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
VG·BCT -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.09 ***
(-109.62) (-108.49) (-107.36) (-132.19)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OQ 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(95.49) (95.51) (97.05) (107.12)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OQ·BS 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(71.92) (72.68) (71.93) (58.30)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OQ·BCT -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 ***
(-37.33) (-38.06) (-35.61) (-29.37)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quality Controls
LnReturn -1.55 * -1.67 * -1.64
(-2.11) (-2.25) (-2.09)
0.74 0.74 0.79
SDPrice 1.09 *** 1.05 *** 0.64 ***
(33.06) (31.55) (18.45)
0.03 0.03 0.03
LnSize -27.74 *** -32.50 *** 3.01 ***
(-15.25) (-17.73) (32.23)
1.82 1.83 0.09
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Intraday Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of observations 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493
Average 39.96 39.96 39.96 39.96 39.96 39.96 39.95 39.95
F-statistics 4,918.72 *** 6,756.09 *** 6,646.60 *** 6,568.19 *** 8,441.38 *** 8,092.82 *** 8,607.93 *** 22,191.30 ***
R2ad j 0.3560 0.4316 0.4347 0.4387 0.5336 0.5352 0.5262 0.4684
TABLE 6.3: Regressions trade count (TC)
This table presents β coefficients of models 1 to 8 (see Section 6.4.2) with TC as dependent variable.
The results are based on daily trade data, while the variable BS represents the number of trades
that fit into a block and BCT denotes the block frequency. The activity controls comprise a stock’s
volume group (VG) and the daily order quantity (OQ). VG is either set to 1, 2, or 3, whereas
larger values indicate higher trading volumes. Quality controls include the daily mean LnReturn,
the corresponding standard deviation SDPrice, and a firm’s LnSize as of December 31st, 2017.
We report β coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and standard errors for each independent
variable and the intercept. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5%
level, respectively.
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Except for models 3 and 8, the BS coefficient is always negative and significant on a
0.1% level. Consequently, a larger BS may lead to a lower amount of trades per day. More
specifically, models 6 and 7 imply that increasing the BS by 1 reduces the number of trades
per day by 1.
However, compared to the average number of trades per day this is equal to a change
of 2.5%. In addition, the interaction between BS and VG indicates that the BS effect
depends on trading volume and is more pronounced for high volume stocks. This result
seems counter-intuitive at first. However, since we calibrate the BS based on actual trading
data, partial executions may cause this effect. More precisely, a small BS - especially in
the BSmin-configurations - can result in imbalanced matching schemes, where large excess
demand or supply leads to partial executions on one side of the market. As a result, the
remaining quantities in the order books can increase trading activity in less active trading
hours. Blocks with a larger BS, on the other hand, facilitate a more balanced matching,
and thus less partial executions. We verify the robustness of this rationale by controlling
for the effect of order book imbalances in Section 6.5.4.
For the BCT, models 2 to 4 suggest that a faster block creation has a weak negative
effect and leads to less trades per day. However, these findings do not hold after adding
activity and quality controls in models 5, 6, and 7. Instead, the interaction term with
trading volume (VG) assumes the effect and indicates that a fast block creation is only
beneficial for high volume stocks. In total, the negative coefficients for either the BCT or
the VG-BCT-interaction imply that a shorter BCT, i.e. a higher trade frequency, leads to
more trades per day. In addition, our results are consistent with the findings on periodic
auctions (Fricke and Gerig, 2018), and indicate that a shorter BCT and a higher trading
intensity go hand in hand.
Eventually, the interaction between BS and BCT is positive, statistically significant, and
implies a weak contrarian effect on the number of trades per day across all models. In
contrast, the OQ and corresponding interactions remain economically insignificant for both
blockchain parameters. R2ad j increases while adding blockchain parameters and related
interactions from models 1 to 6, is above 50% in the full specification (6 and 7), and
declines by 7 percentage points after dropping stock fixed effects. Supported by F-statistics
at the 0.1% level, this suggests that both BS and BCT have a substantial impact on the
number of trades per day, while BCT effects are mediated through a volume channel. In
addition, the partly inverting coefficients in model 8 point to towards a distorting influence
of unobserved heterogeneity on the stock-level.
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Dependent Variable: Size Time Blockchain Size-Time Robustness Full Full Full
TO (per Day) Effect Effect Configuration Interaction Market Activity Specification Specification Specification
(no TFE) (no FE)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 97,594.95 *** 167,011.27 *** 198,760.92 *** 110,879.64 *** -383,939.58 ***
1,745,006.19
*** 2,020,571.80 *** -2,861,970.25 ***
(19.23) (32.62) (39.97) (21.52) (-54.59) (3.48) (4.02) (-106.69)
5,073.93 5,119.96 4,972.66 5,152.54 7,033.43 501,725.74 502,331.17 26,825.55
Blockchain Parameters
BS 5,792.56 *** 13,853.29 *** 55,056.64 *** 61,365.64 *** 60,828.49 *** 60,826.70 *** 72,471.55 ***
(68.08) (137.40) (79.87) (69.30) (68.67) (68.47) (79.42)
85.08 100.82 689.35 885.53 885.83 888.43 912.54
BCT -418.55 *** -969.24 *** -655.65 *** 467.28 *** 478.10 *** 479.09 *** 983.46 ***
(-71.20) (-139.05) (-75.73) (27.42) (28.04) (28.02) (55.70)
5.88 6.97 8.66 17.04 17.05 17.10 17.66
BS·BCT -136.20 *** -115.58 *** -115.29 *** -115.54 *** -192.60 ***
(-60.41) (-55.85) (-55.71) (-55.67) (-89.60)
2.25 2.07 2.07 2.08 2.15
Activity Controls
VG 401,392.98 *** 461,821.32 *** 472,806.73 *** 241,742.96 ***
(137.57) (26.34) (26.94) (168.65)
2,917.77 17,532.02 17,550.17 1,433.39
VG·BS -5,561.06 *** -5,477.14 *** -5,465.74 *** 842.17 ***
(-24.60) -24.22 (-24.10) (3.77)
226.09 226.11 226.77 223.14
VG·BCT -603.10 *** -596.44 *** -597.23 *** -813.61 ***
(-72.77) (-71.93) (-71.82) (-93.56)
8.29 8.29 8.32 8.70
OQ 0.48 *** 0.48 *** 0.48 *** 0.47 ***
(77.13) (77.04) (77.82) (71.23)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
OQ·BS 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.18 ***
(74.58) (75.05) (74.55) (66.10)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OQ·BCT 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 ***
(9.68) (9.20) (10.53) (-6.28)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quality Controls
LnReturn 5,027.18 4,971.67 5,186.04
(0.56) (0.56) (0.54)
8,897.90 8,923.96 9,572.57
SDPrice 8,744.15 *** 8,601.06 *** 10,278.91 ***
(22.01) (21.59) (24.40)
397.33 398.37 421.20
LnSize -92,385.23 *** -104,947.47 107,478.76 ***
(-4.20) (-4.76) (94.57)
22,013.04 22,040.71 1,136.44
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Intraday Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of observations 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493 392,493
Average 403,456.50 403,456.50 403,456.50 403,456.50 403,456.50 403,456.50 403,507.10 403,507.10
F-statistics 5,684.94 *** 5,705.59 *** 6,427.96 *** 6,426.18 *** 8,567.15 *** 8,181.84 *** 8,922.79 *** 21,902.30 ***
R2ad j 0.3898 0.3907 0.4265 0.4333 0.5373 0.5379 0.5352 0.4651
TABLE 6.4: Regressions turnover (TO)
This table presents β coefficients of models 1 to 8 (see Section 6.4.2) with TO as dependent variable.
The results are based on daily trade data, while the variable BS represents the number of trades
that fit into a block and BCT denotes the block frequency. The activity controls comprise a stock’s
volume group (VG) and its daily order quantity (OQ). VG is either set to 1, 2, or 3, whereas
larger values indicate higher trading volumes. Quality controls include the daily mean LnReturn,
the corresponding standard deviation SDPrice, and a firm’s LnSize as of December 31st, 2017.
We report β coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and standard errors for each independent
variable and the intercept. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5%
level, respectively.
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Turnover
Second, we consider the TO to capture a blockchain configuration’s impact on the daily
trading volume of a stock. Models 1 to 8 are based on 392,493 observations with an
average TO of EUR 403,456 per stock-day. Similar to the TC, we examine the individual
effects of the BS and the BCT first (model 1 and 2) and test the robustness of the effects
(model 3 to 6). In addition, models 7 and 8 relax the fixed effects gradually.
Across all specifications presented in table 6.4, the BS has a positive, significant (0.1%
level), and economically large effect on the TO of a stock. More precisely, the full specifi-
cation in model 6 suggests that increasing a block’s size by 1 raises trading volume by EUR
60,828 or 15%. Despite a varying size, this effect is furthermore robust across all 8 speci-
fications. However, this finding also highlights that a higher TC (that comes with smaller
blocks) does not go hand in hand with a higher TO. In addition, a higher VG weakens the
positive effect of a larger BS on TO.
With respect to the BCT, we observe a similar direction but more inconsistent effect
patterns, as coefficients are negative and statistically significant for models 2 to 4. This
indicates that a shorter BCT enhances daily TOs by EUR 655 per minute (model 4). How-
ever, similar to the TC this effect turns positive, after adding activity controls in model
5, while the VG-BCT-interaction assumes the negative impact from the BCT coefficient.
Consequently, the negative impact of enhanced BCTs seems more pronounced for high-
than for low-volume stocks. However, this finding may be driven by the calibration pro-
cess, where we set low-volume stock’s BS to 2 in most BCTmin and BCTmed configurations
(although the input sample suggested lower values). As a result, throughput in these sce-
narios is not restricted and increasing the BCT has no negative effect on TO. Unfortunately,
the interaction between OQ and BCT also remains economically small, and thus struggles
to support this reasoning.
In aggregate, we furthermore find that a shorter BCT supports the positive effect a
larger BS has on daily TOs. More specifically, we find a negative, statistically significant,
and robust interaction effect between BS and BCT. In consequence, reducing the time
between the creation of two blocks by 1 minute raises TO by EUR 115 (model 6 and 7).
Eventually, R2ad j is equal to 0.3898 and 0.3907 in models 1 and 2 and increases to 0.53
after including activity controls and interactions. Adding quality controls from literature
and dropping time fixed effects has no effect, while dropping stock fixed effects diminishes
the R2ad j to 0.4651.
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Similar to the TC regressions in table 6.3, this highlights the presence of unobserved het-
erogeneity on the stock-level. However, in combination with significant F-statistics (0.1%)
across all models, the R2ad j supports the relevance of the blockchain configuration for
TOs.
Average Trade Size
The third and last activity measure is the ATS. The ATS is computed on the block-level,
measures the number of shares included in a trade, and is equal to 279.31 shares per
trade on average. Table 6.5 summarizes the results of the regressions (model 1 to 8) and
highlights the impact of BS and BCT on ATS.
The BS parameter is statistically (0.1%) and economically significant across all model
specifications. Models 5 to 7 for instance suggest that including 1 additional trade in a
block adds about 25 shares to a trade (i.e., an increase of 9% on average). Consistent
with our findings on the TC, this effect may result from an increasing number of partial
executions that comes with smaller blocks. More specifically, we hypothesize that reducing
blocks’ sizes could intensify imbalances between demand and supply, stretch the remain-
ing quantities of large orders over time, and thereby result in an increasing number of
partial executions but also lower the size of each trade. However, whether this rationale
holds is subject to the robustness tests that follow in Section 6.5.4. Furthermore, the in-
teraction between VG and BS is negative and statistically significant indicating an inverse
relationship between trading volume and the positive impact of larger BSs on the ATS.
In consequence, moving to a higher trading volume tertiary (e.g., from medium to high
volume) is accompanied by a loss of about 2.7 trades (1%). The same holds for the rela-
tionship between OQ and BS. However, despite a statistical significance at the 0.1% level,
this effect remains economically negligible.
For BCTs, we observe similar but inverse results. In consequence, the positive and sta-
tistically significant coefficients indicate that longer BCTs are beneficial for the number
of shares included in a trade. Models 5 to 7 imply that increasing BCT by 1 minute in-
creases the ATS by 0.05 shares. For increasing block frequencies from 10 to 60 minutes,
for instance, the ATS grows by about 2.5 shares or 1% compared to mean ATS. However,
similar to the impact of the BS, this effect may be driven by order book imbalances. The
interactions with a stock’s VG is statistically significant (0.1%) and indicates that the pos-
itive impact of creating fewer blocks is more pronounced for stocks with a lower trading
volume. The interactions with the OQ remain economically insignificant.
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Dependent Variable: Size Time Blockchain Size-Time Robustness Full Full Full
ATS (per Block) Effect Effect Configuration Interaction Market Activity Specification Specification Specification
(no TFE) (no FE)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 232.29 *** 210.42 *** 214.64 *** 187.74 *** 170.75 *** 9293.66 *** 8,999.86 *** 3,528.77 ***
(41.90) (37.20) (37.98) (33.17) (28.47) (36.04) (35.00) (368.61)
5.54 5.66 5.65 5.66 6.00 257.88 257.16 9.57
Blockchain Parameters
BS 7.39 *** 6.63 *** 25.44 *** 24.64 *** 24.83 *** 25.00 *** 35.98 ***
(123.42) (87.49) (96.09) (39.23) (39.48) (39.74) (57.55)
0.06 0.08 0.26 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
BCT 0.38 *** 0.09 *** 0.24 *** 0.05 ** 0.04 ** 0.06 *** -0.20 ***
(88.47) (16.12) (41.16) (3.26) (2.90) (4.43) (-14.52)
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BS·BCT -0.07 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 ***
(-74.13) (-59.04) (-59.03) (-59.72) (-53.21)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Activity Controls
VG -35.66 *** 249.00 *** 239.85 *** 107.20 ***
(-26.08) (27.25) (26.32) (191.43)
1.37 9.14 9.11 0.56
VG·BS -2.73 *** -2.76 *** -2.77 *** -6.78 ***
(-13.83) (-13.98) (-14.03) (-34.70)
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
VG·BCT -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.00
(-4.04) (-4.36) (-4.11) (-0.18)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
OQ 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
(784.35) (783.76) (784.35) (878.63)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OQ·BS -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 ***
(-87.05) (-87.31) (-87.41) (-103.03)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OQ·BCT 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(31.81) (32.20) (32.17) (42.87)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quality Controls
LnReturn 9.08 ** 10.18 ** 13.90 ***
(2.82) (3.16) (4.24)
3.22 3.22 3.28
SDPrice -1.64 *** -1.62 *** -9.57 ***
(-12.23) (-12.04) (-72.04)
0.13 0.13 0.13
LnSize -396.49 *** -385.63 *** -148.87 ***
(-34.99) (-34.12) (-369.13)
11.33 11.30 0.40
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Intraday Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of observations 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,541,841 4,541,841
Average 279.31 279.31 279.31 279.31 279.31 279.31 279.40 279.40
F-statistics 14,385.70 *** 14,223.10 *** 14,125.00 *** 13,984.80 *** 27,638.60 *** 26,721.50 *** 42,401.80 *** 118,680.00 ***
R2ad j 0.1436 0.1422 0.1437 0.1447 0.2673 0.2673 0.2669 0.2387
TABLE 6.5: Regressions average trade size (ATS)
This table presents β coefficients of models 1 to 8 (see Section 6.4.2) with ATS as dependent
variable. The results are based on block-level trade data, while the variable BS represents the
number of trades that fit into a block and BCT denotes the block frequency. The activity controls
comprise a stock’s volume group (VG) and the order quantity (OQ) per block. VG is either set to
1, 2, or 3, whereas larger values indicate higher trading volumes. Quality controls include the
daily mean LnReturn, the corresponding standard deviation SDPrice, and a firm’s LnSize as of
December 31st, 2017. We report β coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and standard errors
for each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1% and
5% level, respectively.
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Eventually, the interaction between BS and BCT is always negative and significant at
the 0.1% level. We interpret this result as a consequence of order book imbalances and
hypothesize as follows: If blocks are limited by a smaller BS, a longer BCT leads to a
higher amount of submitted orders and therefore improves the balance between buy and
sell orders. This results in more balanced order books, reduces remaining quantities, and
leads to a higher ATS. Again, imbalance implications are discussed in the robustness sec-
tion. In total and similar to the other activity measures, R2ad j rises while adding blockchain
parameters, interaction effects, and controls and peaks in models 5, 6, and 7 at 0.27. To-
gether with highly significant F-statistics this underlines the explanatory contribution of
the BS and BCT, whereas the drop in model 8 illustrates the hetergeneity among the 30
DAX stocks."
6.5.2 Liquidity
"To evaluate liquidity effects, we utilize an adapted version of the Amihud (2002) illiquid-
ity measure (DILLIQ) on the daily and order book imbalances in form of the RQP on the
block-level. The DILLIQ examines the response of price to order flow, while RQP captures
the ability to trade on a more granular level. In total, the evidence provided in this sec-
tion indicates that daily liquidity is driven by the BCT and profits from a reduction of the
number of blocks per day. On the intraday level on the other hand, we identify an increas-
ing BS as the central determinant of liquidity improvements. However, in both analyses
low values for R2ad j indicate incomplete models, while the blurry nature of both measures
impedes interpretability. On the other hand, we obtain robust and highly significant F-
statistics across all specifications. In total, this supports the relevance of the BCT and the
BS as determinants of daily and intraday liquidity but also highlights the need for more
detailed analyses with liquidity measures tailored to the characteristics of decentralized
markets. In the following subsections we introduce, discuss, and interpret these findings
in detail.
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Daily Illiquidity
To assess the impact of the blockchain configuration on a daily level, we utilize the DILLIQ
ratio. It measures the logarithmic price change (i.e., return) that comes with 1 EUR of
turnover and is equal 18.87 · 10−6 on average. Note that we follow Amihud (2002) and
transform the values in the data panel by scaling them up by a factor of 106. Thereby,
we aim to improve the interpretability of the small coefficients. Table 6.6 summarizes the
resulting regressions.
First, models 3 and 5 indicate a negative relationship between BS and daily liquidity as
increasing the size of blocks is positively correlated with a high DILLIQ. In addition, the
VG interaction suggests that the liquidity improvement that comes with smaller blocks is
stronger for high volume stocks. At first, this finding seems counter-intuitive but may result
from the fact that smaller blocks stretch large trades over time, and therefore improve
liquidity on trading days with a lower trading activity. However, both effects are not robust
across specifications and fade after adding activity and quality controls in models 5 and 6.
Instead, the LnReturn and the SDPrice become statistically and economically significant.
The OQ interaction is neither statistically nor economically significant.
In contrast, the BCT coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level and negative through-
out all specifications. This implies a robust negative relationship between BCT and illiqui-
tiy and suggests that daily liquidity improves with longer BCTs. More specifically, the full
specification in model 6 estimates an improvement of 0.2046 · 10−6 per minute. For an
increase of the block frequency from 10 to 60 minutes, this constitutes an improvement of
10.23 ·10−6 or 54% relative to the daily average. The interaction term with a stock’s VG is
positive and significant at the 1% level in model 5 but does not hold after adding quality
controls in models 6 to 8. In addition, the interaction with the OQ is neither statistically
nor economically significant.
Eventually, we do not find any evidence for a relationship between BS and BCT. In
combination, these findings indicate that daily liquidity is driven by BCTs, while a block’s
size seems to play a minor role. However, despite a steady improvement from models
1 to 6, R2ad j remains low across all specifications pointing out that substantial indepen-
dent variables are missing in the current specification. On the other hand, F-statistics are
consistently significant at the 0.1% level and thereby underline relevance of the BCT as a
determinant of daily liquidity.
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Dependent Variable: Size Time Blockchain Size-Time Robustness Full Full Full
DILLIQ ·106 (per Day) Effect Effect Configuration Interaction Market Activity Specification Specification Specification
(no TFE) (no FE)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 13.1725 20.4386 * 22.0338 * 24.7200 * 33.1713 * -1,668.1469 -1,848.3094 145.4711 **
(1.33) (2.04) (2.19) (2.36) (2.10) (-1.49) (-1.65) (2.61)
9.9310 10.0277 10.0384 10.4640 15.8069 1,119.4426 1,117.5611 55.6558
Blockchain Parameters
BS -0.0101 0.6959 *** -0.5635 4.3834 * 3.8179 3.8362 2.3635
(-0.06) (3.42) (-0.40) (2.20) (1.93) (1.94) (1.25)
0.1665 0.2035 1.3998 1.9898 1.9765 1.9765 1.8933
BCT -0.0572 *** -0.0849 *** -0.0945 *** -0.2156 *** -0.2046 *** -0.2043 *** -0.1959 ***
(-4.97) (-6.03) (-5.37) (-5.63) (-5.38) (-5.37) (-5.35)
0.0115 0.0141 0.0176 0.0383 0.0380 0.0380 0.0366
BS·BCT 0.0042 0.0035 0.0039 0.0038 0.0051
(0.91) (0.75) (0.84) (0.83) (1.13)
0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 0.0045
Activity Controls
VG -8.3860 -67.5199 -74.5467 -14.2910 ***
(-1.28) (-1.73) (-1.91) (-4.81)
6.5571 39.1172 39.0447 2.9739
VG·BS -1.7243 *** -1.6462 -1.6488 -1.3529 **
(-3.39) (-3.26) (-3.27) (-2.92)
0.5080 0.5045 0.5045 0.4630
VG·BCT 0.0568 ** 0.0630 0.0632 0.0663 **
(3.05) (3.41) (3.41) (3.68)
0.0186 0.0185 0.0185 0.0180
OQ -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 *
(-1.10) (-1.34) (-1.43) (-2.10)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ·BS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.40) (0.67) (0.73) (1.69)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ·BCT -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 *
(-0.90) (-1.06) (-1.19) (-2.25)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Quality Controls
LnReturn -1,295.8555 *** -1,296.1314 *** -1,295.8915 ***
(-65.27) (-65.28) (-65.25)
19.8528 19.8536 19.8605
SDPrice 8.7206 *** 8.8000 *** 10.0039 ***
(9.84) (9.93) (11.45)
0.8865 0.8863 0.8739
LnSize 74.1777 82.3650 -3.8306
(1.51) (1.68) (-1.62)
49.1152 49.0351 2.3578
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Intraday Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of observations 302,493 302,493 302,493 302,493 302,493 302,493 302,493 302,493
Average 18.87 18.87 18.87 18.87 18.87 18.87 18.87 18.87
F-statistics 10.38 *** 11.11 *** 11.13 *** 10.84 *** 9.97 *** 110.84 *** 121.38 *** 373.93 ***
R2ad j 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0154 0.0153 0.0146
TABLE 6.6: Regressions daily Amihud illiquidity measure (DILLIQ)
This table presents β coefficients of models 1 to 8 (see Section 6.4.2) with DILLIQ as dependent
variable. A higher DILLIQ indicates lower liquidity (higher illiquidity). The results are based
on daily trade data and scaled by the factor 106 to improve intrepretability (Amihud, 2002). The
variable BS represents the number of trades that fit into a block, while BCT denotes block frequency.
The activity controls comprise a stock’s volume group (VG) and its daily order quantity (OQ). VG is
either set to 1, 2, or 3, while larger values indicate higher trading volumes. Quality controls include
the daily mean LnReturn, the corresponding standard deviation SDPrice, and a firm’s LnSize as of
December 31st, 2017. We report β coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and standard errors
for each independent variable and the intercept. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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Remaining Quantity Porportion
To measure liquidity on a more granular, intraday level we utilize the RQP. The RQP is
defined as ratio of unexecuted to submitted orders and ranges between 0 and 1, while
the sample average is equal to 0.5486. If all orders in a block are completely executed,
liquidity is high and the RQP equal to 0. A value of 1, on the other hand, is assumed if
none of the submitted orders are executed and implies low liquidity. Table 6.7 presents
the regression outputs for models 1 to 8 with RQP as dependent variable.
The BS is statistically significant at the 0.1% level across all and economically large in
most specifications and thereby indidcates that larger blocks improve intraday liquidity.
More specifically, increasing the BS by 1 lowers the RQP within a block by up to 0.092
(models 5 to 7). Compared to the average RQP of 0.5486 across our sample, this con-
stitutes an improvement of 17%. However, this finding may be driven by the growing
number of trades that comes with smaller blocks. As a result of the limited capacity of a
block, the number of partially executed orders grows and their remaining order quantity
spills over to the following blocks - especially when there are large orders on one side of
the market. By including activity controls, we are furthermore able to identify a statisti-
cally significant (0.1%) and robust alleviating effect of higher trading volumes (VG). This
suggests that despite bigger blocks, the liquidity of low-volume stocks is adversely affected
by more severe spill over effects among blocks.
The impact of increasing BCTs is characterized by consistently negative and statistically
significant but small coefficients. Thus, a higher BCT may be beneficial for liquidity but
remains economically negligible. In addition, the significantly negative but also small
interaction between VG and BCT suggests that the liquidity improvements that come with
longer BCTs are weakly reinforced by higher trading volumes.
Finally, the OQ is statistically significant but economically too small to interpret reason-
ably for both blockchain parameters. In contrast, the relationship between BS and BCT
is positive and statistically significant. As a result and consistent with our ATS findings,
liquidity in blockchain configurations with smaller blocks may benefit more from longer
BCTs. However, similar to the impact of the block frequency, the effect sizes of the inter-
action remain small and economically marginal. Overall and in contrast to the daily level,
the evidence given in table 6.7 indicates that intraday liquidity is primarily driven by the
capacity of blocks, while their frequency only plays a minuscule role. However, R2ad j is al-
ways below 0.13 indicating an omitted variable bias, while strongly significant F-statistics
support a minimum explanatory contribution of the coefficients reported in table 6.7."
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Dependent Variable: Size Time Blockchain Size-Time Robustness Full Full Full
RQP (per Block) Effect Effect Configuration Interaction Market Activity Specification Specification Specification
(no TFE) (no FE)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.5342 *** 0.6944 *** 0.6894 *** 0.7462 *** 0.7827 *** -1.2313 *** -1.8870 *** 0.5118 ***
(188.61) (241.48) (240.84) (262.90) (245.32) (-8.98) (-13.79) (102.32)
0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 0.0032 0.1371 0.1368 0.0050
Blockchain Parameters
BS -0.0145 *** -0.0079 *** -0.0476 *** -0.0919 *** -0.0919 *** -0.0919 *** -0.0912 ***
(-474.60) (-205.79) (-358.46) (-275.05) (-274.85) (-274.57) (-279.26)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
BCT -0.0011 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ** -0.0001 ***
(-512.47) (-279.81) (-374.44) (-4.43) (-4.43) (-2.97) (-8.68)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BS·BCT 0.0001 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0002 ***
(311.98) (344.97) (344.79) (344.09) (350.11)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Activity Controls
VG -0.0181 *** -0.0802 *** -0.1022 *** -0.0241 ***
(-24.83) (-16.50) (-21.08) (-82.41)
0.0007 0.0049 0.0048 0.0003
VG·BS 0.0150 *** 0.0150 *** 0.0150 *** 0.0146 ***
(142.55) (142.51) (142.53) (143.08)
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
VG·BCT -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 ***
(-142.09) (-142.07) (-141.85) (-140.70)
0.0000 0.0000 0.00000342 0.0000
OQ 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(373.63) (373.54) (373.52) (382.33)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ·BS -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ***
(-63.50) (-63.56) (-63.42) (-63.63)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ·BCT -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ***
(-18.99) (-18.87) (-19.02) (-19.39)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Quality Controls
LnReturn -0.0024 -0.0016 ** -0.0012
(-1.41) (-0.92) (-0.68)
0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
SDPrice -0.0001 0.0000 ** 0.0001
(-1.72) (0.38) (1.65)
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
LnSize 0.0875 *** 0.1147 *** 0.0097 ***
(14.52) (19.07) (45.83)
0.0060 0.0060 0.0002
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Intraday Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of observations 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605
Average 0.5468 0.5468 0.5468 0.5468 0.5468 0.5468 0.5468 0.5468
F-statistics 5,304.63 *** 6,018.15 *** 6,745.97 *** 8,534.76 *** 10,931.90 *** 10,570.40 *** 16,583.20 *** 53,397.30 ***
R2ad j 0.0582 0.0655 0.0742 0.0936 0.1261 0.1261 0.1246 0.1246
TABLE 6.7: Regressions remaining quantity proportion (RQP)
This table presents β coefficients of models 1 to 8 (see Section 6.4.2) with RQP as dependent vari-
able. A RQP close to 1 indicates low and a value close to 0 high liquidity. The results are based on
block-level trade data, while the variable BS represents the number of trades that fit into a block
and BCT denotes the block frequency. The activity controls comprise a stock’s volume group (VG)
and the order quantity (OQ) per block. VG is either set to 1, 2, or 3, while larger values indicate
higher trading volumes. Quality controls include the daily mean LnReturn, the corresponding stan-
dard deviation SDPrice, and a firm’s LnSize as of December 31st, 2017. We report β coefficients,
t-statistics (in parentheses), and standard errors for each independent variable and the intercept.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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6.5.3 Information
"Within the third and last dimension of market quality, we investigate price formation
effects by taking a closer look at the BI. More specifically, the BI serves as a means to
capture the price change that comes with a block. In total, our analyses suggest that the
BI is higher for larger and more frequent blocks, while both effects support each other.
In consequence, blockchain configurations with a high throughput (i.e., with a large BS
and a short BCT) may also lead to more volatile markets - especially in less active trading
times. We introduce and discuss these findings in detail in the following paragraphs.
Block Impact
The BI is defined as the logarithmic price change that comes with a block and helps us to
capture the price effects illustrated in figure 6.3. In order to improve interpretability, we
report the regressions’ coefficients in basis points (bps) and neglect block directions (BDs).
As a result, we limit our analysis to the absolute block impact (ABI), which considers the
only intensity of price changes but not their direction. However, we include BDs in the
robustness checks that follow in Section 6.5.4. Table 6.8 summarizes the β coefficients of
the ABI regressions in bps, while the average ABI is equal to 48.71 bps.
With respect to the BS, the β coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.1% level
and indicate a robust positive relationship between a block’s price effect and its size. In
consequence, larger blocks create more intense price movements. In model 6, for instance,
1 additional trade per block raises the intensity of the following price change by 30.40 bps.
Relative to the sample average this is equal to an increase of 62%. In addition, the interac-
tion with a stock’s VG is negative and statistically significant, indicating a weakening effect
of increasing trading volumes. This relation may be explained by the lower volatility of
large cap stocks (Fama and French, 1993) but contradicts previous findings on the rela-
tionship between trading volumes and volatility (Jones et al., 1994; Darrat et al., 2003).
With respect to the BCT, we observe a robust, statistically significant, and negative
relationship. This finding is consistent with the anecdotal evidence depicted in figure 6.3
and appendix D.2 and indicates that the intensity of price changes increases with the block
frequency. More specifically, a shift from 10 to 60 minutes reduces a block’s price impact
by about 10.72 basis points or 22% (model 6). Similar to the BS effects, we also find
evidence for an alleviating effect of a stock’s VG as a higher VG weakens the negative
effect of a larger BCT on the ABI.
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Dependent Variable: Size Time Blockchain Size-Time Robustness Full Full Full
ABI ·104 (per Block) Effect Effect Configuration Interaction Market Activity Specification Specification Specification
(no TFE) (no FE)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 17.8524 *** 59.7563 *** 62.9621 *** 54.3253 *** 24.6481 *** 2,143.5872 *** 2,021.2881 *** 568.0573 ***
(5.22) (17.11) (18.06) (15.55) (6.17) (12.74) (12.05) (92.56)
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0168 0.0168 0.0006
Blockchain Parameters
BS 3.1266 *** 5.0458 *** 11.0837 *** 34.3148 *** 30.4034 *** 30.4776 *** 35.6169 ***
(84.62) (107.81) (67.82) (81.93) (74.12) (74.30) (88.86)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BCT -0.0017 -0.2241 *** -0.1755 *** -0.3240 *** -0.2144 *** -0.2211 *** -0.3069 ***
(-0.65) (-66.75) (-48.94) (-34.62) (-23.39) (-24.24) (-34.81)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BS·BCT -0.0213 *** -0.0220 *** -0.0217 *** -0.0219 *** -0.0231 ***
(-38.56) (-39.38) (-39.62) (-39.93) (-42.63)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Activity Controls
VG -0.5150 40.2893 *** 35.6300 *** 5.9893 ***
(-0.56) (6.76) (5.99) (16.68)
0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000
VG·BS -7.6263 *** -6.9720 *** -6.9786 *** -8.5030 ***
(-57.91) (-54.07) (-54.12) (-67.91)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
VG·BCT 0.0211 *** 0.0736 *** 0.0752 *** 0.0928 ***
(4.94) (17.55) (17.94) (22.92)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 ***
(-1.01) (0.37) (0.72) (16.32)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ·BS -0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *
(-4.64) (7.20) (7.32) (2.16)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ·BCT 0.0000 -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ***
(1.54) (-12.52) (-12.65) (-8.90)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Quality Controls
LnReturn 80.2880 *** 80.1862 *** 81.4487 ***
(38.27) (38.22) (38.76)
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
SDPrice 38.1833 *** 38.1897 *** 36.9332 ***
(435.89) (436.24) (433.88)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LnSize -92.0723 *** -86.5239 *** -24.2811 ***
(-12.46) (-11.74) (-93.91)
0.0007 0.0007 0.0000
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Intraday Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of observations 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605 4,546,605
Average 48.71 48.71 48.71 48.71 48.71 48.71 48.71 48.71
F-statistics 523.19 *** 387.47 *** 596.51 *** 612.89 *** 634.43 *** 3,725.46 *** 5,879.99 *** 17,742.60 ***
R2ad j 0.0061 0.0045 0.0070 0.0073 0.0083 0.0484 0.0481 0.0448
TABLE 6.8: Regressions absolute block impact (ABI)
This table presents β coefficients of models 1 to 8 (see Section 6.4.2) with ABI as dependent variable.
The results are based on block-level trade data and reported in basis points (bps). The variable BS
represents the number of trades that fit into a block and the BCT denotes the block frequency. The
activity controls comprise a stock’s volume group (VG) and the order quantity (OQ) per block. VG
is either set to 1, 2, or 3, while larger values indicate higher trading volumes. Quality controls
include the daily mean LnReturn, the daily standard deviation SDPrice, and a firm’s LnSize as of
December 31st, 2017. We report β coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and standard errors
for each independent variable and the intercept. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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Eventually, we also find evidence for statistically significant and negative BS-BCT-inte-
raction. This implies that lowering the BCT reinforces the impact of a larger BS on the
ABI. As a result, more frequent blocks may increase volatility as larger blocks lead to larger
price changes between successive blocks. However, this effect is economically small and
around 0.02 bps in every model specification. The interaction between both BS and BCT
and OQs remain inconclusive and economically insignificant. In addition, R2ad j remains
below 0.05 throughout all model specifications, while F-statistics at the 0.1% level indicate
significance of the estimated models in total. Also note that both R2ad j and the F-statistic
are boosted, when we add quality controls. In combination with the highly significant
coefficients, this suggests that the quality controls explain a substantial amount of the
BI variation. However, together with the F-statistics, the robustness of both parameters
towards all model specifications supports their (at least minor) role as determinants of
price fluctuations in decentralized markets."
6.5.4 Robustness
"To ensure the validity of the findings illustrated in the previous section, we test their
robustness in several ways: We consider the number of blocks, modify the input sample,
take order book imbalances as independent variable into account, examine the impact of
BDs on prices, and disentangle the effects of BCT changes. The underlying motivation and
analyses are described in the following subsections.
Number of Blocks
In the first robustness test, we focus on confounding effects that may arise from different
block frequencies across our data sample. More specifically, the results for the ATS, RQP,
and BI may be endogenously driven by the increasing number of blocks that comes with
a higher block frequency (i.e., lower BCT). As a result, 6 blocks of 10 minutes, for in-
stance, aggregate trading that happens within an hour to 1 block from the corresponding
60-minute configuration. In addition, the coefficients of our regressions may be driven
by the preponderance of the number of observations of configurations with a higher fre-
quency. To take these concerns into account, we aggregate the block-level data to stock-
day-configurations by computing equal-weighted averages (ATS, RQP, and BI) and sums
(ATS) of the dependent and equal-weighted averages of all independent variables.
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Based on the resulting input sample we conduct a full specification regression (model 6)
for each new measure. The results confirm and even strengthen our previous findings for
all three measures, as R2ad j improves substantially. For the sake of brevity, the results of the
regressions are reported in table D.3 in appendix D.3.
Alternative Trading Hours
The second robustness check addresses the high number of trading hours at Stuttgart and
aims to exclude effects caused by early and late trading phases. For this purpose, we modify
the input sample and exclude orders submitted outside of the trading times of the reference
market Xetra (Clapham and Zimmermann, 2016). This includes orders submitted before
9 a.m. and after 5.30 p.m. This way, we also eliminate confounding effects linked to
the choice to initiate the first auction of a day by the first submitted order. Table D.4
in appendix D.3 presents the results of the regressions. Note that we focus on the full
specification of our regression model (model 6), which includes all controls, interactions,
and fixed effects. For the sake of computation and to further demonstrate the robustness of
our findings, we additionally limit the replication of market outcomes to the year 2017.
With respect to market activity, the results with alternative trading hours are largely
consistent with our previous findings and thereby confirm the effects identified in Subsec-
tion 6.5.1 in direction and size. In addition, we find a statistically significant and negative
relationship between the TC and the BCT, which supports the mixed evidence in Section
6.3. On the other hand, the impact of the BS seems to be slightly lower in the 2017 sub-
sample with alternative trading hours, while the impact of an increasing block frequency
on the ATS fades completely. Similarly, both liquidity measures DILLIQ and RQP are ro-
bust to our modifications, as well. Moreover, our robustness analysis provides additional
evidence for the existence of a negative BS effect and the relevance of the a stock’s VG on
the daily level (DILLIQ). On the intraday-level, all effects are consistent. Eventually, we
are able to confirm all ABI effects and find indications for an even stronger impact than
estimated by model 6 in table 6.8.
In total, we do not find any contradicting evidence and can confirm most of the findings
from Subsection 6.5.1. In addition, the regressions with alternative trading hours support
some weak and resolve some inconclusive effects. As a result, we argue that our results
are not biased by Stuttgart’s extended trading hours or by starting trading with the first
order of a day.
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Additional Controls
The aim of the third robustness analysis is to verify our interpretation and to disentan-
gle the effects of partial executions and order book imbalances on market activity. More
specifically, we hypothesize in Subsection 6.5.1 that some blockchain configurations may
facilitate imbalances between demand and supply, and thereby stretch the remaining quan-
tities of large orders over time. As a result, we observe an increasing number of partial
executions (TC) with a lower BS, while the TO and the ATS increases with the blocks’ size
and frequency. In consequence, we reexamine our activity measures by extending our re-
gression model (see equation 6.8) with the RQP as an independent variable (see Section
6.4.1) to verify this hypothesis. Table D.5 in appendix D.3 illustrates the results of the
associated regressions for the TC, TO, and ATS.
With respect to the TC, these results support our hypothesis as adding the RQP boosts
the impact of the BS, while the RQP and its interaction with both blockchain parameters
remains low. In addition, the R2ad j rises from 0.5352 to 0.6615. Consequently, the RQP
is an important control but a block’s size remains an essential determinant of the number
of trades per day. In addition, we find evidence for a moderating role of order book im-
balances for turnover. More specifically, the significant coefficients for the RQP and both
blockchain interactions indicate the RQP’s role as an effect channel and facilitator of size
and time effects. A similar logic applies to the ATS. However, in contrast the results of
the ATS regression remain inconclusive. On one hand, column 3 of table D.5 stresses the
importance of the RQP as a control and driver of our findings, as R2ad j jumps from 0.2673
to 0.8638. On the other hand, the coefficients of the BS, BCT, BS-BCT-interaction, and
VG-BS-interaction change their sign. As a result and in contrast to table 6.5, a smaller BS
and a shorter BCT may increase the average amount of shares per trade. In total, table D.5
in appendix D.3 highlights the role of order book imbalances and underlines that parts of
the activity effects presented in Subsection 6.5.1 may be driven by partial executions.
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Block Directions
Fourth, we aim to analyze the role of BDs on price formation and price changes in de-
tail. To do so, we utilize two subsets from the data panel illustrated in table 6.2. More
specifically, we create two new data panels that either include the 2.3 million blocks with
a positive (BD = +1) or the 2.2 million blocks with a negative (BD = -1) direction. Blocks
with a direction of 0 are not included in either panel. To minimize confusion and improve
interpretability, we furthermore stay with the ABI as dependent variable in our regressions.
In total, the results reported in table D.5 in appendix D.3 confirm our findings from Sub-
section 6.5.3. In addition, they highlight that larger and faster blocks may result in more
volatile prices - irrespective of their direction. However, our findings also indicate that
the VG is more important for blocks with excess demand, while blocks with excess supply
seem substantially more affected by higher BS.
Impact of Block Creation Time Variations
In contrast to the BS, which varies substantially across stocks, the BCT is fixed to either
10, 60, or 300 minutes depending on the underlying blockchain configuration. In conse-
quence, the findings from the previous sections may be driven by increasing BCTs from
10 to 60 minutes, 60 to 300 minutes, or both. In this subsection, we take a closer look at
the changes of our 6 MQMs to examine, whether either change has a more pronounced
effect. To do so, we compute the change of a MQM (∆MQM) that comes with an increase
of the BCT from 10 to 60 and 60 to 300 minutes and compare the respective daily av-
erages to each other. Table 6.9 summarizes the results and shows that the time effects
identified in this section indeed depend on the change of BCTs40. More specifically, mean
differences reported in panel A indicate that the impact on the ∆TC, ∆TO, ∆DILLIQ, and
∆BI is more pronounced for increases from 10 to 60 minutes. ∆ATS and ∆RQP on the
other hand, seem to be more affected by increasing the BCT from 60 to 300 minutes. In
addition, panel B confirms these findings in statistical significance, direction, and strength
in a multivariate setup with year and stock fixed effects. In total, these findings indicate
that the impact of changing block frequencies does not only depend on the direction of the
change but also on its severity."
40In addition, figure D.4 in appendix D.3 provides complementary illustrations by the means of boxplots.
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∆ MQM ∆ TC ∆ TO ∆ ATS ∆ DILLIQ ·106 ∆ RQP ∆ ABI ·104
Panel A: Compared means
Mean ∆MQM1060 -31.80 -197,607.00 21.39 -25.1604 -0.0799 -44.0079
Mean ∆MQM60300 -8.45 7,242.90 81.29 0.4077 -0.1946 28.9804
Mean difference -23.35 *** -204,850.00 *** -59.91 *** -25.5681 *** 0.1147 *** -72.9883 ***
(-158.22) (-117.00) (-52.85) (-5.74 ) (113.6300) (-47.87 )
F-statistics 11.10 *** 1.66 *** 1.41 *** 8.70 *** 1.57 ** 1.22 ***
Panel B: Regression
Intercept 3.73 *** 55,650.40 *** 51.67 *** 6.4368 -0.1559 *** 6.4773
(8.02) (-117.93) (13.49) (0.43) (-45.74) -1.2300
0.46 1,723.37 3.83 15.0761 0.0034 5.2620
∆BCT -22.91 *** -203,244.16 *** -61.59 *** -26.0059 *** 0.1169 *** -73.6678 ***
(-170.03) (-117.93) (-55.45) (-5.95 ) -118.3200 (-48.28)
0.13 1,723.37 1.11 4.3714 0.0010 1.5260
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 200,156 200,156 200,156 200,156 200,156 200,156
Average -19.84 -92670.55 52.07 -12.06 -0.14 -6.62
F-statistics 1,782.33 *** 500.35 *** 409.01 *** 4.31 *** 723.84 *** 91.48 ***
R2ad j 0.2323 0.0782 0.0648 0.0006 0.1094 0.0151
TABLE 6.9: Robustness - block creation time (BCT) variations
This table reports the results of the assessment of BCT changes on market quality. Panel A shows
the results of the compared means analysis, while mean∆MQM1060 and mean∆MQM60300 denote
the daily average change in the considered MQM given a shift from 10 to 60 and 60 to 300 minutes,
respectively. t-values are computed with the Satterthwaite approximation (note that the Cochran
approximation yields the same results) and reported in parentheses. Panel B provides confirming
regressions that take year and stock fixed effects into account. ∆BCT is a binary variable that is
equal to 1 for changes from 10 to 60 minutes and equal to 0 for changes from 60 to 300 minutes.
For each coefficient, we report t-statistics in parentheses and standard errors below. For both panels
(A and B) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
6.6 Discussion
"While our findings highlight the impact of the blockchain configuration on decentralized
markets’ activity, liquidity, and price formation, they are bound by several limitations. In
this section, we discuss our results by illustrating the limitations of the order data, the data
generation process, the applied quality measures, and the empirical analyses.
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First, our study is based on real-world trading data that reflects the behavioral patterns
of (retail) investors, their decisions, and resembles the scale and size of modern financial
markets. However, while this setup offers a realistic environment to evaluate the poten-
tial of future applications, the data does not reflect actual decentralized trading behavior.
On the other side, the scarcity of decentralized trading data complicates the evaluation of
decentralized markets, while keeping a practical perspective. As a result, we perceive our
approach as a first educated guess. Moreover, the preponderance of price discovery hap-
pens on reference markets (Hasbrouck, 1995). For DAX 30 stocks, this reference market is
Xetra (Clapham and Zimmermann, 2016). In consequence and consistent with Stuttgart’s
market position, traders may not fundamentally change their behavior as they rely on
information from the reference market to make trading decisions.
Second, integrating blockchain parameters into the trading system of the Stuttgart stock
exchange shifts the market model from continuous to periodic trading. Thereby, we create
an additional gap between the behavioral patterns (and outcomes) observed in the input
sample and the replicated market outcomes. More specifically, the input sample is based on
orders submitted to trade in continuous limit order books instead of the periodic auctions of
the blockchain-based market mechanism. To minimize the resulting frictions, our market
mechanism closely follows Stuttgart’s exchange rules, while the blockchain parameters are
calibrated according to the input sample’s executions. In addition, the price-time priority
adopted from Stuttgart mitigates timing effects of order submissions and time stamps are
utilized as tie-breakers. Nevertheless, in combination with the transparency that comes
with the decentralization of the order books, the discrete nature of the trading process
may result in different trading decisions and offers the possibility to implement trading
strategies that exploit these features. The (public) availability of data blocks and latency-
related asymmetry of information distribution that characterize today’s blockchain-based
system, can facilitate front running (Aune et al., 2017; Malinova and Park, 2017; Daian
et al., 2019) or other manipulative strategies, such as spoofing (Viana, 2018; Daian et al.,
2019).
Third, low R2ad j-values within the liquidity and information dimension point towards
incomplete empirical models that suffer from an omitted variable bias. In addition, the
DILLIQ and the RQP remain blurry throughout our analyses and robustness tests. In con-
sequence, our findings also highlight the need to develop tailored liquidity measures that
take the specific characteristics of decentralized markets into account. The same holds for
the information dimension, where the BI constitutes only a first step towards the assess-
ment of price formation in decentralized markets.
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Nevertheless, F-statistics for all three measures remain consistently significant at the 0.1%
level, indicating a basic explanatory contribution of our analyses.
Eventually, our study may suffer from the p-value problem that comes with the size of
our data panel. According to Lin et al. (2013), standard errors become extremely small in
very large samples and thereby boost statistical significance. In consequence, we follow
their recommendation and consider the economic as well as the statistical significance of
β coefficients in our interpretation.
However, despite these concerns, we believe that this study a first approximation on
how the blockchain’s discrete data structure and update procedure may affect market out-
comes. In consequence, we hope to offer initial guidance to the engineers of decentralized
markets and support them in their endeavors to build, evaluate, and improve their trading
platforms."
6.7 Concluding Remarks
"In total, this study provides a first analytic assessment of the quality of decentralized
(stock) markets by examining the impact of central blockchain parameters on a market’s
activity, liquidity, and information processing capability. To examine the influence of differ-
ent block sizes and block creation times, we utilize order-level data from the Stuttgart stock
exchange to replicate and analyze 5 years of blockchain-based equity trading. Thereby, we
contribute a technology-agnostic evaluation of decentralized market platforms and find:
First and with respect to the activity of decentralized markets, we find evidence that
smaller blocks lead to a higher number of trades but also limit trading volumes and the
number of shares included in a trade. In addition, the higher number of blocks per day
that comes with increasing the block frequency seems beneficial for the number of trades
and turnover but reduces the average size of trades. As a result, increasing the block sizes
offers a means to maximize the throughput of a system. On the other hand, the effect of
lower block creation times remains ambiguous and exposes the engineers of decentralized
markets to a trade-off between raising turnover and reducing the average trade size.
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Second, the liquidity of decentralized markets depends on the block creation time on the
daily and the block size on the intraday level. More precisely, daily liquidity seems to profit
from a higher block frequency, while increasing a block’s capacity proofs to be beneficial
on the block-level. In consequence, boosting liquidity goes hand in hand with maximizing
the throughput of a system. In addition, market engineers can control liquidity mostly in-
dependently on the daily and intraday level. Third and last, the analyses of the influence
of blockchain configurations on price formation indicates that the price impact of a new
block is stronger for bigger and faster blocks. Therefore, blockchain configurations that
maximize market activity may simultaneously lead to more intense price changes and chal-
lenge market engineers to find a balance between throughput and volatility. In general,
the significant interactions between blockchain parameters across all quality dimensions
call for a joint perspective that takes the adverse effects of changing the block creation
time into account. As a result, these findings demonstrate that boosting block size and
frequency is no silver bullet to resolve scalability issues. Instead, blockchain and market
engineers need to take a holistic perspective that aligns all three dimensions of market
quality with the platform’s objective to find a balanced blockchain configuration.
However, as an initial assessment, this study faces several limitations: First and fore-
most, the lack of native decentralized trading data leads to biased results. More specifi-
cally, the integration of blockchain parameters into the trading system of the Stuttgart stock
exchange and the blockchain’s novel transparency paradigm (Notheisen and Weinhardt,
2018) may change the behavior of traders beyond the scope of our replication. Second, we
utilize and adapt measures from traditional market quality literature to evaluate market
outcomes. However, the blurry nature of some measures - especially in the liquidity and
information dimensions - limits the interpretability and generalizability of our findings.
In addition and third, low R2ad j-values in some analyses indicate incomplete models. In
consequence, future research may focus on the analysis of native decentralized trading
data to bridge the gap between the artificial data in this study, the development of tailored
quality measures, and the analysis of changing trader behavior. This includes the model-
ing, measurement, and analysis of behavioral implications and consequences, as well as
the detection of manipulative strategies and the development of countermeasures. From
a technical perspective, this also comprises the preservation of the decentralized character
of blockchain-based markets on one hand, while ensuring a sufficient level of privacy on
the other hand (Gencer et al., 2017). Nevertheless, we are confident to provide a fertile
ground to researchers and initial guidance to practitioners with this study."
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Conclusion & Outlook
Blockchain technology enables market engineers to create fully decentralized market plat-
forms that allow users to interact in the absence of central authorities and intermediaries.
Driven by the promise of cost savings and the prospect of efficiency gains, organizations
boost their blockchain activities and explore a multitude of market-oriented applications.
However, as an infrastructure technology, the blockchain determines platform character-
istics, influences user behavior, and affects market outcomes. In consequence, a thorough
understanding of the technology and its impact is crucial to facilitate effective adoption
and mitigate adverse side effects. This thesis constitutes a first step towards the assess-
ment of blockchain-based, decentralized markets and illustrates their elements (Chapter
3), demonstrates their feasibility (Chapter 4), and analyzes the impact of central block-
chain characteristics (Chapters 5 and 6). The following sections summarize the resulting
contributions, discuss the implications, and outline opportunities for future research.
7.1 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is threefold and comprises a conceptual, technology,
and economic level: First, on the conceptual level, Chapter 3 combines a structured lit-
erature review with Weinhardt and Gimpel (2007)’s interdisciplinary market engineering
framework to create and extend the blockchain engineering framework. In particular, it
addresses the following two research questions:
Research Question 1. Which pivotal elements and layers define blockchain-based market
platforms?
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Research Question 2. To which extent can the blockchain implement the multi-faceted na-
ture of trust prevalent on the peer-to-peer platforms of today’s sharing economy?
The resulting framework contributes to the rapidly expanding body of blockchain re-
search in IS and adjacent fields and arranges the elements of blockchain-based systems
within a market context, highlights the pivotal role of trust, and establishes a common
language for researchers and practitioners. Thereby, it offers a toolbox to support the con-
struction of blockchain-based platforms, structure research efforts, communicate findings,
and to position a particular work in relation to other studies. In total, the blockchain engi-
neering framework comprises five layers – the environment layer, the infrastructure layer,
the application layer, the agent layer, and the behavioral layer. These layers incorporate
social, legal, and economic constraints, the hard- and software of the blockchain infrastruc-
ture, the micro and business structure of the market platform, and the action spaces and
actual behavior of users (research question 1). However, the behavioral and technological
conceptualizations of trust differ substantially. In the behavioral layer, trust is perceived
as a complex and interlaced construct with a multitude of stakeholders, targets, and di-
mensions. On the other side, the trust-free character of blockchain-based systems emerges
from the infrastructure layer and focuses on technological details, while neglecting the
actual behavior of interacting users. The resulting trust frontier separates the application
and the behavioral layer and overcoming it is paramount to realize fully decentralized
markets (research question 2).
Second, Chapter 4 focuses on the technology level and utilizes two proof-of-concept
prototypes to illustrate and evaluate the blockchain’s capability to implement the building
blocks of decentralized markets. The first prototype introduces a transparent transaction
system that enables interacting parties to transfer physical assets of varying quality (i.e.,
cars) in market environments prone to asymmetrically distributed information. Research
questions 3 to 5 formulate related challenges, guide the artifact’s development, and ask
for economic implications.
Research Question 3. How can market engineers decrease the risk resulting from the irre-
versibility of blockchain transactions, while still providing a valid transaction log?
Research Question 4. To which extent can a blockchain-based transaction system store and
represent the life-cycle of a car?
Research Question 5. Which characteristics of blockchain-based transaction systems affect
information asymmetries, and thus the uncertainty about quality in the market for lemons?
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The resulting IT artifact contributes to both the growing body of blockchain design liter-
ature and the interdisciplinary analysis of blockchain-based economic systems. Practically,
it offers an alternative to bureaucratic, trust-based, and centralized registry systems that
enables the transaction of physical assets by providing a valid, transparent, and consistent
record to traders, authorities, and other third parties. More specifically, Section 4.2 in-
troduces a fiduciary safeguard mechanism to reduce the transaction risk arising from the
blockchain’s immutable nature (research question 3). Second, it utilizes the use case of a
vehicle register to illustrate and assess the challenges and limitations of fully decentralized
registry systems (research question 4). Third, it connects the prototypes technological na-
ture to its economic application context by leveraging the blockchain’s publicly available
record to alleviate the negative effects of information asymmetries in lemon markets. In
addition, the generalized software design of the market framework takes practical consid-
erations into account, facilitates extensions, and ensures its adoption beyond the use case
of trading cars.
The second prototype utilizes this extensibility, focuses on the microstructure aspects,
and implements a blockchain-based market mechanism. Consequently, research questions
6 and 7 ask:
Research Question 6. How can smart contracts implement a decentralized market mecha-
nism that incorporates a double auction, keeps distributed order books, and allows traders to
submit limit and market orders?
Research Question 7. To which extent can a blockchain-based market platform operate the
value chain of securities trading and which technology features limit performance?
Similar to the first prototype, Section 4.3 offers both academic and practical insights.
Academically, it contributes to interdisciplinary blockchain design literature as well as eco-
nomically driven IS research. Practically, it illustrates and evaluates a blockchain-based
market mechanism that empowers users to trade stocks in a fully decentralized fashion.
More specifically, the market mechanism implements a matching engine and invokes an or-
der book structure to processes the market and limit orders submitted by traders (research
question 6). As a result, intermediaries and centralized market operators are rendered
obsolete, while clearing and settling a transaction becomes an integral part of the trading
process (research question 7). In combination with highly customizable assets, this facil-
itates cheap and efficient platforms and offers an alternative channel for venture capital
investments. On the other side, the prototype also highlights the distorting and restricting
effect of the blockchain’s discrete nature.
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Third, the economic level investigates the impact of distinctive blockchain character-
istics identified on the technology level (Chapter 4) on behavioral patterns and market
outcomes. Chapter 5 focuses on the blockchain’s public transparency paradigm and uti-
lizes game theory to examine its effect on the behavior of different types of users, market
outcomes, and welfare:
Research Question 8. Which participants of a market with asymmetric information are
affected by the blockchain’s shift towards public transparency? When and how does their
behavior change?
Research Question 9. How do the behavioral changes of opportunistic market participants
affect their counterparties, market outcomes in total, and the welfare of the economy?
Guided by these research questions, the contribution of Chapter 5 is threefold: First, it
extends the growing body of research on the economics of blockchain by analyzing the ef-
fects of the blockchain’s public transparency paradigm in market environments with asym-
metric information. Second, it contributes to the field of banking research by examining
the impact of the disclosure of quality information to the broad public. And third, it adds
to the interdisciplinary blockchain adoption and IS literature by highlighting the risks of
blockchain-based transparency. In line with prior research about information sharing ar-
rangements, the related findings indicate that the blockchain’s record mitigates the impact
of adverse selection effects and reduces moral hazard by disciplining entrepreneurs. On
the other side, there is evidence that lemons can increase their utility by behaving op-
portunistically, when information brokers enhance the informativeness of the stored and
shared data. This effect seems more pronounced for greater price improvements, lower
quality differences, and lower quality in general. In opaque markets, neither plums nor
lemons behave opportunistically. Irrespective of the information regime, there are lock-in
effects across all types and scenarios. Thus, the consequences of irrational decisions spill
over to future periods (research question 8). From a market perspective, opportunistic
lemons create a welfare gain within their own generation. However, their behavior also
violates the break-even condition of the banking sector, leads to a market collapse, and de-
nies future generations the access to credit (research question 9). In total, these findings
highlight that blockchain adoption in market environments exposed to irrational behavior
and intense competition should be considered carefully (research question ??).
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Finally, Chapter 6 examines the impact of the blockchain’s discrete, block-based data
structure and update procedure on the quality of decentralized markets. The related anal-
ysis considers the size and frequency of new data blocks, covers three quality dimension
(activity, liquidity, and information), and comprises the empirical assessment of quality
effects, the identification of quality drivers and trade-offs, and the discussion of practical
implications. Research question 10 condenses these aspects as follows:
Research Question 10. How do the size and frequency of database updates (i.e., blocks)
impact the activity, liquidity, and price formation on blockchain-based markets?
Answering this question contributes to three streams of research: First, it adds to the
growing body of interdisciplinary blockchain research by providing an initial technology-
agnostic assessment of the relationship between blockchain design parameters and market
quality. Second, it paves the way for empirical research on decentralized markets by high-
lighting interesting starting points. Third, it resembles the scale and scope of modern
financial markets, and thus offers initial guidance to the engineers decentralized markets.
In total, the empirical analyses of Chapter 6 indicate that increasing the capacity of data
blocks improves activity, while higher block frequencies impose a trade-off between higher
turnovers and lower trade sizes. In addition, they suggest the block creation time and block
size as core drivers of daily and intraday liquidity, respectively. In consequence, improving
liquidity goes hand in hand with a higher activity. However, the positive effect of the up-
date size and frequency on a block’s price impact highlights that faster and bigger blocks
are no silver bullet to scale decentralized markets and may facilitate volatility.
7.2 Future Research
The Role of Trust in Real-World Applications
While the blockchain can be considered as trust-free within the boundaries of a closed
ecosystem (Chapter 4), the actual impact of the underlying technology on trust is rarely
addressed in academic literature (Chapter 3). "Although first academic attempts to inves-
tigate the potential of blockchain technology in replacing trusted third parties are made
(Bogner et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2016), the success of such attempts is rather limited and
primarily focuses on the context of online interaction and transaction transparency (Huckle
et al., 2016).
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Actual connections of the blockchain with the physical world are hardly addressed [...]. A
noteworthy exception is a recent paper by Pazaitis et al. (2017), who approach the issue
of ’trusted interactions on top of the trustless blockchain technology’ by the introduction
of a so-called proof-of-value concept. [This concept highlights] the value of a (human)
contribution to [verify interactions in] a sharing ecosystem. Following this promising work,
future research should address the design of trusted interfaces to support the successful
implementation of blockchain-based [...] platforms – not only for online, but also for
offline interactions. Overcoming the trust frontier without the necessity of trusted third
parties will be a major challenge for future work and may provide platform operators with a
business opportunity. Moreover, to better understand consumers’ perception of blockchain-
based platforms, particularly with regard to the formation of trust, future research should
address the conceptualization and development of adequate measurement instruments for
trust in blockchain-based algorithms" (Hawlitschek et al., 2018, p. 60). An important first
step in this endeavor is to explore how the blockchain as a technological environment
affects the concepts, dimensions, and targets of trust from a user perspective.
Information Asymmetries & Transparency - Model Extensions
While the theory-driven analyses in Chapter 5 offer initial insights on the economic effects
of public transparency, the abstract nature of the model neglects central characteristics
of real markets. To take these limitations into account, multiple model extensions and
relaxations come to mind: First and foremost, the analyses are limited to comparative
statics. Considering dynamic interactions between market participants would add a crucial
dimensions and allow the examination of behavioral actions and reactions. Second, the
cost for acquiring and sharing - and thus the operation of the blockchain-based information
system at hand - are set to zero for both sides of the market. In consequence, modelling
the actual costs and incentives to take more active roles that come with different design
decisions constitutes a noteworthy and interesting extension. Third, the current model
does not take the switching costs of entrepreneurs into account, refrains from generalizing
the disutility of effort, and excludes the impact of entrepreneurial wealth. On the banking
side, the role of relationship information is not considered, while opportunistic behavior is
not possible. Relaxing these assumptions would contribute to a more realistic assessment
of the blockchain’s public transparency paradigm and provides opportunities for future
research.
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Native Decentralized Trading Data
Despite the growing number of fully decentralized exchanges, trading data from these
market places is still scarce. Consequently, Chapter 6 utilizes order data from the Stuttgart
stock exchange to compute trades on a DEX. While this approach resembles the scale and
scope of actual financial markets, it may lead to biased results: First and foremost, while
the data generation process approximates the behavior traders in a fully decentralized
market environment, it still builds on Stuttgart’s market model and orders submitted to
it. On the other side, the decisions of traders on a decentralized platform are affected by
the blockchain’s discrete and transparent nature and may deviate substantially. Second,
the utilized quality measures are adapted from established market quality literature, and
thus their interpretability remains limited. As a result, directions for future research com-
prise the examination of native decentralized trading data, the study of related behavioral
changes, and the development of tailored quality measures. From an economic perspec-
tive, this includes modelling, measuring, and analyzing behavioral patterns, assessing the
implications for traders and the market, the identification of manipulative strategies, and
the development of countermeasures. From a technical perspective, the tension between
the preservation of the market platforms’ decentralized and trust-free character and the
provision of a sufficient level of privacy constitutes a challenge.
Technology Selection & Blockchain Adoption
Despite the technology’s disruptive potential and their efforts, many organizations strug-
gle to orientate in the rapidly growing and increasingly complex market for blockchain
solutions (Friedlmaier et al., 2018). Thus, "finding the right technology for [a specific ap-
plication] constitutes a challenging task that needs to incorporate the constantly evolving
blockchain landscape and the functional [and organizational] requirements of a use case
[and its stakeholders] alike. While IS research offers a variety of taxonomies and frame-
works, such as Glaser and Bezzenberger (2015) or Notheisen et al. (2017), that help to
structure [blockchain knowledge], many organizations still fail to connect these abstract
concepts to [their] specific requirements [...]" (Notheisen et al., 2019, p. 4615). To resolve
this issue, Notheisen et al. (2019) combine established methods to develop taxonomies
with a requirements perspective and introduce a new technology assessment tool. To il-
lustrate the tool’s application and efficacy, they furthermore apply their method to the use
case of blockchain-based securities post-trading.
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column 5 differentiates between peer-reviewed journal articles and conferences proceedings, edited book chapters, and unpublished working
papers presented at refereed conferences. Column 6 indicates inclusion in the thesis at hand and refers to the corresponding chapter or section.
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A.2 Consensus Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Consensus Mechanism Security Latency Volume Anonymity Application References
Computation-based proofs
Proof of Work Moderate High Low High Bitcoin, Ethereum Nakamoto (2008), Buterin (2013)
Time-based proofs
Proof of stake Moderate High Low - Ethereum (Serenity) Walsh et al. (2016), King and Nadal (2012)
Proof of activity Moderate High Low - Decred Bentov et al. (2014), Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)
Permission-based proofs
Probabilistic voting Low Low Moderate - Ripple Schwartz et al. (2014)
Federated Byzantine Agreement Moderate Low Moderate Low Stellar Mazieres (2015)
Proof of authority High Low - Low Microsoft Azure Angelis et al. (2018)
Memory-based proofs
Proof of capacity - Moderate - - Spacemint Dziembowski et al. (2015)
Proof of retrievability - High - High Permacoin Miller et al. (2014)
Communication-based proofs
Proof of bandwidth High High High Moderate TorCoin Debus (2017), Ghosh et al. (2014)
Dependent-based proofs
Proof of publication Low - - - CommitCoin Todd (2014)
Proof of burn Low Low - High Slimcoin Debus (2017)
TABLE A.2: Overview consensus mechanisms
This table summarizes the characteristics of selected consensus mechanisms and classifies them into computational-based, time-based,
permission-based, memory-based, communication-based, and dependent-based approaches. Column 1 comprises the name and class of a
mechanism, column 2 its security, and columns 3 to 7 latency, transaction volume, user’s level of anonymity, actual applications, and refer-
ences for further information, respectively. Security, latency, volume, and anonymity is either ’High’, ’Moderate’ and ’Low’. If no information
could be found, the respective cell are left empty’. Cachin and Vukolic (2017) and Mingxiao et al. (2017) provide more extensive reviews.
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A.3 Concept Matrix Interdisciplinary Blockchain
Literature
Blockchain Trust-free Bitcoin & Financial service
technology economic systems cryptocurrencies innovation & FinTech
Beck et al. (2016) x
Brenig et al. (2016) x
Dhillon (2016) x
Frey et al. (2016) x
Geng (2016) x
Ingram and Morisse (2016) x
Wörner et al. (2016) x
Baiyere and Salmela (2015) x
Brenig et al. (2015) x
Connolly and Begg (2015) x
Dahlberg et al. (2015) x
Glaser and Bezzenberger (2015) x
Greiner and Hui (2015) x
Hur et al. (2015) x
Ingram et al. (2015) x
Kazan et al. (2015) x
Lustig and Nardi (2015) x
Mai et al. (2015) x
Morisse (2015) x
Fürstenau and Kliewer (2014) x
Glaser et al. (2014) x
Kazan and Damsgaard (2014) x
Kazan et al. (2014) x
Liebenau et al. (2014) x
Moser et al. (2013) x
Hjelholt and Damsgaard (2012) x
Puschmann et al. (2012) x
TABLE A.3: Concept matrix blockchain in IS
This table shows the IS studies identified in the review of Notheisen et al. (2017) and assigns them
to the concepts of Blockchain technology, Trust-free economic systems, Bitcoin & cryptocurrencies,
and Financial service innovation & FinTech.
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A.4 Information Sharing Arrangements in Practice
Sharing information helps to mitigate problems associated with asymmetric information
and improves market efficiency. In practice, information sharing takes place via centralized
institutions that set and govern the rules of the information exchange. In credit markets -
the analytic environment we arrange this study in - information sharing arrangements are
either set up by superior institutions as public credit registries or form endogenously as
private credit bureaus. This section illustrates their features and highlights differences.
Public credit registries Private credit bureaus
Purpose
• Support the state’s role as a
supervisor of financial institu-
tions
• Collect information on stand-
ing borrowers and make it
available to the actual and po-
tential lenders (i.e., the report-
ing financial institutions) and
regulators
• Usually no provision of value-
added services
• Focus on banking supervision
• Cater to the information
requirements of commercial
lenders
• Provide value-added services,
such as credit scores, collec-
tion services
• Collect comprehensive data
to asses and monitor the
creditworthiness of individual
clients
• Exchange of information
among banks and financial
institutions
• Theoretical substitutes: Public credit registers are set up to compen-
sate for the lack of private information sharing arrangements, having
been created mostly where no private credit bureaus existed
• Practice: Private and public credit reporting systems of coexist and
cater to different segments of the credit market
Ownership & Operation
• Public entities created by
national government author-
ities and managed by central
banks, supervision agencies,
or other regulatory authorities
• Single entity per (national)
market
• Set up, owned, and managed
by commercial enterprises or
non-profit organizations
• Borrowers have the right to in-
spect data and request dele-
tions or corrections
• Potentially competing multi-
national operations
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Public Credit Registries Private Credit Bureaus
Coverage
• Loans made by regulated fi-
nancial institutions
• All loans above the reporting
threshold must be registered
• Compulsory participation im-
posed by regulation based on
rules dictated by law
• Resulting from their national
regulatory origin, public credit
registries cover only intra-
national loans and struggle
with the international integra-
tion of capital markets
• Detailed information on
small business loans, con-
sumer credit, and trade credit
provided by financial and
non-financial lenders
• Gather and process informa-
tion on firms and individuals
from multiple sources, includ-
ing credit markets, lenders,
and suppliers
• Voluntary participation based
on the principle of reciprocity
and rules based on contractual
agreements
• In most jurisdictions data stor-
age is limited to a certain
amount of time (e.g., Euro-
pean Commission, 2018)
Data
• Information about the type,
terms, and structure of out-
standing loans
• Personal & identifying infor-
mation
• Information about the type,
terms, and structure of indi-
vidual loans, repayment histo-
ries and performance of indi-
vidual standing borrowers
• Integration of hard, soft
(Liberti and Petersen, 2018),
black, and white information
from additional sources such
as public records, demo-
graphic databases or lawsuits
Summary
Universal coverage of loans above
a specified threshold, which mainly
consists of credit data and is dissemi-
nated in consolidated form as the to-
tal loan exposure of a borrower
Incomplete but detailed coverage of
individual loans, which is merged
with credit data and other data to en-
able a comprehensive assessment of
individual borrowers
References
Pagano and Jappelli (1993); Padilla and Pagano (2000); Jappelli and
Pagano (2002); Djankov et al. (2007); World Bank (2011, 2013)
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A.5 Decentralized Markets in Practice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Name Transaction object Functional scope Technology Website (whitepaper)
Augur Expectations Creating of and trading on prediction markets Ethereum https://www.augur.net (Ø)
ATLANT Real estate Tokenization and trading of subdivided parcels Ethereum https://atlant.io (Ø)
Bancor Crypto assets Trading cryptocurrencies Bancor protocol https://www.bancor.network (Ø)
Bisq (Bitsquare) Crypto assets Trading crypto- and fiat currencies P2P network (Tor) https://bisq.network (Ø)
BitShares Financial assets Trading crypto and financial assets Graphene https://bitshares.org (Ø, Ø)
CrowdForce Micro businesses Offer and pay micro tasks and services Ethereum https://token.crowdforce.io (Ø)
CryptoBridge Crypto assets Trading cryptocurrencies Graphene https://crypto-bridge.org (-)
Dmarket In-game items Trading platform Exonum https://dmarket.io (Ø)
Gnosis Expectations Creation of and trading on prediction markets Ethereum https://gnosis.pm (Ø)
IDEX Financial assets Real-time trading and blockchain-based account management Ethereum https://idex.market (Ø)
OpenBazaar eCommerce Trading digital/physical goods, services, and cryptocurrencies Own protocol https://openbazaar.org (-)
OpenLedger DEX Crypto assets Trading cryptocurrencies Graphene https://dex.openledger.io (-)
Sharevest Financial assets Issuing and trading security tokens Ethereum https://www.sharevest.co (Ø)
Polymath Financial assets Issuing and trading security tokens Ethereum https://polymath.network (Ø)
Waves Dex Crypto assets Trading crypto currencies and crypto tokens Waves platform https://wavesplatform.com (Ø, Ø)
TABLE A.4: Overview of decentralized exchanges
Overview of selected blockchain-based market platforms including the name of the venture (1), the type of transaction object (2), the functional
scope implemented in a decentralized fashion (3), the utilized (blockchain) technology (4), and a reference to additional information (5).
Checkmarks in column 5 indicate the availability of whitepapers and contain embedded links to them.
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A.6 Overview Market Quality Measures
MQM Source Citations Interpretation Frequency Advantages Disadvantages
trade count (TC)
T Ci,d,s = ni,d,s
Barclay et al.
(2003)
347
TC measures the execution frequency.
The higher TC, the higher is the market
activity level.
Per day
TC is easy to calculate and
interpret.
TC does neither contain price
nor quantity information.
turnover (TO)
TOi,d,s =
∑T Ci,d,s
j=1 Pricei,d,s, j ·Quanti t y Ti,d,s, j Barclay et al.(2003) 347
TO measures the trading volume in
euro. The higher TO, the higher is the
market activity level.
Per day
TO is easy to calculate and
interpret and contains
information on price and
quantity.
The TO interpretation may be
distorted by large orders.
average trade size (ATS)
ATSi,b,s =
∑T Ci,b,s
j=1 Quanti t y
T
i,b,s, j
T Ci,b,s
Hendershott
et al. (2011)
1,182
ATS measures the amount of shares per
trade. The higher ATS, the higher is the
market activity level.
Per block
ATS is easy to calculate and
interpret.
ATS does not provide
information on the trade
frequency.
daily Amihud illiquidity measure (DILLIQ)
DI LLIQ i,d,s =
|Returni,d,s|
TOi,d,s
Amihud (2002),
Næs et al.
(2011)
7,102
DILLIQ measures the response of price
to order flow. The higher DILLIQ, the
less liquid is the stock.
Per day
DILLIQ is a robust and simple
measure. It does only require
daily data.
DILLIQ does not capture
microstructure aspects.
remaining quantity proportion (RQP)
RQPi,b,s =
∑T Ci,b,s
j=1 Quanti t y
R
i,b,s, j∑T Ci,b,s
j=1 Quanti t y
S
i,b,s, j
Cao et al.
(2009),
Brogaard et al.
(2014)
916
RQP measures the percentage of
remaining order quantity within a block.
The higher RQP, the lower is the
percentage execution.
Per block
RQP is easy to calculate and
interpret on a percentage scale.
The RQP interpretation may be
biased by large orders.
block impact (BI)
BIi,b,s = BDi,b,s · ln

Pricei,b,s
Pricei,b−1,s
 Hendershott
et al. (2011)
1,182
BI indicates the information content of a
trade. The higher BI, the higher is the
information content of a trade, i.e. the
price movement.
Per block
BI offers a simple
approximation of the
information impact.
A heuristic is needed for
determining the BD. More
robust measures focus on the
trade innovation.
TABLE A.5: Overview market quality measures
All measures are calculated for each stock i, each blockchain configuration s, and each block b or day d, respectively.
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Appendix B Software & Algorithms
B.1 Prototypes
To facilitate comprehensibility of the findings from chapter 4, this appendix provides Gitlab
references to the prototypes’ smart contracts and testing procedures. Tables B.1, B.2, and
B.3 provide an overview, brief descriptions, and hyperlinks.
File path & directory Description Link
. . ./ Section 4.2 - A Transparent Transaction System Prototype implementation https://goo.gl/Tt1USk
. . ./ Section 4.3 - An Intermediary-free Market Mechanism Prototype implementation https://goo.gl/m1yNT3
TABLE B.1: Repository overview
File path & code file Description Link
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ contracts Implemented smart contracts https://goo.gl/aeAC6C
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ DMR.sol Market place and registry for cars https://goo.gl/kz6QgP
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ HumanStandardToken.sol Token-based user account https://goo.gl/iLYCZ3
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ IndexedMarketplace.sol Generalized market place with safeguards https://goo.gl/TU7T6o
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ Marketplace.sol Functional scope of a market place https://goo.gl/CS3icA
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ Migrations.sol Final transaction settlement https://goo.gl/aGDuLP
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ Owned.sol Functional scope of a transactional object https://goo.gl/5qsHj6
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ StandardMarketplace.sol Generalized market place https://goo.gl/mNVQgJ
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ StandardToken.sol Generalized token https://goo.gl/wtQde1
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ Token.sol Functional scope of a token (ERC-20) https://goo.gl/cYq37G
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ Tradeable.sol Generalized transactional object https://goo.gl/7gr9Ss
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ Vehicle.sol Transactional object with vehicle characteristics https://goo.gl/zcHZFf
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ test Testing procedures https://goo.gl/vE743w
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ DMR.js Test car registry https://goo.gl/xHuczD
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ HumanStandardToken.js Token-based cash management https://goo.gl/EcVEpm
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ StandardMarketplace.js Test generalized market place https://goo.gl/YZjzxp
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ Tradeable.js Test transactional object https://goo.gl/3i8zxb
TABLE B.2: Directory overview "Section 4.2 - A Transparent Transaction System"
File path & code file Description Link
. . ./ 4.3 . . ./ contracts Implemented smart contracts https://goo.gl/1pM2QE
. . ./ 4.3 . . ./ . . ./ ConvertLib.sol Conversion https://goo.gl/1XXL5A
. . ./ 4.3 . . ./ . . ./ DSX.sol Market place and mechanism https://goo.gl/znZCwm
. . ./ 4.3 . . ./ . . ./ Migrations.sol Final transaction settlement https://goo.gl/UY7KxY
. . ./ 4.3 . . ./ . . ./ Token.sol Tokenized security https://goo.gl/UbNPqG
. . ./ 4.3 . . ./ test Testing procedures https://goo.gl/1b4cBq
. . ./ 4.2 . . ./ . . ./ DSXspec.js Testing procedures IPO and trading https://goo.gl/tB2wmf
TABLE B.3: Directory overview "Section 4.3 - An Intermediary-free Market Mechanism"
X
B.2 Decentralized Matching Engine
B.2 Decentralized Matching Engine
Algorithm 1: Decentralized matching engine
Data: Buy orders, Sell orders, market ID
Result: Void
1 BidOrderID := HighestBidOrderID
2 AskOrderID := HighestAskOrderID
3 while (orderbook[BidOrderID].price ≥ orderbook[AskOrderID].price and
orderbook[BidOrderID].blockNumber 6= orderbook[AskOrderID].blockNumber) do
4 if (orderbook[BidOrderID].amount = 0 or orderbook[AskOrderID].amount = 0) then
5 return
6 end
7 if (orderbook[BidOrderID].amount ≥ orderbook[AskOrderID].amount) then
8 fill := orderbook[AskOrderID].amount
9 orderbook[BidOrderID].amount −= fill
10 available token balance buyer + = fill
11 trading token balance seller −= fill
12 send money to seller(fill · orderbook[AskOrderID].price
13 send money to buyer(fill · (orderbook[BidOrderID].price − orderbook[AskOrderID].price))
14 if (orderbook[BidOrderID].amount > orderbook[AskOrderID].amount) then
15 OldAskOrderID = AskOrderID
16 AskOrderID = get next cheapest ask order()
17 remove order(OldAskOrderID)
18 else
19 OldAskOrderID = AskOrderID
20 OldBidOrderID = BidOrderID
21 AskOrderID = get next cheapest ask order()
22 BidOrderID = get next highest bid order()
23 remove order(OldAskOrderID)
24 remove order(OldBidOrderID)
25 end
26 else
27 fill := orderbook[BidOrderID].amount
28 orderbook[AskOrderID].amount −= fill
29 available token balance buyer + = fill
30 trading token balance seller −= fill
31 send money to seller(fill · orderbook[AskOrderID].price)
32 send money to buyer(fill · (orderbook[BidOrderID].price − orderbook[AskOrderID].price))
33 OldBidOrderID = BidOrderID
34 BidOrderID = get next highest bid order()
35 remove order(OldBidOrderID)
36 end
37 end
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B.3 Replicated Market Mechanism
FIGURE B.1: Class diagram replicated market mechanism
Attribute Data type Value (example) Description
trade_id Integer 1 Unique trade identifier
order_number String 1501029450129 Unique identifier for order submission
order_type Character K Either K or V for buy or sell
stock String daimler Unique stock identifier
order_limit Float 73.33 Order limit (0 for market orders)
order_qty Integer 10 Order quantity
re_qty Integer 5 Remaining order quantity
trade_qty Integer 5 Traded quantity
trade_price Float 72.78 Price per stock in the trade
timestamp String 02Jan2013:06:36:26.00 Timestamp of the trade
TABLE B.4: Data structure market outcomes
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B.3 Replicated Market Mechanism
FIGURE B.2: Price determination algorithm
This figure illustrates the price determination algorithm. Blue indicates decisions, grey the results
and cases, and green, orange, and red market outcomes. Green implies that a trade is possible,
orange that a trade may be possible, and red that no trade is possible. The black box highlights
the start of the price determination.
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C.1 Variable Definitions Chapter 5
Variable Scope Description
b > 1 Number of competing banks
R¯ [1, R] Gross interest rate banks pay to raise funds
Πt - Individual bank profits in period t
R j,t [R¯, R] Gross interest rate offered to entrepreneurs
t {1,2} Lending period
j {H,L,P} Equilibrium characteristics (P = pooling, H, P = separating)
RP,1 [R¯, R] Period 1 pooling rate
RH,2 [R¯, R] Period 2 interest rate offered to plums
RL,2 [R¯, R] Period 2 interest rate offered to lemons
RP,2(0) [R¯, R] Period 2 pooling rate offered following default in period 1
RP,2(R) [R¯, R] Period 2 pooling rate offered following success in period 1
µ(H|R) [0, 1] Probability that a successful entrepreneur is a plum
µ(L|R) [0, 1] Probability that a successful entrepreneur is a lemon
µ(H|0) [0,1] Probability that a defaulted entrepreneur is a plum
µ(L|0) [0,1] Probability that a defaulted entrepreneur is a lemon
TABLE C.1: Variable definitions banking perspective
Variable Scope Description
R > 1 Project return in the case of success
i H, L Entrepreneurial type
H - Good entrepreneur (plum)
L - Bad entrepreneur (lemon)
θ (0, 1) Share of plums in the market
1− θ (0, 1) Share of lemons in the market
a
i
> 0 Entrepreneurial quality of type i
pk
i,t
[0, 1] Effort level (success probability) of a type i entrepreneur in period t
k {U , I} Level of entrepreneurial information
U - Uninformed entrepreneur
I - Uninformed entrepreneur
Vi(pki ,t) ai p
k
i ,t
2
Disutility of effort of a type i entrepreneur
Ui(pki,1 , p
k
i,2
) > 0 Total utility of type i entrepreneurs
MC ki,t - Marginal costs of type i entrepreneurs in period t
MRki,t - Marginal returns of type i entrepreneurs in period t
TABLE C.2: Variable definitions entrepreneurial perspective
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Proposition 1: Banks’ assessment of entrepreneurs
p
H︸︷︷︸
Perfect info.
?
> µ(H|R)p
H
+µ(L|R)p
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imperfect info.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2
?
> θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Full opacity︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1
?
> µ(H|0)p
H
+µ(L|0)p
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imperfect info.
?
> p
L︸︷︷︸
Perfect info.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2
While banks operate under full opacity in period 1, they acquire information about
entrepreneurial characteristics before their second offer in period 2. However, their abil-
ity to distinguish between types depends on the features of the information system they
acquire the information from. Under perfect information, their approximation of effort
levels (i.e., success probabilities) is completely accurate. Under imperfect information on
the other hand, banks underestimate (overestimate) the effort levels of plums (lemons).
To show this, we compare the different information regimes and periods with each other.
To compare perfect with imperfect information, we have to consider the average effort
levels of plums and non-defaulters and lemons and defaulters: For non-defaulters p
H
>
µ(H|R)p
H
+
 
1−µ(H|R)p
L
holds true, if µ(H|R)< 1 and p
H
> p
L
. While p
H
> p
L
is trivially
true by assumption, µ(H|R) = pH θθ pH +(1−θ )pL < 1 is only true, if θ < 1. However, θ < 1 is
also fulfilled by assumption as there is at least one lemon in the market. As a result, the
first part of proposition 1 is true and p
H
> µ(H|R)p
H
+
 
1−µ(H|R)p
L
(I). The same logic
applies to the comparison between defaulters and lemons. µ(H|0)p
H
+
 
1− µ(L|0)p
L
>
p
L
holds, if µ(H|0) > 0 and p
H
> p
L
. Again, both conditions are trivially fulfilled by
assumption as there is at least one lemon in the market and effort is more costly to lemons.
In consequence, the last part of proposition 1 proofs to be correct as well (II).
For imperfect information and full opacity, µ(H|R)p
H
+
 
1−µ(H|R)p
L
> θ p
H
+(1−θ )p
L
is true, if µ(H|R)> θ and p
H
> p
L
.
µ(H|R) = pHθ
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
> θ⇔ pH
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
> 1⇔ p
H
> θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
This is trivially true as θ ∈ (0, 1) and p
H
> p
L
and so is µ(H|R)p
H
+
 
1− µ(H|R)p
L
<
θ p
H
+(1−θ )p
L
(III). Analogously, θ p
H
+(1−θ )p
L
> µ(H|0)p
L
+
 
1−µ(H|0) follows from
our assumption that θ ∈ (0,1) and p
H
> p
L
(IV).
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In total, this shows that when effort levels are positive and high enough to create lend-
ing, proposition 1 proofs to be true and
p
H
(I)
> µ(H|R)p
H
+µ(L|R)p
L
(I I I)
> θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
(IV )
> µ(H|0)p
H
+µ(L|0)p
L
(I I)
> p
L
.

Proposition 2: Relationship between interest rates
R¯
?≤ RH,2 ?≤ RP,2(R) ?≤ RP,1 ?≤ RP,2(0) ?≤ RL,2 ?≤ R
R represents the project return. RH,2 and RL,2 are the period 2 interest rates offered to
plums (5.11) and lemons (5.12) under perfect information. To break even under imperfect
information in period 2, banks offer either RP,2(0) or RP,2(R) conditional on period 1 default
(5.8) or success (5.9). RP,1 is the pooling rate banks offer without any information in
period 1 (5.14). If a bank overcharges these break-even rates, its competitors can undercut
profitably, while undercutting creates a loss on average.
To investigate the strictly increasing relationship between interest rates, we plug the
interest rate formulas from sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.1 into the equation below and reduce
the resulting fractions to lose R¯. Finally, in combination with proposition 1 inverting the
fractions shows that the proposed inequality relationship holds for all rates.
RH,2
?
< RP,2(R)
?
< RP,1
?
< RP,2(0)
?
< RL,2
⇔ R¯
p
H
<
R¯
µ(H|R)p
H
+µ(L|R)p
L
<
R¯
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
<
R¯
µ(H|0)p
H
+µ(L|0)p
L
<
R¯
p
L
⇔ 1
p
H
<
1
µ(H|R)p
H
+µ(L|R)p
L
<
1
θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
<
1
µ(H|0)p
H
+µ(L|0)p
L
<
1
p
L
⇔p
H
> µ(H|R)p
H
+µ(L|R)p
L
> θ p
H
+ (1− θ )p
L
> µ(H|0)p
H
+µ(L|0)p
L
> p
L
Prop. 1⇒ RH,2 < RP,2(R)< RP,1 < RP,2(0)< RL,2
However, banks can never charge more than the project return R without risking a
market collapse, and thus all rates are capped by R for sufficiently low effort levels. In
consequence, "<" becomes "≤". In addition, if effort levels are below the banks’ break-
even thresholds, there is no lending. R¯≤ RH,2 follows directly from equation 5.11 and the
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assumption that entrepreneurs cannot exert more than 100% effort (i.e., p
H
∈ [0,1]). In
total this shows that proposition 2 holds and
R¯≤ RH,2 ≤ RP,2(R)≤ RP,1 ≤ RP,2(0)≤ RL,2 ≤ R.

Proposition 3: Effort levels of uninformed entrepreneurs under imperfect information
pU
H,t
?
> pU
L,t
∀t ∈ {1,2}
In period 1, pU
H,1
> pU
L,1
holds, when the numerator of pU
H,1
is greater than the numerator
of pU
L,1
, while the denominator of pU
H,1
is equal or lower than the denominator of pU
L,1
or vice
versa. To show that this is fulfilled for period 1 interest rates, we examine the relationship
between numerators (I) and denominators (II) in the following. In combination, (I) and
(II) confirm that plums exert higher period 1 effort than lemons on average.
pU
H,1
> pU
L,1
⇔
R− RP,1 + ∆R2aH
 
R− RP,2(0)

2a
H
− (∆R)22aH
>(I)−
<(II)
R− RP,1 + ∆R2aL
 
R− RP,2(0)

2a
L
− (∆R)22aL
> 0
(I) R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
H
 
R− RP,2(0)

>R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
L
 
R− RP,2(0)

⇔ 1
2a
H
>
1
2a
L
⇔a
H
Ass.
< a
L
.
(II) 2a
H
− (∆R)2
2a
H
< 2a
L
− (∆R)2
2a
L
⇔2a
L
− (∆R)2
2a
L
− 2a
H
+
(∆R)2
2a
H
aL>aH
> 2a
L
− (∆R)2
2a
L
− 2a
H
+
(∆R)2
2a
L
> 0
⇔2a
L
− (∆R)2
2a
L
− 2a
H
− (∆R)2
2a
H
> 2a
L
− 2a
H
= a
L
− a
H
Ass.
> 0.
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To show that the proposed ”> ”-relationship also holds for period 2, we apply the same
logic as in period 1. While (II) is trivially satisfied by the assumption about the quality
differences, (I) directly follows from pU
H,1
> pU
L,1
shown above.
pU
H,2
> pU
L,2
⇔ R+ pH,1∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
H
>(I)−
<(II)
R+ p
L,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
L
> 0
In consequence, pU
H,t
> pU
L,t
holds for both periods t ∈ {1, 2}.
pU
i,1
?≥ pU
i,2
∀i ∈ {H, L}
Similar to the relationship between type-specific effort levels, we compare numerators
(I) and denominators (II) of the interest rate formulas to show that the ">"-relationship
holds over time.
(I) R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R− RP,2(0)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
maxRP,2(0)=R (Prop. 2)
− R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
 ?
> 0
⇔·· ·> RP,1 + RP,2(0)− pi,1︸︷︷︸
≥1
∆R> RP,1 + RP,2(0)−
 
RP,2(0)− RP,2(R)

> 0
⇔·· ·> · · ·> RP,1 + RP,2(0)> 0
(II) 2a
i
−

2a
i
−
∆R≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(∆R)2
2a
i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤2a
i
≥ 0
As a result pU
i,1
> pU
i,2
holds for all i ∈ {H, L}, and thus proposition 3 proofs to be true in
total.

Proposition 4: Effort levels of uninformed entrepreneurs under perfect information
pU
H,t
?
> pU
L,t
∀t ∈ {1, 2}
XX
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To show that this proposition holds, we follow the same logic as in proposition 3. In
period 1, the numerator R−RP,1 - which results from the pooling of entrepreneurs in period
1 and the absence of stochastic price effects due to the distinct separation in period 2 - is
constant over types, and thus we only need to show that the inequality holds true for the
denominators. Again, this complies with our model’s assumptions, and thus pU
H,1
> pU
L,1
holds.
pU
H,1
> pU
L,1
⇔ R− RP,1
2a
H
− R− RP,1
2a
L
> 0⇔ 1
2a
H
− 1
2a
L
> 0⇔ a
H
Ass.
< a
L
In period 2, period 1 performance qualifies entrepreneurs for type-specific interest rates
RH,2 ≤ RL,2 (proposition 2). This relationship between interest rates charged to plums and
lemons trivially leads to (I), while (II) directly follows from the model assumption that
a
L
> a
H
> 0. In consequence, pU
H,2
> pU
L,2
also holds true for period 2.
pU
H,2
> pU
L,2
⇔ R− RH,2
2a
H
≥(I)−
<(II)
R− RL,2
2a
L
> 0
In total, this shows that pU
H,t
> pU
L,t
is true for all t ∈ {1,2}.
To proof the second part of proposition 4, we now examine the variation of effort levels
over time.
pU
H,1
?
< pU
H,2
⇔ R− RH,2
2a
H
− R− RP,1
2a
H
> 0⇒ RP,1 − RH,2
Prop. 2≥ 0
pU
L,1
?
> pU
L,2
⇔ R− RH,2
2a
H
− R− RP,1
2a
H
> 0⇒ RP,1 − RH,2
Prop. 2≥ 0
In total, this shows that relationships formalized by proposition 4 hols over both types
and time.

Proposition 5: Lock-in effect under imperfect information
pI
H,2
?
< pU
H,2
, pI
L,2
?
> pU
L,2
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For plums, plugging in the formulas from equations 5.16 and 5.20 highlights that the dif-
ference between period 2 efforts of uninformed and informed plums lies in the realization
of the interest rate advantage∆R. Substituting pI
H,1
for pU
L,1
and simplifying the relationship
between both effort levels leads to pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
> 0, of which the correctness directly follows
from proposition 3.
pU
H,2
− pI
H,2
> 0⇔ R+ p
U
H,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
H
− R+
:=pU
L,1︷︸︸︷
pI
H,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
H
> 0⇔ pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
Prop. 3
> 0
For lemons, the same logic applies but with an inverse direction (i.e., lemons raise their
effort to mimic plums). In consequence, pI
L,2
> pU
L,2
follows from proposition 3.
pI
L,2
− pU
L,2
> 0⇔ R+
:=pU
H,1︷︸︸︷
pI
L,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
L
− R+ p
U
L,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
L
> 0⇔ pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
Prop. 3
> 0
In total, this shows that pI
H,2
< pU
H,2
and pI
L,2
> pU
L,2
.

Proposition 6: Utility of mimicking entrepreneurs under imperfect information
Ui
 
pU−i,1 , p
I
i,2
 ?
< Ui
 
pU
i,1
, pU
i,2
 ∀i ∈ {H, L}
To show that this inequality holds for plums, we analyze the following utility effects:
In period 1, ∆UH,1 < 0 is trivially satisfied as the deviation from equilibrium effort to
pI
H,1
= pU
L,1
< pU
H,1
(Prop. 3) creates an imbalance between marginal costs and returns. To
show that plums never experience utility gains from mimicking, we now investigate how
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deceptive behavior in period 1 impacts utility in period 2:
∆UH,2 =
 
MCH,2(p
I
H,2
)−MCH,2(pUH,2)

pU
H,2
+
1
2
 
MCH,2(p
I
H,2
)−MCH,2(pUH,2)

(pI
H,2
− pU
H,2
)

=2a
H
(pI
H,2
− pU
H,2
)pU
H,2
+
1
2

2a
H
(pI
H,2
− pU
H,2
)2

= a
H︸︷︷︸
>0 Ass.
(pI
H,2
− pU
H,2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 (Prop. 5)
(pI
H,2
+ pU
H,2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
Formally, this underlines that the lock-in effect creates an utility loss in period 2 (∆UH,2 <
0). In aggregate, these utility losses in period 1 and 2 indicate that mimicking does not
provide any benefits for plums and leads to UH
 
pU
L,1
, pI
H,2

< UH
 
pU
H,1
, pU
H,2

.
For lemons, the situation is a bit more complex: While deviation from equilibrium leads
to utility losses in period 1, increasing efforts pI
L,2
> pU
L,2
in period 2 ((Prop. 5)) provides
access to a lower expected interest rates and creates an utility gain.
∆UL,2 =
 
MCL,2(p
I
L,2
)−MCL,2(pUL,2)

pU
L,2
+
1
2
 
MCL,2(p
I
L,2
)−MCL,2(pUL,2)

(pI
L,2
− pU
L,2
)

=2a
L
(pI
L,2
− pU
L,2
)pU
L,2
+
1
2

2a
L
(pI
L,2
− pU
L,2
)2

= a
L︸︷︷︸
>0 Ass.
(pI
L,2
− pU
L,2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 (Prop. 5)
(pI
L,2
+ pU
L,2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
However, to show that these utility gains cannot outweigh the utility loss in period 1, we
need to investigate whether the net utility change ∆UL =∆UUL,1 +∆U
U
L,2 remains negative
in all cases. Note that in the following, we compute the ∆UL from a cost perspective
∆UL =∆UUL,1 −∆UUL,2 and therefore costs dominate, when ∆UL > 0.
∆UL =
1
2
 
MCUL,1(p
U
H,1
)−MCUL,1(pUL,1)

(pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
)

− 1
2
 
MRUL,1(p
U
H,1
)−MRUL,1(pUL,1)

(pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
)

=
1
2
 
2a
L
((pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
)) +
∆R2
2a
L
(pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
)

(pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
)
−1
2
∆R2
a
L
(pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
)2
=
1
2
(pU
H,1
− pU
L,1
)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 Prop. 3

2a
L
+
∆R2
2a
L
− ∆R2
a
L

︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 (I)
> 0
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The inequality of part (I) follows from the following logic: To estimate a lower bound, we
first let a
L
→ 0. As a
L
> a
H
> 0, this also pushes a
H
→ 0 and infinitely cheap effort conse-
quently raises effort levels for both types infinitely close to 1. As a result of these extremely
high effort levels and the minimal difference in quality, interest rates rise and converge to
R, and thus ∆(R)→ 0. If we take a look a the equation below, we can easily see that this
movement towards 0 is twice as fast for ∆R than for a
L
. In addition, the fraction-based
functional form of interest rates (i.e., RαpH +(1−α)pL , where α represents some distribution of
entrepreneurs) leads to an even stronger decrease compared to the quadratic and linear
formalization of the disutility and return created by efforts. In consequence, 2a
L
−∆R
always remains > 041, and thus (I) holds true as long as lending occurs.
2a
L
+
∆R2
2a
L
− ∆R2
a
L
= 4a2
L
−∆R2 > 0⇔ 2a
L
>∆R
Eventually, this shows that UL
 
pI
L,1
, pI
L,2

= UL
 
pU
H,1
, pI
L,2

< UL
 
pU
L,1
, pU
L,2

is true. In aggregate,
the perspective of plums and lemons indicate that proposition 6 holds whenever lending
occurs (i.e., p
i,t
> 0 ∀i ∈ {H, L}, t ∈ {1,2}).

Proposition 7: Lock-in effect under perfect information
pI
H,2
?
< pU
H,2
, pI
L,2
?
> pU
L,2
Comparing the perfect information interest rates banks offer to uninformed (5.18) and
informed (5.22) plums highlights the negative relationship between efforts and prices. In
consequence, pI
H,2
< pU
H,2
directly follows from proposition 2.
pU
H,2
− pI
H,2
> 0⇔ R− RH,2
2a
H
− R− RL,2
2a
H
> 0⇔−RH,2 − (−RL,2)> 0⇔ RL,2 − RH,2 Prop. 2> 0
For lemons, the same logic applies with an inverse price effect and pI
L,2
> pU
L,2
follows
from proposition 2.
pI
L,2
− pU
H,2
> 0⇔ R− RH,2
2a
L
− R− RL,2
2a
L
> 0⇔ RL,2 − RH,2 Prop. 2> 0
41">" holds furthermore true as we never reach 0.
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In total, this shows that plums and lemons are locked-in to their behavioral change from
period 1 as pI
H,2
< pU
H,2
and pI
L,2
> pU
L,2
. In addition, the strict inequality ">" holds as long as
Ri,2 < R, i.e. as long as effort levels are high enough (see section 5.4.1).

Proposition 8: Utility of mimicking plums under perfect information
UH
 
pI
H,1
, pI
H,2
 ?
< UH
 
pU
H,1
, pU
H,2

Similar to imperfect information, plums experience an utility loss over both periods under
perfect information. In period 1, ∆UH,1 < 0 follows directly from MRH,1 > MCH,1. In
addition, lowering period 1 efforts to pI
H,1
:= pU
L,1
leads to a higher interest burden RL,2 ≥
RH,2. This burden lowers marginal returns MR
U
H,2 > MR
I
H,2. In combination with the
resulting decline of effort, utility drops and ∆UH,2 < 0. To support that this reasoning
holds whenever lending occurs and efforts are high enough, we refer to proposition 7
(figure 5.8 support this reasoning graphically).
∆UH,1 =
1
2
(pU
H,1
− pI
H,1︸︷︷︸
:=pU
L,1
)
 
MCH,1(p
U
H,1
)−MCH,1( pIH,1︸︷︷︸
:=pU
L,1
)

=
1
2
(pU
H,1
− pI
H,1
)2a
H
(pU
H,1
− pI
H,1
) = a
H︸︷︷︸
>0 (Ass.)
(pU
H,1
− pI
H,1
)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 (Prop. 4)
> 0
∆UH,2 = p
I
H,1
 
MCH,2(p
U
H,2
)−MCH,2(pIH,2)

+
1
2
(pU
H,2
− pI
H,2
)
 
MCH,2(p
U
H,2
)−MCH,2(pIH,2)

= a
H︸︷︷︸
>0 (Ass.)
(pU
H,2
− pI
H,2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 (Prop. 7)
(pI
H,2
+ pU
H,2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 (when lending occurs)
> 0
In total, this shows that UH
 
pU
L,1
, pI
H,2

= UH
 
pI
H,1
, pI
H,2

< UH
 
pU
H,1
, pU
H,2

, and thus plums
do not experience any gains from mimicking.

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Proposition 9: Utility of mimicking lemons under perfect information
UL
 
pI
L,1
, pI
L,2
 ?
> UL
 
pU
L,1
, pU
L,2

In contrast to plums, under perfect information lemons experience an utility loss in period
1 (as MRL,1 < MCL,1) and an utility gain in period 2. However, unlike lemons in the
imperfect information regime, period 2 gains of mimicking can outweigh its cost in period
1, thereby making deception in period 1 profitable. To investigate in which situations
mimicking provides a profitable alternative, we examine when the net utility gain over
both periods ∆UL =∆UL,2 −∆UL,1 > 0.
∆UL =∆UL,2 +∆UL,1 > 0
⇔a
L
(pU
L,2
− pI
L,2
)(pI
L,2
+ pU
L,2
)− a
L
( pI
L,1︸︷︷︸
:=pU
H,1
−pU
L,1
)2 > 0
⇔

R− RH,2
2a
L
− R− RL,2
2a
L

R− RH,2
2a
L
+
R− RL,2
2a
L

−

R− RP,1
2a
H
− R− RP,1
2a
L
2
> 0
⇔ 1
4a2
L

(RL,2 − RH,2)(2R− RH,2 − RL,2)
−(R− RP,1)2
4a2
H
− 2RP,1)
2
2a
H
2a
H
+
RP,1)2
4a2
L
> 0
⇔ 1
4a2
L

(RL,2 − RH,2)(2R− RH,2 − RL,2)
−(R− RP,1)2 a2L − 2aH aL + a2H4a2
H
4a2
L
> 0
⇔ 1
4a2
L

(RL,2 − RH,2)(2R− RH,2 − RL,2)
−(R− RP,1)2 (aL − aH )24a2
H
4a2
L
> 0
⇔ (RL,2 − RH,2)(2R− RH,2 − RL,2)
(R− RP,1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative price effect
− (
∆a︷ ︸︸ ︷
a
L
− a
H
)2
a2
H︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative cost effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net utility gain
> 0
Eventually, the quality difference∆a > 0 and its connection to interest rates via42 supports
the inequality∆UL > 0, and thus shows that UL
 
pU
H,1
, pI
L,2
= UL
 
pI
L,1
, pI
L,2

> UL
 
pU
L,1
, pU
L,2

.

42For details on the underlying logic, we refer to proposition 6, where we apply the same but inverse
rationale.
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Proposition 10: Welfare effect
∆W
?
> 0
To evaluate the welfare effect ∆W of blockchain adoption, we compare the welfare gen-
erated by informed entrepreneurs (i.e., mimicking lemons) with the welfare generated by
uninformed entrepreneurs. As the plums do not change their behavior, the ∆WH = 0. In
addition, the costs of capital R¯ are constant, and thus do not play a role in the compari-
son between informed and uninformed lemons. As a result, ∆W is reduced to the utility
change of mimicking lemons, and thus ∆W > 0 directly follows from proposition 9 and
our assumption that there is at least on lemon/plum in the market.
∆W =W (pU
H,1
, pU
H,2
, pI
L,1
, pI
L,2
)−W (pU
H,1
, pU
H,2
, pU
L,1
, pU
L,2
)
=(1− θ )pI
L,1
R− R¯− VL(pIL,1) + pIL,2R− R¯− VL(pIL,2)
− pU
L,1
R+ R¯+ VL(p
U
L,1
)− pU
L,2
R+ R¯+ VL(p
U
L,2
)

=(1− θ )pI
L,1
R− VL(pIL,1)−
 
pU
L,1
R− VL(pUL,1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆UL,1
+ pI
L,2
R− VL(pIL,2)−
 
pU
L,2
R− VL(pUL,2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆UL,2

=(1− θ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0Ass.
∆UL︸︷︷︸
>0 Prop. 9
> 0

Proposition 11: Market collapse
To break even in the face of perfect competition, banks use the success probabilities of
past (uninformed generations) to compute adequate interest rates for plums and lemons.
The break-even condition for period 2 is equal to:
ΠU2 = θ

pU
H,2
RH,2 − R¯

+ (1− θ )pU
L,2
RL,2 − R¯

= 0
However, when lemons change their the resulting success probabilities the break-even
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condition for period 2 does not hold anymore:
ΠI2 = θ

pU
H,2
RH,2 − R¯
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+(1− θ )pI
L,2
RH,2 − R¯
 ?
= 0
⇔pI
L,2
RH,2 − R¯ ?= 0⇔ pIL,2
R¯
pU
H,2
− R¯ ?= 0⇔ p
I
L,2
R¯
pU
H,2
− p
U
H,2
R¯
pU
H,2
?
= 0⇔ (pI
L,2
− pU
H,2
)R¯
?
= 0
⇔

R− RH,2
2a
L
=−
>︸︷︷︸
Ass.
R− RH,2
2a
H

< 0
As a result, banks are not able to roll over their funding at the end of period 2 and go
bankrupt.

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Banking Perspective
Period 2 break-even success probabilities (imperfect information):
µ(H|0)p
H
R+µ(L|0)p
L
R− R¯ != 0
⇔ (1− pH )θ
θ (1− p
H
) + (1− θ )(1− p
L
)
p
H
R+
(1− p
L
)(1− θ )
θ (1− p
H
) + (1− θ )(1− p
L
)
p
L
R− R¯ != 0
⇔(1− p
H
)θ p
H
R+ (1− p
L
)(1− θ )p
L
R− R¯θ (1− p
H
) + (1− θ )(1− p
L
)
 !
= 0
⇔(p
H
− p2
H
)θR+ (p
L
− p2
L
)(1− θ )R− R¯θ (1− p
H
) + (1− θ )(1− p
L
)
 !
= 0
Solving for p
H
or p
L
respectively yields the corresponding upper and lower limits for
for lending at the given rates p′
H
, p′′
H
, p′
L
, and p′′
L
for the period 1 defaulters. Applying
the same approach to the break-even condition for successful entrepreneurs µ(H|R)p
H
R+
µ(L|R)p
L
R− R¯ != 0 yields p′
H
, p′′
H
, p′
L
, and p′′
L
.
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Period 1 Break-even success probabilities: In period 1, banks cannot distinguish be-
tween entrepreneurial types and offer a pooling rate to both of them. However, to provide
lending at this rate, entrepreneurial effort levels need to allow banks to break even on the
total pool’s expected profits. For the lowest possible pi ’s this means that RP,1 = R, while
banks require all project returns to break even. Based on the profits under perfect compe-
tition θ p
H
R+ (1− θ )p
L
R− R¯ != 0, this break-even threshold is given by p
H
+ p
L
(1−θ )
θ ≥ R¯θR
(I). In consequence, when p
L
= 0, the average success probability of plums p
H
(p
L
= 0)
has to be greater than or equal to R¯θR (II). Similarly, pL(pH = 0) ≥ R¯(1−θ )R , when plums
have zero success probability (III). Figure C.1 illustrates the resulting lending areas for in
greater detail (lending areas A and B). Note that when we assume p
H
> p
L
- such as we do
in section 5.4.1 for instance - the lending area is limited to probability combinations that
comply with this restriction (lending area A only).
(I) p
H
=
R¯− (1− θ )p
L
R
θR
⇔p
H
=
R¯
θR
− (1− θ )pL R
θR
=
R¯
θR
− (1− θ )pL
θ
⇒p
H
+ p
L
(1− θ )
θ
=
R¯
θR
Entrepreneurial Perspective
To find the optimal effort choices of entrepreneurs, we consider first and second order
conditions and apply the following four-step approach: Step 1 identifies potential optimal
effort levels in periods 1 and 2. Step 2 evaluates whether these choices are indeed maxima
by showing that the determinant of the hessian matrix |HUi | > 0 and ∂ ∂ Ui∂ pi,t∂ pi,t < 0. Step 3
checks whether the optimal effort levels lie within the defined range of pi ∈ (0, 1) Finally,
step 4 compares entrepreneurial utility of the effort choices identified in step 1 with the
utility at the boundary points pi,t = 0 and pi,t = 1. However, we keep this step short, as
the convexity of utility trivially ensures that the argument holds for all combinations of
boundary effort choices.
The difference between plums and lemons lies in the marginal cost of effort (0 < ai <
aL) and the resulting effort levels (pH,t > pL,t ). In the uninformed scenarios, the limited ac-
cess scope of the information system prevents entrepreneurs from learning about other en-
trepreneurs’ behavior. As a result, they choose effort levels in periods 1 and 2 to maximize
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p
H
(p
L
)
p
L
(p
H
)
1
0
0 1
p
H
=
R¯−(1−θ )pL R
θR (I)
p
H
= R¯θR (II)
p
L
= R¯(1−θ )R (III)
p
H
= p
L
Lending area A Lending area B
FIGURE C.1: Lending areas under full opacity and pooling.
their individual utility independently of each other. In informed scenarios, entrepreneurs
have knowledge about the average success probability of plums and lemons (from past
generations), and thus can change their effort levels in period 1 in order to mimic the
respective other type. Based on this change, they maximize their utility by choosing effort
levels in period 2. In addition, the information available (imperfect/perfect) to the banks
varies, and thus interest rates change accordingly. Eventually, this results in four analytic
scenarios: Uninformed entrepreneurs who face imperfectly informed banks, uninformed
entrepreneurs who face perfectly informed banks, informed entrepreneurs who face im-
perfectly informed banks, and informed entrepreneurs who face perfectly informed banks.
To facilitate the understanding of the underlying rationale, we provide detailed calcula-
tions for the behavior of uninformed entrepreneurs under imperfect information. For the
sake of brevity however, we limit the calculations for the remaining 3 scenarios to central
results of each step.
XXX
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Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs in the imperfect information regime: In
the imperfect information regime, banks have to rely on project outcomes from period 1
(i.e., default (0) or success (R)) to approximate entrepreneurial types. As a result, both
plums and lemons are offered a pooling rate dependent on default or success in period
1.
Note that entrepreneurs only differ in their marginal cost of effort (0 < a
H
< a
L
) . In
consequence, we formalize rationales from a general perspective and denote type-specific
variables with the subscript i ∈ {H, L}.
Ui
 
p
i,1
, p
i,2

= p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
 
R− E[RP,2]
− a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
=p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1
+ p
i,2
 
R− p
i,1
RP,2(R) + (1− pi,1)RP,2(0)
− a
i
p2
i,2
=p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1
+ p
i,2
 
R+ p
i,1

RP,2(0)− RP,2(R)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆R
−RP,2(0)
− a
i
p2
i,2
=p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1
+ p
i,2
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
− a
i
p2
i,2
Step 1: Identification of optimal effort choices
∂ Ui
∂ p
i,2
=R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRi,2
−2a
i
p
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCi,2
!
= 0
⇒ pU
i,2
(p
i,1
) =
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i
Ui
 
p
i,1
, pU
i,2
(p
i,1
)

=p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1
+ pU
i,2
(p
i,1
)
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
− a
i
 
pU
i,2
(p
i,1
)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
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∂ Ui
∂ p
i,1
=R− RP,1 − 2ai pi,1 + ∆Ra
i
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)’
−∆R
2a
i
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)’
=R− RP,1 + ∆Ra
i
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRi,1
−2a
i
p
i,1
− ∆R
2a
i
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCi,1
=R− RP,1 − 2ai pi,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

=R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R− RP,2(0)

+ p
i,1

(∆R)2
2a
i
− 2a
i

!
= 0
⇒ pU
i,1
=
R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R− RP,2(0)

2a
i
− (∆R)22a
i
(I)
∂ (I)
∂ p
i,1
=pU
i,2
′(p
i,1
) ·  . . . + pU
i,2
(p
i,1
) ·  . . . ′
=
∆R
2a
i
·  R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

+
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i
·∆R
=
∆R
a
i
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

(II)
∂ (I I)
∂ p
i,1
=2a
i
pU
i,2
(p
i,1
) · pU
i,2
′(p
i,1
)
=2a
i
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i
· ∆R
2a
i
=
∆R
2a
i
 
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)

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Step 2: Evaluation of optimal effort choices
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,2
∂ p
i,2
= −2a
i
,
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,2
∂ p
i,1
=∆R,
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,1
∂ p
i,1
= −2a
i
,
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,1
∂ p
i,2
=∆R
⇒ HUi =
−2a
i
∆R
∆R −2a
i

⇒ Det HUi=
−2ai ∆R∆R −2a
i
= (−2ai)(−2ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aL>aH>0
− (∆R)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
> 0
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,1
∂ p
i,1
= −2a
i
< 0 ⇒ pU
i,1
is a maximum,
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,2
∂ p
i,2
= −2a
i
< 0 ⇒ pU
i,2
is a maximum
Step 3: Admissibility of optimal effort choices
Proposition: pU
i,2
≥ 0
pU
i,2
(p
i,1
) =
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i︸︷︷︸
>0
≥ 0
⇔R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
min p
i,1
=0
≥ R− RP,2(0)≥ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
No lending for R< RP,2(0)
.
Even if plums do not exert effort in period 1, negative effort levels remain infeasible in
period 2 as banks would not lend at these levels.
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Proposition: pU
i,2
≤ 1
pU
i,2
(p
i,1
) =
R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i
≤ 1
⇔R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)≤ 2ai
⇔R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)
max p
i,1
=1
≤ R+ ∆R︸︷︷︸
RP,2(0)−RP,2(R)
−RP,2(0)≤ 2ai
⇔R+ p
i,1
∆R− RP,2(0)≤ R− RP,2(R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Best case period 2 net return
≤ 2a
i
Increasing the period 2 net return (in a best case scenario - i.e., when p
i,1
= 1) can
push plums’ equilibrium effort levels in period 2 beyond the domain of [0, 1]. However,
entrepreneurs cannot invest more than 100% effort. In consequence, we set pU
i,2
to 1, if
R− RP,2(R)> 2ai .
Proposition: pU
i,1
≥ 0
pU
i,1
=
RP,1=R⇒0︷ ︸︸ ︷
R− RP,1 +
≥0︷︸︸︷
∆R
2a
i
 max RP,2(0)=R⇒≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
R− RP,2(0)

2a
i
− (∆R)2
2a
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
?≥0⇒(I)
≥ 0.
(I) 2a
i
− (∆R)2
2a
i
≥ 0 | · 2a
i
⇔(2a
i
)2 − (∆R)2 ≥ 0
⇔(2a
i
)2 ≥ (∆R)2 |p
⇔2a
i
≥∆R.
The proposition pU
i,1
≥ 0 holds true, if the interest rate differential RP,2(0)−RP,2(R) =∆R
does not outweigh the marginal costs of effort: 2a
i
≥∆R. We assume this to be true, as in-
terest rates usually differ on the decimal level in practical contexts (a difference of 2 would
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be equal to 200 percentage points). Economically, this result indicates that in equilibrium
plums exert positive effort as along as the marginal punishment for default is lower than
the marginal cost of effort. The severity of punishment furthermore increases with the
fraction of lemons in the market and their average success probability (see proposition 2).
Proposition: pU
i,1
≤ 1
pU
i,1
=
R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R− RP,2(0)

2a
i
− (∆R)22a
i
≤ 1
⇔R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R− RP,2(0)
≤ 2a
i
− (∆R)2
2a
i
⇔R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
R− ∆R
2a
i
RP,2(0)≤ 2ai − ∆R2a
i
 
RP,2(0)− RP,2(R)

⇔ R− RP,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 net return
+
∆R
2a
i
 
R− RP,2(R)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 net benefit
≤ 2a
i
Similar to period 2, increasing period 1 net returns and period 2 net benefits can lead
to equilibrium effort levels greater then 1 as Ui becomes strictly increasing. However,
entrepreneurs still cannot invest more than 100% effort in each period. In consequence,
we set pU
i,1
to 1, if R− RP,1 + ∆R2a
i
 
R− RP,2(R)

> 2a
i
.
Step 4: Maximum utility and comparison to boundary points
In combination with pi,t ∈ [0, 1], the convexity of the total and partial utility (period
1, period 2) ensures that Ui(pUi,1 , p
U
i,2
) is indeed a maximum and no boundary points offer
higher utility. In some special cases however (i.e., when R − RP,2(R) > 2ai or R − RP,1 +
∆R
2
 
R − RP,2(R)

> 2a
i
) the optimal effort levels pU
i,2
and pU
i,1
can be equal to 1. In these
special situations maximum utility is realized at the boundary of the specified domain of
pi,t .
Effort choices of uninformed entrepreneurs in the perfect information regime: In
contrast to imperfect information, the information broker in the perfect information regime
allows banks to acquire information about entrepreneurial types after period 1. As a result,
they are able to offer risk-adjusted interest rates conditional on an entrepreneur’s type
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at the beginning of period 2. In consequence, we apply the following logic to find the
equilibrium effort choices of plums and lemons:
Ui
 
p
i,1
, p
i,2

= p
i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
p2
i,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
 
R− Ri,2
− a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
Step 1: Identification of optimal effort choices
∂ UL
∂ p
i,1
=R− RP,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRi,1
−2a
i
p
i,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCi,1
!
= 0
∂ UL
∂ p
i,2
=R− Ri,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRi,2
−2a
i
p
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCi,2
!
= 0
⇒ pU
i,1
=
R− RP,1
2a
i
⇒ pU
2,1
=
R− Ri,2
2a
i
Step 2: Evaluation of optimal effort choices
HUL =
−2a
i
0
0 −2a
i

⇒ Det HUL=
−2ai 00 −2a
i
= (−2ai)(−2ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
i
>0
−02 > 0.
∂ ∂ UL
∂ p
i,1
∂ p
i,1
= −2a
i
< 0 ⇒ pU
i,1
is a maximum,
∂ ∂ UH
∂ p
i,2
∂ p
i,2
= −2a
i
< 0 ⇒ pU
i,2
is a maximum
Step 3: Admissibility of optimal effort choices
pU
i,1
=
max RP,1=R︷ ︸︸ ︷
R− RP,1
2a
i︸︷︷︸
a
i
>0
≥ 0, pU
i,2
=
max Ri,2=R︷ ︸︸ ︷
R− Ri,2
2a
i︸︷︷︸
a
i
>0
≥ 0.
pU
i,1
=
R− RP,1
2a
i
≤ 1. pU
i,2
=
R− Ri,2
2a
i
≤ 1.
Similar to the previous scenarios, high net returns can push pU
i,t
beyond 1, and thus we
set pU
i,t
:= 1 in these cases.
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Step 4: Comparison to boundary points
The inferiority of boundary points follows directly from the (strict) convexity of UL.
Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs in the perfect information regime: We im-
plement the deceptive behavior of entrepreneurs by setting period 1 effort levels to a fixed
value pU−i,1 drawn from the blockchain-based information system. To find period 2 choices,
we then use the resulting utility function and the conditional interest rates charged under
pooling to find pI
i,2
.
Ui
 
pU−i,1 , pi,2

= pU−i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
(pU−i,1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
 
R− E[RP,2]
− a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
=pU−i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
(pU−i,1)
2 + p
i,2
 
R+ pU−i,1∆R− RP,2(0)
− a
i
p2
i,2
Step 1: Identification of optimal effort choices
∂ Ui
∂ p
i,2
=R+ p∗−i,1∆R− RP,2(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRi,2
−2a
i
p
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCi,2
!
= 0
⇒ pI
i,2
(pU−i,1) =
R+ p∗−i,1∆R− RP,2(0)
2a
i
Step 2: Evaluation of optimal effort choices
The second order condition is satisfied, because of the convexity of Ui directly follows
from the convexity of Vi. More specifically,
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,2
∂ p
i,2
= −2a
H
< 0 ∀i ∈ {H, L}. In addition,
this holds true for both types, as marginal effort is strictly more expensive for lemons but
always positive (0> aH > aH). As a result, p
I
i,2
proofs to be a maximum.
Step 3: Admissibility of optimal effort choices
The admissibility of pI
i,2
follows the same principle as in the other cases before: pI
i,2
is
greater than 0 as both numerator and denominator are both ≥ 0. In consequence, all pI
i,2
trivially qualify as admissible. With respect to the upper bound of p
i,2
≤ 1 we set pI
i,2
to 1,
whenever high net returns or low marginal costs would push effort beyond 100%. More
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specifically, we set pI
i,2
to 1, if R− RP,2(R)> 2ai and pIH,1 to 1.
Step 4: Comparison to boundary points
Again, the convexity of total and partial utility - which follows directly from the strict
convexity of Vi - ensures the validity of p
I
i,2
.
Effort choices of informed entrepreneurs in the perfect information regime: Similar
to imperfect information, entrepreneurs set period 1 efforts to effort levels from their coun-
terparts to mimic them. The lending bank then acquires this from the information system
at the beginning and offers a type-specific interest in the period 2 separating equilibrium.
In consequence, utility for type i is equal to:
Ui
 
pU−i,1 , pi,2

= pU−i,1
 
R− RP,1
− a
i
(pU−i,1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 utility
+ p
i,2
 
R− R−i,2
− a
i
p2
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 utility
Step 1: Identification of optimal effort choices
∂ UL
∂ p
i,2
=R− R−i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRi,2
−2a
i
p
i,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCi,2
!
= 0
⇒ pI
i,2
=
R− R−i,2
2a
i
Step 2: Evaluation of optimal effort choices
Analogous to the imperfect information regime, the second order condition is trivially
satisfied, because of the convexity of Ui. More specifically,
∂ ∂ Ui
∂ p
i,2
∂ p
i,2
= −2a
i
< 0 ∀i ∈ {H, L},
as marginal effort is strictly more expensive for lemons but always positive (0> aH > aH).
As a result, pI
i,2
proofs to be a maxmimum for both types respectively.
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Step 3: Admissibility of optimal effort choices
pI
i,2
=
max Ri,2=R︷ ︸︸ ︷
R− Ri,2
2a
i︸︷︷︸
a
i
>0
≥ 0, pI
i,2
=
R− R−i,2
2a
i
≤ 1.
Similar to the other cases, high net returns and/or low marginal costs can push pI
i,2
beyond 1, and thus we set pI
i,t
:= 1 in these cases.
Step 4: Comparison to boundary points
The inferiority of boundary points follows directly from the (strict) convexity of Ui.
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D.1 Statistics
DAX Stock Trading volume [EUR] Submissions Executions
High Trading Volume
Daimler AG 2,878,824,761 170,317 161,167
BASF SE 1,895,009,981 97,310 92,951
Allianz SE 1,751,893,157 83,149 78,932
Volkswagen AG 1,709,763,141 87,879 82,535
Deutsche Bank AG 1,625,199,132 103,769 96,536
Commerzbank AG 1,347,282,920 93,959 87,311
Siemens AG 1,128,144,976 63,834 60,560
Deutsche Telekom AG 1,113,196,399 77,900 74,123
E.ON SE 879,639,827 75,053 70,742
Munich Re AG 790,393,581 38,902 36,975
Total (High) 15,119,347,874 892,072 841,832
Medium Trading Volume
Bayer AG 753,049,363 40,316 38,342
Deutsche Post AG 710,822,205 47,692 45,601
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 707,565,780 52,246 48,978
BMW AG 588,956,034 35,811 33,910
Infineon Technologies AG 576,222,195 39,339 37,016
SAP SE 539,192,253 38,576 36,694
RWE AG 472,087,701 38,415 36,265
Linde AG 429,160,228 25,347 24,252
Adidas AG 406,272,085 27,746 26,530
Continental AG 371,871,258 18,602 17,710
Total (Medium) 5,555,199,102 364,090 345,298
Low Trading Volume
thyssenkrupp AG 325,780,643 28,745 27,081
Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA 281,528,879 21,004 20,003
ProSiebenSat.1 Media SE 207,858,196 17,796 16,800
HeidelbergCement AG 188,301,059 12,498 11,962
Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA 187,662,133 12,878 12,215
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA 183,770,006 12,005 11,393
Merck KGaA 167,651,636 10,939 10,351
Deutsche Börse AG 159,721,055 11,738 11,125
Vonovia SE 113,569,486 10,396 9,797
Beiersdorf AG 84,097,020 6,283 6,000
Total (Low) 1,899,940,114 144,282 136,727
Total 22,574,487,089 1,400,444 1,323,857
TABLE D.1: Volume groups
Volume groups based on the EUR trading volume, the number of submissions, and the number of
executions at the Stuttgart stock exchange during the observation period (2013 to 2017).
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Statistics
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Trading Days 253 252 253 237 236 1,231 Trading Days 253 252 253 237 236 1,231
Total Submissions Total Executions
Total 324,487 272,297 301,193 281,872 220,595 1,400,444 Total 307,771 257,521 286,388 264,048 208,129 1,323,857
High 207,377 173,235 193,444 189,960 128,056 892,072 High 196,011 163,782 183,782 177,954 120,303 841,832
Medium 86,008 73,755 78,877 65,611 59,839 364,090 Medium 82,137 69,788 75,117 61,261 56,995 345,298
Low 31,102 25,307 28,872 26,301 32,700 144,282 Low 29,623 23,951 27,489 24,833 30,831 136,727
Submissions per Day Executions per Day
Total - Average 1,282.56 1,080.54 1,190.49 1,189.33 934.72 1,137.65 Total - Average 1,216.49 1,021.91 1,131.97 1,114.13 881.90 1,075.43
Median 1,220.00 1,005.50 1,069.00 1,083.00 876.00 1,060.00 Median 1,155.00 929.00 1,019.00 1,015.00 823.00 997.00
Standard Deviation 360.72 402.92 520.22 720.32 320.50 498.39 Standard Deviation 355.08 400.30 514.72 697.01 314.47 487.57
High - Average 819.67 687.44 764.60 801.52 542.61 724.67 High - Average 774.75 649.93 726.41 750.86 509.76 683.86
Median 777.00 630.00 674.00 728.00 512.00 662.00 Median 731.00 587.50 646.00 680.00 473.50 620.00
Standard Deviation 264.24 271.44 364.58 535.85 195.21 359.04 Standard Deviation 262.23 269.55 359.65 516.36 191.24 350.07
Medium - Average 339.95 292.68 311.77 276.84 253.56 295.77 Medium - Average 324.65 276.94 296.91 258.49 241.50 280.50
Median 320.00 263.00 285.00 253.00 235.50 273.00 Median 306.00 246.50 268.00 237.00 222.00 257.00
Standard Deviation 99.70 122.46 135.92 148.37 99.24 125.92 Standard Deviation 98.03 121.21 135.10 144.80 97.90 124.11
Low - Average 122.93 100.42 114.12 110.97 138.56 117.21 Low - Average 117.09 95.04 108.65 104.78 130.64 111.07
Median 116.00 91.50 103.00 101.00 117.00 106.00 Median 109.00 84.00 98.00 97.00 110.00 100.00
Standard Deviation 44.05 45.10 54.43 62.60 84.39 60.77 Standard Deviation 43.40 43.97 53.68 60.85 82.56 59.38
Shares per Trade Trading Volume per Day [EUR]
Total - Average 579.24 565.27 478.15 558.14 588.53 551.91 Total - Average 19,455,634 17,823,060 20,331,201 17,557,332 16,338,639 18,338,332
Median 200.00 160.00 130.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 Median 18,070,182 16,655,422 18,742,236 16,210,178 15,409,822 16,925,251
Standard Deviation 1,955.92 1,721.49 1,422.17 1,891.90 1,754.31 1,761.46 Standard Deviation 6,661,126 7,736,631 9,671,249 9,550,444 6,449,342 8,241,854
High - Average 597.98 598.49 462.84 614.08 711.11 588.14 High - Average 12,942,418 12,161,910 13,794,422 12,056,780 10,307,920 12,282,167
Median 195.00 160.00 110.00 150.00 170.00 150.00 Median 11,941,958 11,343,034 12,674,440 10,842,951 9,471,874 11,159,156
Standard Deviation 2,043.62 1,808.44 1,474.51 2,161.38 2,077.36 1,921.80 Standard Deviation 5,060,658 5,739,640 7,128,774 7,053,992 4,804,935 6,136,795
Medium - Average 592.77 562.77 587.57 493.75 476.19 548.77 Medium - Average 4,886,115 4,305,437 5,082,196 4,059,208 4,178,873 4,512,753
Median 189.00 170.00 192.00 140.00 120.00 150.00 Median 4,515,928 3,793,530 4,706,574 3,605,665 3,808,895 4,138,044
Standard Deviation 2,028.88 1,743.56 1,493.50 1,254.98 1,339.12 1,629.86 Standard Deviation 1,848,190 1,996,051 2,447,861 2,213,432 1,806,268 2,114,017
Low - Average 417.81 345.38 281.53 316.11 317.93 336.73 Low - Average 1,627,102 1,355,713 1,454,584 1,441,344 1,851,846 1,543,412
Median 200.00 160.00 110.00 120.00 100.00 150.00 Median 1,468,654 1,144,763 1,241,672 1,225,662 1,610,711 1,342,409
Standard Deviation 818.41 765.61 606.61 778.06 683.28 734.30 Standard Deviation 764,644 847,508 779,826 947,779 1,043,229 895,423
TABLE D.2: Detailed summary statistics of the input sample by year and volume group.XLIII
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D.2 Replicated Market Outcomes
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FIGURE D.1: Comparative statics market outcomes VW AG
Each panel illustrates the replicated trade prices or trading volumes for VW AG in 2013 (253
trading days), while holding either the BS or the BCT fixed. Prices are computed as daily averages
and volumes as daily totals. The line color indicates the respective blockchain configuration (BS,
BCT).
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FIGURE D.2: Comparative statics market outcomes SAP SE
Each panel illustrates the replicated trade prices or trading volumes for SAP SE in 2013 (253
trading days), while holding either the BS or the BCT fixed. Prices are computed as daily averages
and volumes as daily totals. The line color indicates the respective blockchain configuration (BS,
BCT).
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FIGURE D.3: Comparative statics market outcomes Deutsche Börse AG
Each panel illustrates the replicated trade prices or trading volumes for Deutsche Börse AG in
2013 (253 trading days), while holding either the BS or the BCT fixed. Prices are computed
as daily averages and volumes as daily totals. The line color indicates the respective blockchain
configuration (BS, BCT).
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D.3 Robustness
Dependent Variable: ATS (daily avg) ATS (daily sum) RQP (daily avg) ABI ·104 (daily avg)
Independent Variable (Full Specification, per day) (Full Specification, per day) (Full Specification, per day) (Full Specification, per day)
Intercept 8,741.04 *** 318,017.44 *** 0.5245 * -417.5691
(31.32) (14.07) (2.26) (-1.04)
279.11 22,600.83 0.2321 400.9959
Blockchain Parameters
BS 28.49 *** 1,509.55 *** -0.0865 *** 35.6595 ***
(57.39) (37.55) (-209.54 ) (50.00)
0.50 40.20 0.0004 0.7132
BCT 0.08 *** 24.13 *** -0.0001 ** -0.2204 ***
(8.37) (31.50) (-6.81) (-16.22)
0.01 0.77 0.0000 0.0520
BS*BCT -0.06 *** -2.22 *** 0.0001 *** -0.0309 ***
(-55.41) (-23.66) (149.74) (-18.58)
0.00 0.09 0.0000 0.0017
Activity Controls
VG 218.77 *** 14,790.58 *** 0.0035 -57.0188 ***
(22.43) (18.73) (0.43) (-4.07)
9.75 789.68 0.0081 14.0108
VG*BS -2.64 *** -289.55 *** 0.0140 *** -7.9369 ***
(-20.76) (-28.11) (132.73) (-43.42)
0.13 10.30 0.0001 0.1828
VG*BCT -0.00 -23.87 *** -0.0004 *** 0.1081 ***
(-0.84) (-63.95) (-116.00) (5.50)
0.00 0.37 0.0000 0.0066
OQ 0.02 *** 2.03 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0011 ***
(177.88) (180.66) (120.62) (6.68)
0.00 0.01 0.0000 0.0000
OQ*BS -0.00 *** 0.04 *** -0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(-87.29) (104.79) (-55.06) (6.68)
0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000
OQ*BCT 0.00 *** -0.01 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ***
(65.14) (-95.13) (-27.94) (-12.35)
0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000
Quality Controls
LnReturn 10.31 -41.31 -0.0034 -87.5039 ***
(2.08) (-0.10) (-0.83) (-12.30)
4.95 400.83364 0.0041 7.1118
SDPrice -1.58 *** -79.90 *** -0.0003 64.8309 ***
(-7.16) (-4.46) (-1.61) (204.04)
0.22 991.60 0.0002 0.3177
LnSize -373.47 *** -14,062.03 *** 0.0079 19.8261
(-30.50) (-14.18) (0.77) (1.13)
0.22 991.60 0.0102 17.5935
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intraday Fixed Effects No No No No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 302,493 302,493 302,493 302,493
Average 268.69 13,183.86 0.4627 64.29
F-statistics 15,526.20 *** 11,262.20 *** 5,721.88 *** 1,241.77 ***
R2ad j 0.6884 0.6157 0.4487 0.1500
TABLE D.3: Robustness – Number of Blocks
This table presents full specification regressions (model 6) with block-level measures aggregated to
stock-day-configurations (equal-weighted averages and totals, i.e. sums). Particularly, the daily
sum of the ATS is equal to the daily number of traded shares. We report β coefficients, t-statistics
(in parentheses), and standard errors for each variable. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
0.1%, 1% and 5% level.
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Quality Dimension Activity Liquidity Information
Dependent Variable: TC TO ATS DILLIQ RQP ABI
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -108.44 -2,144,752.55 156.71 161.0954 0.7995 269.4001
(-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
345,790.91
4,997,767,543.00
492244.35
8,388,148.8890
245.4898 497,006.6214
Blockchain Parameters
BS -0.38 ** 54,851.64 *** 20.75 *** 7.6942 ** -0.0864 *** 41.1652 ***
(-3.27) (32.42) (12.77) (2.71) (-104.38) (27.94)
0.12 1,692.00 1.62 2.8390 0.0008 1.4734
BCT -0.02 *** 256.96 *** 0.05 -0.3760 *** -0.0000 ** -0.2945 ***
(-8.75) (7.94) (1.45) (-6.92) (-2.61) (-9.09)
0.00 32.00 0.04 0.0540 0.0000 0.0324
BS·BCT 0.01 *** -103.44 *** -0.05 *** 0.0012 0.0001 *** -0.0326 ***
(27.42) (-26.04) (-22.28) (0.18) (123.52) (-16.14)
0.00 4.00 0.00 0.0070 0.0000 0.0020
Activity Controls
VG 17.37 *** 249,452.82 *** -41.05 -10.6210 -0.0083 -20.4891
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
10,755.36
155,448,802.00
15310.60 260,902.0290 7.6356 15,458.7192
VG·BS -0.57 *** -6,048.45 *** -1.63 ** -2.7331 *** 0.0149 *** -9.4650 ***
(-18.98) (-14.04) (-3.20) (-3.78) (57.50) (-20.52)
0.03 431.00 0.51 0.7230 0.0003 0.4612
VG·BCT -0.04 *** -373.38 *** 0.01 0.1330 *** -0.0005 *** 0.1109 ***
(-37.96) (-23.40) (0.89) (4.97) (-56.09) (7.40)
0.00 16.00 0.02 0.0270 0.0000 0.0150
OQ 0.00 *** 0.72 *** 0.05 *** -0.0000 0.0000 *** -0.0015 ***
(56.95) (45.00) (313.36) (-0.69) (159.06) (-11.11)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
OQ·BS 0.00 *** 0.189 *** -0.00 *** 0.0000 -0.0000 *** 0.0001 ***
(30.92) (32.98) (-34.52) (0.32) (-29.54) (6.89)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OQ·BCT -0.00 *** 0.004 *** 0.00 *** -0.0000 -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *
(-16.87) (6.39) (5.80) (-0.56) (-9.62) (-2.07)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Quality Controls
LnReturn 1.85 30754.77 * -0.19 -453.3191 *** -0.0064 * 0.0074 ***
(1.96) (2.25) (-0.03) (-19.80) (-2.27) (14.56)
0.94 13640.00 5.58 22.8930 0.0028 0.0005
SDPrice 1.10 *** 5,017.49 *** -0.12 11.5977 *** -0.0015 *** 0.0042 ***
(19.77) (6.24) (-0.32) (8.60) (-7.54) (120.22)
0.06 804.00 0.39 1.3490 0.0002 0.0000
LnSize 4.75 80,953.96 -0.37 -5.5876 -0.0012 -0.0010
(0.00) (0,00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
15,028.94
217,215,455.00
21,394.17 364,569.8930 10.6696 2.1601
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intraday Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 59,910 59,910 688,931 59,910 688,931 688,931
Average 30.37 328,524.40 295.17 21.59 0.5603 62.12
F-statistics 1,816.99 *** 1,711.48 *** 5,367.28 *** 21.51 *** 1,750.44 *** 475.22 ***
R2ad j 0.5491 0.5343 0.2968 0.0136 0.1209 0.0360
TABLE D.4: Robustness – Alternative trading hours
This table presents full specification regressions (model 6) with a modified data panel for each
MQM. Consistent with Xetra’s trading hours, we only consider orders submitted between 9 a.m.
and 5.30 p.m. to replicate market outcomes for 2017. We report β coefficients, t-statistics (in
parentheses), and standard errors for each variable, while ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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Dependent Variable: TC TO ATS BI BI
Independent Variables (Full Specification (Full Specification (Full Specification (Full Specification (Full Specification
with RQP) with RQP) with RQP) BD = +1) BD = -1)
Intercept 275.90 *** -2,370,305.00 *** 511.23 2,130.87 *** -110.83
(7.80) (-5.48) (0.00) (8.92) (-0.00)
35.39 432,425.73 202,521.75 238.98 140,702.75
Blockchain Parameters
BS -3.01 *** 37,149.93 *** -104.75 *** 22.98 *** 44.44 ***
(-47.12) (47.61) (-379.66) (45.20) (64.28)
0.06 780.36 0.28 0.51 0.69
BCT -0.02 *** 277.21 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 -0.23 ***
(-15.85) (18.61) (-30.29) (-15.83) (-15.48)
0.00 14.90 0.01 0.01 0.01
BS·BCT 0.02 *** -70.23 *** 0.34 *** -0.02 *** -0.03 ***
(104.47) (-38.87) (898.16) (-26.98) (-32.53)
0.00 1.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
Activity Controls
VG 37.09 *** 291,311.63 *** 4.00 34.70 *** -22.32
(29.98) (19.28) (0.00) (4.07) (-0.01)
1.24 15,113.17 6,299.17 8.53 4,376.37
VG·BS -0.38 *** -1,729.68 *** 3.44 *** -5.03 *** -10.44 ***
(-23.27) (-8.64) (39.69) (-31.16) (-49.01)
0.02 200.30 0.09 0.16 0.21
VG·BCT -0.05 *** -382.91 *** -0.17 *** 0.06 ** 0.10 ***
(-89.99) (-51.93) (-59.65) (11.46) (13.26)
0.00 7.37 0.00 0.01 0.01
OQ 0.00 *** 12.99 *** 0.40 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *
(336.13) (316.24) (4758.98) (0.70) (-1.97)
0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 -
OQ·BS 0.00 *** 0.03 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(10.77) (8.88) (-438.92) (5.51) (5.04)
0.00 0.00 - - -
OQ·BCT -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 ***
(-52.24) (-8.59) (-1963.0) (-9.55) (-7.34)
0.00 0.00 - - -
RQP -0.00 *** -12.86 *** -0.40 ***
(-307.49) (-288.60) (-4395.3)
0.00 0.04 0.00
RQP·BS -0.00 *** -0.15 *** 0.00 ***
(-19.37) (-22.22) (165.77)
0.03 0.01 -
RQP·BCT 0.00 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 ***
(25.67) (13.61) (1300.41)
0.00 0.00 -
Quality Controls
LnReturn -1.75 ** 2,945.91 0.70 0.02 *** -0.00 ***
(-2.78) (0.38) (0.51) (72.30) (-13.08)
0.63 7,665.10 1.39 0.00 0.00
SDPrice 1.21 *** 10,070.88 *** 0.45 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(43.09) (29.41) (7.76) (320.30) (298.55)
0.03 342.39 0.06 0.00 0.00
LnSize -12.22 *** 88,178.38 *** -10.24 -0.01 *** 0.00
(-7.87) (4.65) (-0.00) (-8.65) (0.00)
1.55 18,972.46 8,802.10 0.00 0.61
Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intraday Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 302,493 302,493 4,546,605 2,211,991 2,307,771
Average 39.95 403,507.10 279.40 0.0049 0.0048
F-statistics 12,838.50 *** 12,589.50 *** 436,505.00 *** 2,021.68 *** 1,808.96 ***
R2ad j 0.6615 0.6571 0.8638 0.0537 0.0471
TABLE D.5: Robustness – Additional controls and block direction
This table shows the regression results with RQP as additional control (columns 1 to 3) and for
subsets with a positive (column 4) and a negative block direction (column 5). Blocks with a block
direction of 0 are excluded. We report β coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses) and standard
errors for each variable, while ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level,
respectively.
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FIGURE D.4: Impact of Block Creation Time Variations – Compared means ∆ BCT
This figure provides boxplots that illustrate the market quality changes (∆ MQM) that come
with increasing the BCT from 10 to 60 and 60 to 300 minutes respectively. All plots are based
on daily averages, while the underlying data was winsorized at the 1% level to improve the visual
representation.
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